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Abstract 
Name: Lu Lu 
Title of the Thesis: The Exceptions in Documentary 
Credits in English Law 
The main subject of this thesis is the exceptions in documentary credits in 
English law. The exceptions were established during the development of the 
documentary credits system to solve drawbacks of the payment means 
caused by its distinctive feature of autonomy. A rationale of the research is 
the current decline of the market share of documentary credits as a 
recognized means of settlement in international trade. This thesis aims to 
explore an appropriate and efficient way to apply certain necessary 
exceptions in documentary credits system. And hopefully, the current high 
rate of the rejection of the documents by banks by relying on the strict 
compliance principle can be decreased by the improving of the application of 
exceptions in documentary credits. 
The research centres primary the application of the exceptions in English law. 
An early study of the original development of the fraud exception will cover 
both English and American authorities. Because there is no statute law in 
English law to regulate the exceptions in documentary credits, the thesis will 
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analyse the exceptions mostly through the case law. The main exceptions 
analysed in the thesis are the fraud rule, the illegality exception and the nullity 
exception. The application pattern for the three exceptions will be worked out 
respectively; the specific application of the injunction rules in applying the 
fraud rule will be concluded during the analysis of the fraud rule; some 
common features in the application among the exceptions will also be 
summarized in the thesis. An effort is made to suggest a prospective 
development of exceptions, which is in consistent with the autonomy principle. 
And as the necessary exceptions are applied efficiently, the disputes existing 
in documentary credits system currently may be settled without the appliance 
of any explanatory rules. 
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Introduction 
Documentary credits have been used as the main means of payments in 
international trade transactions for over 200 years. Despite the advantages of 
the system, the separation between the documents and the goods, which is 
the fundamental principle of documentary credits - the autonomy principle -
may also cause many problems, such like frauds and the abuse of the credit. 
The recent decline of the market share of documentary credits as a 
recognised means of settlement in international trade clearly exposed the 
negative effect caused by the serious drawbacks within the documentary 
credits system. According to a survey leading to the UCP600'' revision, 
approximately 70% of documents presented under letters of credit were 
being rejected on first presentation because of discrepancies. The strict 
compliance doctrine has become the best way for banks to avoid payment. 
The lack and inefficiency of necessary exceptions may be one of the reasons 
which caused the high rate of rejection of documents on the basis of strict 
compliance. The new phenomenon of applying an additional warranty to 
restrict the beneficiary's title in achieving payment further reflected the 
necessity of an analysis to the exceptions in documentary credits, which is 
the core content of the thesis. 
^ The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) is a set of rules on the 
issuance and use of letters of credit. The UCP was first published by the ICC (International 
Chamber of Commerce) in 1933. UCP 600 is the latest version of the UCP. 
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This thesis is composed of five chapters. The first chapter is generally a 
background study in the documentary credits system. The main operation 
process, essential principles, the internal contractual relationships and some 
other fundamental issues are all discussed in this chapter as an introduction. 
In the end of chapter one, a comparison among documentary credits and 
other popular payment types reflects the problems in the current 
documentary credits system. The rationale of the thesis to analyse the 
exceptions within the system is further pointed out by the appearance of the 
application of additional warranties in documentary credits system. 
As the first and most important exception in documentary credits, the fraud 
rule is analysed in both chapter two and chapter three. Chapter two mainly 
focuses on the establishment and original development of the fraud rule in 
both American law and English law. Although the root of the fraud rule in 
England and Wales comes from the old American Case Sztejn v. J. Henry 
Schroder banking Corporation^, English courts applied a different test, other 
than the "material fraud" test of the United States, in identifying the fraud in 
the application of the fraud rule. A comparison between the two standards of 
application will also be made in the second chapter. The third chapter begins 
with research into a different application of the fraud rule at the pre-trial stage 
in English law. The reasonableness and the different tests for the application 
are both discussed in this chapter. The special rule for granting an 
^ Sztejn K J. Henry Schroder banking Corporation (1941) N.Y.S.2d 631. 
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interlocutory injunction in fraud cases is also one of the main essentials in 
chapter 3. 
Chapter four turns to investigate another established exception in 
documentary credits in English law, the illegality exception. The necessity of 
the existence of the illegality exception and the conditions for its practical 
application are analysed in this chapter. Some other issues which are also 
relevant to the fraud rule, such like the reliance principle, the crucial time for 
established evidence, and so on, are discussed in chapter four as well. 
Chapter five, which is the last chapter of the thesis, examines the nullity 
exception, which has not been clearly recognised in English law. The 
research in this chapter provides strong support for the application of the 
nullity exception. A narrow application of the nullity exception is justified by 
the analysis of related English authorities. Some common features among 
the application of the three exceptions are summarised in the end of the 
thesis. Finally, the thesis exploits the potentialities of the development of 
those exceptions in documentary credits. The improvement of the exceptions 
may also benefit the growth of the documentary credits system. 
14 
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Chapter One: A Study in Documentary Credits 
System 
Preface: 
To start the research in exceptions in documentary credits, it is essential to 
have a background study in the documentary credit system itself. The first 
chapter of the thesis starts with an introduction of the documentary credit 
system, including its general operation, contractual relationships and the two 
fundamental principles. The study also introduces the main reasons and 
necessity of the research of exceptions in documentary credits. 
15 
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/. The Operation of Documentary Credits 
A documentary credit is an assurance by the bank that payment will be made 
to the seller in exchange for the presentation of certain documents which 
have been specified in the credit. Generally, the documentary credit operates 
using certain procedures: following the contract which signed between the 
buyer and the seller, the buyer, as the applicant, requests his bank to issue a 
credit in favour of the beneficiary seller; according to the instructions of the 
buyer, the issuing bank then opens the credit and requests a nominated bank 
to notify the seller the opening of the credit and the terms and conditions in 
the credits, by issuing the credit, the issuing bank undertakes an absolute 
obligation to pay against the documents stipulated in the credit; the 
nominated bank may confirmed the credit if requested by the seller, by 
confirming the credit, the nominated bank, as the confirming bank, also 
undertakes an absolute obligation to pay against the documents. At this stage, 
the documentary credit is established independently from the underlying 
contract. After the shipment of the goods, the seller presents the stipulated 
documents to the nominated bank (probably the conforming bank) to ask for 
the payment. The nominated bank checks the documents according to the 
terms of the credit, pay against the documents if the documents are 
complying with the credit. Then the nominated bank sends the documents to 
the issuing bank for reimbursement, and the issuing bank has to reimburse 
the nominated bank if the documents conform to the terms of the credit. In 
the end, the buyer collects the documents from the issuing bank then 
presents them to the carrier to take the delivery of the goods. The buyer may 
16 
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reimburse the issuing bank before or after receiving the documents, 
depending on the arrangement between the parties. Because of the complex 
operation of documentary credits, the contractual relationships involved in it 
are even more complicated. The bank plays the essential role in 
documentary credit transactions. It is the bank who connects the buyer and 
seller when the payment going through. The security provided by the 
documentary credit is highly relying on the bank's credit. 
Z The Contractual Relationships in Documentary Credits 
2.1. The contractual relationship between the buyer and the 
Issuing bank 
The underlying contract, which is usually a sales contract, is the basis for the 
existence of documentary credits. No Documentary credits, by their nature, 
are separate transactions from the underlying contracts on which they may 
be based.' The process of establishing a letter of credit begins with the buyer 
requesting the bank to issue a letter of credit in favour of the seller.^  After the 
bank accepts the buyer's application of issuing the credit, the contract 
between buyer and the issuing bank established. The bank, as the agent of 
the buyer, then undertakes an obligation to pay the seller against conforming 
documents according to the terms and conditions agreed in the contract and 
^ See Article 4 of UCP 600. Supra note 1 in "Introduction" section of tiie thesis. 
^ Ricliard King, "Gutteridge and Megrah's Law of Bankers' Commercial Credits" (8th edn, 
Routledge, 2001), p. 55. 
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to take "reasonable care"^ in examining the documents before the payment. 
Article 7 of UCP 600 specified the undertaking of the issuing bank as follows: 
"Article 7 Issuing Bank Undertaking 
a. Provided that the stipulated docuinents are 
presented to... the issuing bank and that they 
constitute a complying presentation, the issuing 
bank must honour... 
b. An issuing bank is irrevocably bound to honour 
as of the time it issues the credit..."^ 
The issuing bank's obligation to pay against documents is independent from 
the underlying contract between the buyer and the seller. He is required to 
make the decision whether to pay the beneficiary seller solely depending on 
the documents. The issuing bank owes the applicant buyer a duty of 
examining the facial conforming of documents. Standard for examination of 
documents is also specified in UCP 600: 
"Article 14 Standard for Examination of Documents 
a. ...the issuing bank must examine a presentation 
to determine, on the basis of the documents alone, 
whether or not the documents appear on their face 
to Constitute a complying presentation. 
b. . . .the issuing bank shall each have a maximum of 
five banking days following the day of presentation 
to determine if a presentation is complying. This 
period is not curtailed or otherwise affected by the 
occurrence on or after the date of presentation of 
any expiry date or last day for presentation. 
As long as the issuing bank takes reasonable care and follows the buyer's 
instruction in examining the documents, it performs its obligation under the 
contract with the buyer. It is essential, however, that the bank shows that it 
has carried out, in all their strictness, the buyer's instructions as specified in 
the contract between the buyer and the bank resulting in the issue of the 
^ The term "reasonable care" is used to be In the old version of the UCP until UCP 500. This 
term was omitted in UCP 600. 
" Article 7 of UCP 600, p. 16. 
5 Ibid, p. 24. 
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credit.^ Otherwise, the issuing bank will not be able to get the reimbursement 
from the applicant buyer. In the old case of Equitable Tmst Co of New Yorl< v 
Dawson Partner LtcP, It was held that the bank was not entitled to the 
reimbursement because the bank accepted a certificate which was not 
conforming to the requirement of the credit. Lord Sumner said: 
"What [the bank] tendered, as one of the documents 
and as the only certificate of quality, was one issued 
by only one expect who was a sworn broker, and by 
nobody else. There is really no question here of 
waiver or estoppel or of negligence or of breach of 
a contract of employment to use XBasoaabla care and 
skill. The case rests entirely on performance of the 
conditions precedent to the right of indemnity, 
which is provided for in the letter of credit. It 
is both common ground and common sense that in such 
a transaction the accepting bank can only claim 
indemnity if the conditions on which it is authorised 
to accept are in the matter of accompanying documents 
strictly observed. There is no room for documents 
which are almost the same, or which will do just as 
well. Business could not proceed securely on any 
other lines. The bank's branch abroad, which knows 
nothing officially of the details of the transaction 
thus financed, cannot take upon itself to decide what 
will do well enough and what will not. If it does 
as it is told, it is safe; if it declines to do 
anything else it is safe; xf dt departs from the 
conditions laid down, it acts as its own risk. The 
documents rendered were not exactly the document 
which the defendants had promised to take up. And 
prima facie they were right in refusing to take 
them."8 
Equalled to the obligation of the issuing bank to take a reasonable care to 
examine the documents, the applicant buyer is obliged to reimburse the 
issuing bank as long as the issuing bank performed its obligation. And the 
only obligation which the bank has to perform is to pay reasonable care to 
examine the documents standardized in UCP 600. In the case of Gian Singh 
^ See Richard King, "Gutteridge and Megrali's Law of Bankers' Commercial Credits", p. 60, 
supra note 1. 
^ Equitable Trust Co of New York v. Dawson Partner Ltd {1927) 27 LI.L.R. 49. 
8 Ibid, 52. 
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& Co Ltd V. Banque de L'/ndoch/'ne^, even though the falsehood of a 
docunnent was proved, the bank was held entitled to the reimbursement 
because reasonable care had been showed during the examining of 
documents. Lord Diplock said during the judgment that: 
"In business transactions financed by documentary 
c redi t s banks must be able to act promptly on 
presentation of the document, in the ordinary case 
visual inspection of the actual document presented 
i s a l l that i s called for. The bank is under no duty 
to take any further steps to invest igate the 
signature of the person named or described in the 
l e t t e r or c red i t . "^ ° 
Lord Diplock's words shows cleared that the obligation of the buyer to 
reimbursement the bank are independent from any other disputes in the 
underlying contracts or even in the documents as long as the bank performed 
its responsibility. And the bank's responsibility is only to pay a reasonable 
care in examining the conformity documents and made the decision in time. 
The contractual relationship between the buyer and the issuing bank also 
reflects the relationship between the issuing bank and the seller beneficiary. 
2.2. The contractual relationship between the Issuing bank and the 
seller beneficiary 
The contractual relationship established between the issuing bank and the 
seller when the bank issues the credit and notifies the seller. Although the 
effect of the contact between the issuing bank and the seller depends upon 
^ Gian Singh & Co Ltd V. Banque de L'Jndoch/ne [191 A] 2 Lloyd's Rep 1. Gian Singh \s. even 
a more important case In the research of the fraud exception. See later in Chapter 2, section 
5.22. 
10 Ibid, 1 1 . 
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whether the credit is irrevocable or revocable,^•' UCP 600 interpreted that "A 
credit is irrevocable even if there is no indication to that effect."^^ Under an 
irrevocable credit the issuing bank gives a binding undertaking to the 
beneficiary that it will pay against documents in compliance with the terms of 
the credit.""^ The effect of an irrevocable credit is to substitute the issuing 
bank for the buyer, as the person who signs the sales contract with the seller, 
and promises to pay against the shipping documents.'''* In other words, by 
establishing an irrevocable credit relationship with the seller, the issuing bank 
undertakes an absolute obligation to pay the seller beneficiary as long as the 
documents of title presented by the documents are in order, the documents 
are complying with the credit. The bank's responsibility is independent to the 
sale contract between the seller and the buyer. The controversy between the 
seller and the buyer in the underlying contract will not affect the bank's 
responsibility of payment. As Rowlatt J said in Stein v. Hambros Bank of 
Nort/iem Commerve'^^: 
"The obligation of the bank is absolute, and is meant 
to be absolute, that when the documents are presented 
they have to accept the bill. That is the commercial 
meaning of it." 
However, similar to the buyer's obligation to reimburse the issuing bank, the 
issuing bank's obligation of payment is also subject to the seller's 
responsibility of presenting conforming documents. Although the issuing bank 
^^  See Richard King, "Gutteridge and Megrah's Law of Bankers' Commercial Credits", p.74, 
supra note 1. 
12 See Article 3 of UCP 600. 
1^  In M.A. Sassoon & Sons Ltd v International Banking Corporation [1927] AC 711, 724. It 
was said by Lord Sumner that:" It is not easy to see in what respect [the word 'irrevocable'] 
would carry the matter further than the word 'contract', used in its strict sense, would have 
done, for... the word 'irrevocable' simply closed the door on any option or locus penitentiae, 
and makes the agreement definite and blinding — in other words, creates a true contract, 
which will either be performed or be broken." 
1" See Urquhard Lindsay & Co. Ltd v. Eastern Bank Ltd [1922] 1 KB 318, 323. 
15 Stein K Hambros Bank of Northern Commerce {1921) 9 LI.L.R 433, 507.'See also 
Scrutton LJ in DonaldH. Scott & Co Ltd \/ Barclays Bank LtA [1923] 2 K.B. 1 at 14. 
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cannot refuse payment relying on any defence that may be open to the buyer 
on the underlying contract, it will still have the right to refuse payment if the 
documents presented are not complying with the credit. The UCP 600 
represents the bank's rights in rejecting nonconforming documents in Article 
16 as follows: 
"Article 16 Discrepant Documents, Waiver and Notice 
a. When ... the issuing bank determines that a 
presentation does not comply, it may refuse to honour 
or negotiate. 
b. When an issuing bank determines that a 
presentation does not comply, it may in its sole 
judgement approach the applicant for a waiver of the 
discrepancies."" 
The issuing bank's entitlement of rejecting payment is because of the seller's 
responsibility of representing the conforming documents. As the bank takes 
the position of the buyer to promise to buy the complying documents, the 
seller also owes the duty of presenting conforming documents. One of most 
important reasons why the documentary credit system can work is because 
the value of the document is standing for the goods in the underlying contract. 
The documentary credit transaction asks the issuing bank to undertake the 
obligation of payment, but also offers a security interest to the issuing bank 
since the bank may be seen as in hold of the contractual goods as long as it 
holds the conforming documents. Hence, it is not only the obligation which 
arises from the sale contract for the seller to present the conforming 
documents; the security interest which is provided by the documentary credit 
transaction for the bank also requires the bank to present the documents 
complying to the credit. Otherwise, the bank is entitled to reject the payment. 
Of course, the bank should be ready to be challenged by the beneficiary 
16 See Article 16 of UCP 600. 
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seller in the trial for wrongful dishonour if it decides to reject the documents. 
2.3. The contractual relationship between the intermediary bank 
and the issuing bank or seller beneficiary 
Documentary credits are more popular in international transactions where the 
seller and the buyer are located in different countries. In this case, an 
intermediary bank in the seller's country is usually introduced into the credit 
contract. This arrangement may provide the seller better security than dealing 
with a bank in a foreign country. The relationship between the issuing bank 
and the intermediary bank will depend upon the role which the intermediary 
bank is playing. 
The intermediary bank may merely give the notice of the credit to the 
beneficiary, in this case, no real contractual liability will arise between the 
advising bank and the seller. The advising bank only works as agent for the 
issuing bank and has a limited liability to take reasonable care to check the 
facial conforming of the documents presented by the seller. However, if the 
advising bank is unable to establish the apparent authenticity of the 
documents, it must inform the issuing bank without delay. This is all the 
obligation the advising bank owes to the issuing bank under UCP 600;^^ but 
an advising bank may be authorized as the nominated bank, on behalf of the 
^^  See UCP 600, Article 9. "... b. By advising the credit or amendment, the advising banl< 
signifies that it has satisfied itself as to the apparent authenticity of the credit or 
amendment and that the advice accurately reflects the terms and conditions of the credit or 
amendment received.... e. If a bank is requested to advise a credit or amendment but elects 
not to do so, it must so inform, without delay, the bank from which the credit, amendment 
or advice has been received, f. If a bank is requested to advise a credit or amendment but 
cannot satisfy itself as to the apparent authenticity of the credit, the amendment or the 
advice, it must so inform, without delay, the bank from which the instructions appear to 
have been received..,". 
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issuing bank, to pay against the documents. However, unless the nominated 
bank chose to confirm the payment under the credit, the nominated bank is 
not bound to pay against the beneficiary's documents. But by authorizing the 
nominated bank to pay, the issuing bank undertakes the obligation of 
reimbursement to the nominated bank as long as it pays against the facially 
conforming documents. Of course, it will be another story if the nominated 
bank chose to confirm the credit. By confirming the credit, the nominated 
bank becomes the confirming bank which undertakes the same absolute 
obligation to pay against conforming documents. The conforming bank's 
undertaking is specified in Article 8 of UCP 600: 
"a. Provided that the s t ipula ted documents are 
presented to the confirming bank . . . t h e confirming 
bank must honor. . . 
b. A confirming bank is irrevocably bound to honour 
or negotiate as of the time i t adds i t s confirmation 
to the c r e d i t . . . " . 
Of course, the issuing bank is bound to reimburse the conforming bank as 
long as the conforming bank pays against conforming documents. In the case 
of Byserische Aktiengesellschaft v. National Bank of Pakistaii^^, it was held 
that the issuing bank was liable to the confirming bank in damages because it 
failed to reimburse the confirming bank.""^  However, the confirming bank, 
unlike the mere nominated bank but similar to the issuing bank, also 
undertakes an obligation to pay the beneficiary seller against conforming 
documents. In this case, the beneficiary obtains the undertaking from both 
the issuing bank and the confirming bank. The contractual obligations differed 
because of the different roles the intermediary bank was playing also 
introduces another question, which is the types of credit. 
^^  Byserische Aktiengesellschaft V. National Bank of Pakistan \Vi^l\ 1 Lloyd's Rep. 59. 
^' See Jason Chuah, "Law of International Trade"(4'*' edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2009), p. 436. 
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J. Types of the Credit 
The UCP has contributed to common usage of language in letters of credit 
and common meanings for various terms, however, there are different types 
of letter of credit. "Owing to the absence of any standard form of bankers' 
commercial credit it is necessary to attempt some kind of classification of the 
different types of this instrument which are in use in the business world."^^ 
The letter of credit may be classified into different types by different standard. 
For example, by reference to the method of payment, letters of credit may be 
classified into a "sight" credit, a "deferred payment" credit, an "acceptance" 
credit and a "negotiation" credit; by the transferability of the credit, letters of 
credit may be classified into a "transferable" and a "back-to-back" credit. It 
might be out of place to discuss the details of the classification of the letter of 
credit since this chapter is only a background study of documentary credits 
for the later focus of the exceptions.2'' However, it may be necessary to 
discuss further for the most important division in the classification of credits, 
which is revocable and irrevocable credit since the basic contractual 
relationships may be totally different between the two types of credits. 
Article 3 of UCP 600 states that: "A credit is irrevocable even if there is no 
indication to that effect." This means the presumption under a documentary 
credit contract is that the credit is irrevocable if there is no clear stipulation as 
to the revocability of the credit. In fact, the revocable credit offers the seller so 
limited security that the buyer may be able to cancel the credit at any time by 
°^ See Richard King, "Gutteridge and Megrah's Law of Banl<ers' Commercial Credits" (8"^ 
edn, Routledge, 2001), p. 18. 
^^  For further reading for types of letters of credit, See Richard King, "Gutteridge and 
Megrah's Law of Banl<ers' Commercial Credits", Chapter 2, p. 17 to 25, supra note 1; and 
Jason Chuan, "Law of International Trade", p. 413 to 422, supra note 18. 
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instructing the issuing bank.^ ^ In this case, the buyer is allowed to terminate 
the letter of credit and further breach the sale contract with the seller. "The 
seller is then left with little option but to seek legal redress [under the sale 
contract], which of course means inconvenience, bad publicity and costs. 
Revocable credits are therefore not popular in international trade."^^ Hence 
the credits discussed in the thesis are generally irrevocable credits. An 
irrevocable credit offers a much better security for the seller beneficiary. It 
says in Article 10 of UCP 600: 
"Article 10 Amendments 
a. Except as otherwise provided by article 38, a 
credit can neither be amended nor cancelled without 
the agreement of the issuing bank, the confirming 
bank, if any, and the benef iciary. . . "^ ^ 
A confirmed irrevocable credit even means more secure payment for the 
seller. As has been discussed earlier.^s the seller may prefer to work with a 
bank in its own country rather than one in a foreign country which is hard to 
communicate with. It may ask its own bank to add a confirmation of payment 
to the credit. The seller's bank then as the confirming bank undertakes the 
obligation of payment against the documents complying with the credit. 
Actually, confirmed letters of credit have even more advantages then the 
higher security which they offer to the seller. "Confirming letters of credit have 
not only the advantage of security as far as the seller concerned, but also of 
speed. The seller is able to claim payment as soon as documents are 
presented to his bank."^^ Those advantages of letters of credit are essential 
" Although it was not discussed directed in UCP 600, In UCP 500 Article 8(a), it said that a 
revocable credit may be amended and cancelled by the issuing bank at moment and without 
prior notice to the beneficiary. 
" See Jason Chuah, "Law of International Trade", p. 413, supra note 18. 
2" See Article 10 of UCP 600. 
2^  See section 2.3 of this chapter. 
^^  See Jason Chuah, "Law of International Trade", p. 418, supra note 18. 
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for the unshakable position of documentary credits as a main method of 
payment In international trade transactions. 
4. The Essential Security Provided by Documentary Credits ~ 
a Comparison between Documentary Credits and Other 
Payment Types 
4 . 1 . The main feature of documentary credits 
The main object of a documentary credit Is to provide a means to a buyer to 
pay for goods or services supplied by a seller. Unlike other payment means, a 
documentary credit has its own feature, which is mainly the high security. The 
documentary credits system ensured payment to the seller for the contract 
goods or services on one hand and their delivery to the buyer on the other 
hand, especially when the dealings are between merchant in different 
countries. In the operation of documentary credits system, the banks' position 
is essential. The credit is normally issued by a bank (or other financial 
facilities) to make a promise to pay against the presentation of stipulated 
documents in the credit which representing the goods. 
The documentary credits system is best suited for transactions in which the 
contractual parties are not well known to each other. In this case, it can be 
hard for the seller to trust the strange buyer to pay solely relying on his 
reputation. A further function of documentary credits is to enable the seller to 
obtain prompt payment, while allowing the buyer to postpone payment until 
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the time when he has been able to market the goods. Documentary credits 
also developed year by year to satisfy the requirements of business. 
4.2. The advantages of documentary credits contrasted to other 
means of payment 
Although the documentary credit can also be used in domestic business, it 
may be seen as much more popular in international business in \Nh\ch parties 
are not known to each other. The complex procedures of the documentary 
credit^'' provide a high security for the contractual parties. For the seller, the 
existence of the nominated bank (probably the confirming bank) reduces the 
risk of the insolvency or non-payment of the international buyer since the 
nominated bank will pay against documents. The confirmed credit will provide 
even more security for payment for the seller. And for the buyer, the 
reimbursement to the issuing bank against the documents provides good 
evidence that the contractual goods have been shipped. For the banks, the 
documents also provide comparative security to both the issuing and 
nominated banks, and more important a good profit as rolling in documentary 
credit. Documentary credits not only offer security to all the parties, additional 
terms in different documentary credit contacts may provide better capital 
liquidity to the parties. For example, a confirming bank may negotiate the 
documents before the payment is due, and then provide the seller an earlier 
payment. 
" For the operation of documentary credits, see early tinis chapter, section 1. 
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Except for all the advantages, documentary credits also have problems; the 
high cost of banking settlement may made the buyer choose to use some 
other payment means to avoid the high expense. The advance payment is 
one of the more economical payment means. Just as its name implies, 
advance payment means the part or full of the contractual price is paid in 
advance for the goods or service. Clearly, advance payment is safe for the 
seller since the seller may receive the money before the goods being shipped. 
However, it can be risky for the buyer, who pays the money without anything 
in hand to make sure the goods will be delivered. What is more, if the 
insolvency of the seller occurs, the buyer may have difficulty receiving the 
goods which he has actually paid for. Because of the low security for the 
buyer, the advance payment is not popular for comparatively higher value 
business or long distance business. And the advance payment causes a high 
rate of advance payment fraud in developing areas.^^ However, it may be a 
good choice for some business to save the payment settlement costs as long 
as the buyer has a good trust in the seller who he is dealing with. 
Nevertheless, advance payment should not be seen as an eligible 
replacement to documentary credits. 
In contrast to the advance payment, the "open account" may be a much 
preferred payment means for most buyers. In an "open account" payment, 
according to the agreement, the buyer may only need to pay for the goods or 
services provided by the seller within a specific period after the performance 
of the contract. Compared with a documentary credit, open account saves 
28 Olubusola H. Akinladejo in his article "Advance fee fraud: trends and issues in the 
Caribbean", discussed the high rate of fraud caused by the advance payment in the area of 
Caribbean and some other developing counties. See [2007] Journey of Financial Crime, 
Voll4, No.3, p. 320-339. 
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the high cost of a banking commission fee. However, in an open account 
payment, the seller may have a high risk of suffering the buyer's 
non-payment. Actually, "open account is quite normal between parties who 
have been trading with each other for a long time and there is implicit trust 
between them. It is particularly popular in intra-E.U. Trade."^^ It may not be 
practical in all international trade transactions, especially when the parties 
are not familiar with each other. The seller may not be able to process action 
until the buyer fails to pay, at which time the seller has already delivered the 
goods and may not be able to repossess the goods. Therefore, although the 
open account payment becomes quite popular, its usage is only limited to 
certain areas, and mostly to domestic transactions; the documentary credit is 
still in an unshakable position in international trade transactions. 
Of course, the documentary credit system faced problems recently. The high 
rate of rejection of documents in practice has serious implications for 
maintaining or increasing its market share as a recognized means of 
settlement in international trade. "Until two years ago, letters of credit were 
the dominant payment method for companies, used in over 80 per cent of 
transactions, but has now dropped to about 15 per cent. Open account 
trading is now over 80 per cent," Henri de Bellefroid, marketing 
communication manager at credit insurer Atradius, told the Standard 
newspaper.^° This negative effect reveals that there are serious drawbacks 
within documentary credits system itself. To explore the real problems in 
documentary credits, it may be better to start the research from its main 
principles - Autonomy & Strict Compliance. 
" Jason Chuah, "Law of International Trade", p. 390, supra note 18. 
30 See Mark Ford, "Where L/C is weak-and strong", 
http://www.lccbooks.com/Home/LCUse.aspx. 
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5. The Autonomy of Documentary Credits 
It is a fundamental principle in documentary credits that the contract relating 
to the documentary credit is autonomous and separate from the underlying 
sale contract. The autonomy of the documentary credit is reflected in article 4 
of UCP 600 as follows: 
"Article 4 Credits v. Contracts 
a. A credit by its nature is a separate transaction 
from the sale or other contract on which it may be 
'based. Banks are in no way concerned with or bound 
by such contract, even if any reference whatsoever 
to it is included in the credit. Consequently, the 
undertaking of a bank to honour, to negotiate or to 
fulfil any other obligation under the credit is not 
subject to claims or defences by the applicant 
resulting from its relationships with the issuing 
bank or the beneficiary. A beneficiary can in no case 
avail itself of the contractual relationships 
existing between banks or between the applicant and 
the issuing bank. 
b. An issuing bank should discourage any attempt by 
the applicant to include, as an integral part of the 
credit, copies of the underlying contract, proforma 
invoice and the like." 
According to the autonomy principle, the seller is assured of payment as long 
as he can present documents which are conforming to the credit. "It is not 
open to anyone (including the buyer) to argue that there has been a breach of 
the underlying contract of sale and hence, deny the seller payment under the 
letter of credit."^^ And the bank is not entitled to reject documents by relying 
on the underlying contract conflicts. As Hirst J stated in Tukan Timber Ltd v. 
Barclays Bank Pic. ^ i^ 
"I t i s of course very c lear ly established by the 
au thor i t ies that a l e t t e r of credi t i s autonomous. 
^' Jason Chuah, "Law of International Trade", p. 422, supra note 18. 
32 Tukan Vmber Ltd v. Barclays Bank Pic. [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep 171, 174. 
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that the bank is not concerned in any way with the 
merits or demerits of the underlying transaction, 
and only in the most extremely exceptional 
circumstances should the Court interfere with the 
payment bank honouring a letter of credit in 
accordance with its terms bearing in mind the 
importance of the free and unrestricted . flow of 
normal commercial dealings." 
Hirst J's words did not only express the bank's obligation and liability under 
documentary credits, but also showed that the English courts had traditionally 
been hesitant to interfere with the operation of documentary credits in respect 
to the autonomy of credits.^^ 
The autonomy principle which means a separation of the underlying contract 
and the letter of credit is the foundation for a smooth operation of 
documentary credits system. As Professor Jason Chuah said in his bool< 
"Law of International Trade"^ :^ 
"We should also remember that in many international 
trade transactions, there are more parties involved 
than just the buyer or seller. The seller usually 
had to obtain goods or raw materials from a supplier 
before he is able to meet the contract made with the 
buyer. The seller will need to be financed in making 
payment to their suppliers. That financing comes 
from the negotiation or discounting of drafts drawn 
under the documentary credit system. That system of 
financing would break down completely if a dispute 
between the seller and buyer was to have the effect 
of "freezing" the sum in respect of which the letter 
of credit was opened. "^ ^ 
The autonomy principle isolates the credit from the underlying contract; the 
document under the credit, consequently, becomes essential in documentary 
credits transactions. Article 5 of UCP 600 specified that "banks deal with 
" Also see Hamzeh Malas & Sons v. British Imex Industrial Ltd. [1958] 2 Q.B. 127. Details 
are discussed in Chapter 2 of the thesis, at section 5.1. 
^^  Jason Chuah, "Law of International Trade", supra note 18. 
^^  Jason Chuah, "Law of International Trade", p. 423, supra note 18. 
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documents and not with goods, services or performance to which the 
documents may relate."^^ 
In fact, during the operation of documentary credits, not only banks, but all 
the parties are concerned only with documents. In the old case of Urquhart 
Lindsay & Co. Ltd v. Eastern Bank LtcP, a letter of credit was opened to 
secure the payment for an underlying contract of machinery purchase. The 
underlying contract contained a clause which said the price was to be 
increased in the event of a rise in wages, cost of materials or transit rates etc., 
but there was no such clause mentioned in the credit. Later, the bank rejected 
documents presented by the seller on the ground that items of extra cost of 
labour were included in the invoice price of the goods. It was held by Rowlatt 
J that the bank must accept the documents and pay irrespective of any 
defence under the underlying contracts. For the bank's position under an 
irrevocable credit, he said: 
"...the defendant [the bank] undertook to pay the 
amount of invoiced for machinery without 
qualification, the basis of this form of banking 
facility being that the buyer is taken for the purpose 
of all questions between himself and his banker, or 
between his banker and the seller, to be content to 
accept the invoices of the seller as correct. It seems 
to me that, so far from the letter of credit being 
qualified by the contract of sale, the latter must 
accommodate itself to the letter of credit. "^ ^ 
According to the words of Rowlatt J, the credit may take priority over the 
underlying contract when there are contradictions between the two. His 
judgment also established the essential position of documents in 
documentary credits transactions. Banks can only make the decision of 
3« See Article 6 of UCP 600. 
3^  UrquhardLindsay, [1922] 1 K.B. SI'S, supra note 13. 
38 Ibid, 323. 
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whether paying by examining the stipulated documents in the credit.^^ The 
dominant position of documents also induces the other fundamental principle 
in documentary credit, which is the strict compliance. 
6. The Principle of Strict Compliance 
"The idea of strict compliance has developed from the general principle of the 
law of agency that an agent is only entitled to reimbursement from his 
principle if he acts in accordance with his instructions."^° In documentary 
credit transactions, banks, who act as the agent of the applicant, are only 
entitled to reimbursement from the applicant if they pay against documents 
complying with the condition under the credit. Article 14 of UCP 600 provides 
the guidance for banks to examine the documents as follows: 
"Article 14 Standard for Examination of Documents 
a. A nominated bank acting on its nomination, a 
confirming bank, if any, and the issuing bank must 
examine a presentation to determine, on the basis 
of the documents alone, whether or not the documents 
appear on their face to constitute a complying 
presentation. 
d. Data in a document, when read in context with the 
credit, the document itself and international 
standard banking practice, need not be identical to, 
but must not conflict with, data in that document, 
any other stipulated document or the credit. 
Accordingly, banks must determine on the basis of the face of the documents 
along whether they are in compliance with the terms and conditions under the 
credit. Banks are obliged to pay against conforming documents, however. 
^' See Richard King, "Gutteridge and Megrah's Law of Bankers' Commercial Credits", p. 14, 
supra note 1. 
"0 Ibid, p. 181. 
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they are entitled to reject payment as long as document is not in compliance 
with the credit. In other words, banks are unable to get the reimbursement if 
they paid against nonconforming documents. It is interesting that the new 
version of UCP omits the word of "reasonable care" from UCP SOO.'*^  This 
perhaps emphasizes the compliance of documents is the only criterion to 
determine whether banks are entitled to the reimbursement. A nonconforming 
document may not be accepted by the applicant simply because the bank 
has paid reasonable care in examining documents. The strict of the principle 
was clearly expressed by Lord Summer in the old case of Equitable Trust Co 
of New York v. Dawson Partners Ltd^^: 
"It is both common ground and common sense that in 
such a transaction the accepting bank can only claim 
indemnity if the conditions on which it is authorised 
to accept are in the matter of the accompanying 
documents strictly observed. There is no room for 
documents which are almost the same, or which will 
do just as well. Business could not proceed (?) 
securely on any other lines . The bank' s branch abroad, 
which knows nothing officially of the details of the 
transaction thus financed, cannot take upon itself 
to decide what will do well enough and what will not. 
If it does as it is told, it is safe; if it declines 
to do anything else, it is safe; if it departs from 
the conditions laid down, it acts at its own risk." 
Of course, facial conformity may not require a word-for-word compliance. 
Simple typographical errors may not be seen as nonconforming while 
examining documents. And it is certainly not reasonable for banks to reject 
documents by relying on very minor defects. However, the strict compliance 
principle is strict. It is hard to define the sort of discrepancy which can 
properly be seen as trivial. In Seaconsar Far East Ltd v. Bank Markazi 
"1 In the previous version of the UCP, UCP 500, the relative article Article 13(a) said:"Banks 
must examine all documents stipulated in the Credit with reasonable care, to ascertain 
whetheror not they appear, on their face, to be in compliance with the terms and conditions 
of the credit...". 
"2 Equitab/e Trust Co, (1927) 27 LI.LRep. 49, 52, supra note 6. 
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Jomhoun Islami Irarf^, it was stipulated in the credit that that all documents 
presented to the bank should carry the credit number and the buyer's name. 
But one of the documents tendered omitted to state the credit number and 
the buyer's name. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the bank was 
entitled to reject the documents.'*^ Lloyd LJ said: 
"[The plaintiffs] argues that the absence of the 
letter of credit number and the buyer's name was an 
entirely trivial feature of the document. I do not 
agree. I cannot regard as trivial something which, 
whatever may be the reason, the credit specifically 
requires. It would not help, I think, to attempt to 
define the sort of discrepancy which can properly 
be regarded as trivial. '"'^  
According to his words, there is no room for a de minimis effect argument. 
Therefore, banks may feel safer to reject defective documents even they 
believe the discrepancy is trivial, otherwise they accept them on their own 
risk. 
Furthermore, the bank is not required to have special knowledge to decide 
the materiality of the discrepancy. In the case of Jl-i Raynor & Co. Ltd v. 
Hambro's Banl< Ltd'^, the beneficiary tendered a bill of lading describing the 
goods as "machine-shelled ground kernels", while the description in the 
credit was "Coromandel groundnuts". The Court of Appeal, although 
admitting the two terms are the same in the specific area, still held that the 
bank was right to reject the documents because the bank is not required to 
have the knowledge of the meaning of terms in different industries. 
" Seaconsar Far East Ltd V. Bank Markazi Jomfjoun Is/ami Iran il993'\ 3 W.LR. 756 (HL), 
[1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 236 (CA). 
'*'• This point was not discussed by the House of Lords. The House of Lords reversed the 
decision of the Court of Appeal on some other grounds and granted leave to serve the 
proceedings out of jurisdiction on the defendant bank. 
^^ Seaconsar Far East, [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 236, 241, supra note 42. 
'^ 6 JH Raynor & Co. Ltd v. Hambro's Bank Ltd [\.9Q3] Q.B. 711. 
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It is reasonable that the bank is not required to know more than the facial 
meaning of the documents; nevertheless, it is not easy either to define the 
reasonable knowledge of bank when a possible discrepancy occurs. The 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in Glencore International AG &Anorv. Bank 
of Chin^'^ may be a good example. Although Glencore International \% an 
important case in the issue of original documents'*^, another pleaded 
discrepancy relates to the discretion of the origin of the goods was not a 
simple one. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of Commercial Court 
in this issue, holding that the additional words "Indonesia — Inalum" brand, 
found in the commercial invoice but not appearing in the description of the 
origin of the goods in the letter of credit, was not inconsistent with the 
requirement in the credit. Regarding to bank's knowledge in this issue, MR 
Bingham said: 
"It is, we think, plain that the origin specified 
in the credit (*any western brand') is expressed in 
a very broad generic way. A banker would require no 
knowledge of the aluminium trade to appreciate that 
there could be more than one brand falling within 
the genus. ... It seems to us quite plain on the face 
of the document that the additional words were to 
indicate the precise brand of the goods, it being 
implicit that that brand fell within the broad 
generic description which was all that was required. 
" 4 9 
Bingham MR believed that a banker should have the knowledge that the 
additional words which was not in the description of the origin in the credit 
were to indicate a precise brand. However, he did not clearly explain the 
reason why the bank should be able to understand the function of the 
"^  Glencore International AG & Anor V Bank of China [1996] C.L.C. 95. 
'•^ The detailed application of the strict compliance principle is not discussing in the thesis. 
Further reading, see Richard King, "Gutteridge and Megrah's Law of Bankers' Commercial 
Credits", Chapter 7, p. 179 to 245, supra note 1; and Jason Chuan, "Law of International 
Trade", p. 427 to 435, supra note 18. 
" ' Glencore, [1996] C.L.C. 95, 119, supra note 46. 
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additional words. It seems hard to define the nature and extent of the bank's 
duty with regard to the exactness of complying documents. The precise 
meaning of the phrase "on their face" was even more controversial.^° It can 
be more difficult to identify the compliance of a document when specific 
issues, such as the originality of documents, different types of documents 
involved in specific cases. The rule of absolute documentary conformity can 
lead to harsh results. It is almost impossible to achieve complete 
standardisation in an area where each letter of credit will normally be 
adjusted to reflect the parties' concerns and the trade in question.^^ 
Documentary errors and discrepancies occur all the time. According to R.J. 
Mann's survey, only 27 percent of documents which presented under letters 
of credit are complying.^^ Normally the applicant will waive the discrepancy 
to obtain the goods because he may not be able to get possession of goods 
until the credit is paid. However, sometimes he will refuse to waive the 
discrepancies.^^ In that case, the bank may usually choose to reject 
documents on the ground of the discrepancies to stay in a safer position. 
What is more, the doctrine of strict compliance can also be abused by the 
bank by scrutinizing the document and rejecting them technically, if the bank 
knows that there is a falling market and the buyer wants to get out of the 
contract. According to the survey of UCP600, approximately 70% of 
documents presented under letters of credit were being rejected on first 
presentation because of discrepancies. This situation caused a negative 
effect on the letter of credit being seen as a means of payment and could 
50 Janet Ulph, "The UCP 600: documentary credits in the 21st century", (2007) 3BL 355, 
362. 
" Ibid, 363. 
" R.J. Mann, "The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions", (2000) 98 Michigan 
Law Review 2494, 2502, and statistical appendix at 2534. 
" Duncan Sheehan, "Rights of recourse in documentary (and other) credit transactions", 
(2005) JBL 326, 326. 
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have serious implications for maintaining or increasing its market share as a 
recognized means of settlement in international trade.« This is also one of 
the most important reasons of the recent publishing of the new version of 
UCP (UCP600). The detailed procedural of documentary credits in UCP 600 
is essential in regulating the operation of documentary credits, and solving 
the problems in recent documentary credit transactions. 
7. Exceptions to the Principle of t/te Autonomy 
A new version of UCP may be effective in standardizing the banking practice 
in documentary credits; it will not be able to solve the controversy within 
documentary credits system, which was mainly caused by the principle of 
autonomy. The autonomy principle "imposed upon the banker an absolute 
obligation to pay, irrespective of any dispute there may be between the 
parties as to whether the goods are up to the contract or not".« This doctrine 
no doubt promotes the smooth operation of documentary credits. However, 
the separation of documents from the actual performance of the underlying 
contract leaves a space to parties to abuse the system. For this reason, some 
exceptions5^ such as the fraud rule, were introduced into the operation of the 
documentary credits system. 
Nevertheless, there are also always arguments in applying exceptions. The 
most important reason is the existence of exceptions may destroy the 
fundamental principle of "autonomy". Also, it may put the bank into a reluctant 
5'' See UCP 600, Introduction section. 
" HamzehM3las\X^SZ\ 2 Q. B. 127, 129, supra note 32. 
56 The exceptions which are discussed in the thesis are: the fraud rule, the illegality 
exception and the nullity exception. 
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situation. It is always hard for banks to make the decision of whether applying 
exceptions without knowing the underlying contract, which is not the 
responsibility for banks in documentary credits system. Consequently, to 
protect the position of "autonomy", the standard of proof in applying those 
exceptions becomes extremely high in the common law world." And the 
inefficiency of the application may also cause buyers or banks to choose a 
comparatively easy way to avoid payment when they noticed a possible fraud 
while the evidence was not too clear to them. The buyer may instruct the 
bank to try to rely on the strict compliance principle to find discrepancies in 
the document and then reject it, even the defects are really minor. The bank 
will still get a better chance to avoid the payment. It may be too assertive to 
say the inefficiency of the application of the exceptions, especially the fraud 
rule, caused the high rate of the rejection of the documents. But it is certainly 
essential to improve the efficiency of the fraud rule in documentary credits. 
Janet Ulph suggested in her article "The UCP 600: documentary credits in 
the21^'century"58 that: 
"One possible method of tacking the risks of fraud 
is to require the beneficiary to warrant that the 
documents presented are not forged or otherwise 
fraudulent. The advantage of such a warranty is that 
it gives a bank more power to refuse documents because 
it can rely upon the warranty alone rather than the 
fraud exception." 
The new version UCP does not provide any guidance in the issue of warranty. 
But the recent decision to the case of SIrius International Insurance Co v. FAI 
" This issue will be mainly discussed in Chapter 2 of the thesis. 
58 ]anet Ulph, "The UCP 600: documentary credits in the 21st century", at 371, supra note 
49. 
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Genera/Insurance LtcP may indicate that English courts are open to accept 
a warranty although the judgment of the Court of Appeal received lots of 
criticism.^° In Sinus International Insurance Co, the Court of Appeal held that 
a beneficiary under a letter of credit was not entitled to draw upon it because 
he had agreed to in a separate contract that he will not draw upon the credit 
unless certain conditions are satisfied. IVIay LJ said in his judgment: 
"The present case is in more than one important 
respect a variant of the more typical. Here the 
relevant underlying agreement is, not the commercial 
transaction that the letter of credit was intended 
to support, as in the typical case the contract of 
sale or in the present case the retrocession treaties, 
but a related agreement regulating as between FAX 
and Sirlus terms on which the letter of credit would 
be established. The terms included express 
contractual restrictions on the circumstances in 
which Sirius would be entitled to draw on the letter 
of credit. To that extent the letter of credit was 
less than the equivalent of cash and Sirius's 
security was correspondingly restricted. Although 
those restrictions were not terms of the letter of 
credit, and although the bank would have been obliged 
and entitled to honour a request to pay which 
fulfilled its terms, that does not mean that, as 
between themselves and FAI, Sirius were entitled to 
draw on the letter of credit if the express conditions 
of this underlying agreement were not fulfilled."^^ 
IVIay LJ explained the judgment as the express contractual restrictions 
restricted the security provided by the credit. He also believed that the 
restriction is only between the beneficiary and the applicant. In other words, 
the bank is still obliged and entitled to pay. This explanation is not so 
convicting. As Christopher Hare argued in his article, the bank may be left in 
" Sirius International Insurance Co v. FAI Generai Insurance Ltd [2QQA] 1 WLR 3251 (HL), 
[2003] 1 W.L.R. 2214 (CA). 
*° See Christopher Hare, "Not so Black and White: The limits of the Autonomy Principle" 
[2004] CLJ 288; Jason Chuah, "Documentary Credit - Principle of Autonomy - Derogation", 
[2003] 3 JIML 9. 
" SiriusInternationai[20Q3] 1 W.L.R. 2214, 2225, supra note 58. 
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an impossible position in this circumstance.^^ However, since the House of 
Lords believed it was unnecessary to discuss the point of the autonomy and 
made the decision on the basis of the correct contextual interpretation of two 
related documents, it seems that English courts started to be more flexible in 
applying the autonomy principle in the operation of documentary credits. 
Although the applying of warranty can affect of the autonomy of documentary 
credits, it may be seen as reasonable since the UCP itself is not law. The 
parties are only obliged to comply with the UCP only if they choose to use 
documentary credits as the payment means and "the text of the credit 
expressly indicates that it is subject to these rules"^^. Therefore, the UCP is 
binding on parties as contracts rather than the law. It is common that parties 
are free to amend any terms of the contract. There is no reason why they are 
unable to amend the autonomy principle of the UCP in the underlying 
contract. However, the amendment may only restrict the contractual parties, 
which normally are the applicant and the beneficiary. In other words, banks, 
who are not concerned with the underlying contract may not be affected by 
the amendment even it is about the UCP as long as it was not incorporated 
into the credit. Hence, the applying of additional warranty may be effective to 
restrict the beneficiary's title of achieving payment but will not affect the 
bank's payment obligation under the UCP unless the bank chooses not to pay. 
" See Christopher Hare, "Not so Black and White: The limits of the Autonomy Principle", 
supra note 59, "On the one hand, the bank would be risking its commercial reputation if it 
did not pay against such documents, but on the other hand, payment would entail the risk 
of liability for breaching the terms of an injunction." 
" See UCP 600, Article 1, "The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, 
2007 Revision, ICC Publication no. 600 ("UCP") are rules that apply to any documentary 
credit ("credit") (including, to the extent to which they may be applicable, any standby 
letter of credit) when the text of the credit expressly indicates that it is subject to these 
rules. They are binding on all parties thereto unless expressly modified or excluded by the 
credit." 
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The application of the additional warranty and the high rate of rejection of 
documents under the strict compliance doctrine showed that both the English 
courts and the banks are aware of the problems caused by the autonomy 
principle. Although it is possible to incorporate a warranty to avoid the fraud 
issues in documentary credits^, it would be strange to use any other rules 
to solve the fraud or other issues while there are exceptions already. Hence, 
a research in the application of the exceptions in documentary credits 
becomes more than necessary. It is essential to find a solution to improve the 
efficiency of the exceptions, such like the fraud rule, in documentary credit. 
This is also the main rationale for the author to write the current thesis. 
" It was suggested by Janet Ulph in her article. See Janet Ulpli, (2007) JBL 355, supra note 
49. 
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Summary: 
The autonomy principle is the essence of documentary credits system. The 
operation of the unique payment system is based on the application of the 
autonomy principle. Because of the separation between the documents and 
underlying contract, banks can only make the decision of whether paying 
based on the facially complying of the documents. Accordingly, the strict 
compliance doctrine becomes the best way for the bank to avoid payment 
especially when a bank suspect a fraud but cannot prove it. The difficulty in 
the application of the fraud exception may be one of the reasons of the high 
rate of rejection of documents by the strict compliance. The new 
phenomenon of the application of additional warranty to restrict the 
beneficiary's title in achieving payment further shows the problems caused by 
the inefficiency of the application of the fraud exception. All the discussion in 
this chapter points out the necessity of a research in the exceptions in 
documentary credits. 
44 
Lu Lu: The Exceptions in Documentary Credits in English Law. 
Chapter Two: The Early Development of the 
Fraud Rule in English and American Law 
Preface: 
During the operation of documentary credits, all the parties concentrate on 
and only concentrate on documents themselves. The principle of autonomy is 
the foundation for the operation of documentary credits system. However, in 
the American case of Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder banking Corporation', the 
fraud rule, as an exception in documentary credits system, was established. 
Although the fraud rule has been recognized as an exception long ago , it is 
still a developing area in the law of documentary credits. The reason may 
mostly be seen as the strong position of the autonomy principle in the 
documentary credits system. Different jurisdictions may apply the fraud rule 
by different means. While in the United States, Article 5 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC)^ has recognized the existence of the fraud 
exception, there is no statutory basis for the fraud rule in English law. The 
^ Sztejn V. J, Henry Sciiroderbanl<ing Corporation (1941) IM.Y.S.2d 631. 
^ The Uniform Commercial Code (the UCC) is a collection of model statutes drafted and 
recommended by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform States Laws and 
the American Law Institute for enactment by the legislatures of the States of the United 
States. It consists of 11 different Articles, each covering a different aspect of commercial 
law. Article 5 of UCC is a uniform statutory scheme governing letters of credit and the fraud 
rule was first recognized in UCC Art.5-114(2) (1972 version). The UCC (1995 version) is the 
first statuary which regulated the fraud rule as an exception (Article 5-109) in documentary 
credits. The most recent version is Art-5-109(2004 version). 
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reorganization of the fraud rule can only be traced from case law.^  Therefore, 
the United Stated may be seen as the first country which approved the fraud 
rule as an extraordinary rule to documentary credits. It is fair enough to trace 
the root of the fraud rule in the law of the United States. 
As the home of the famous case, Sztejn v. J Henry Schroder Banking Cofp 
in which the fraud rule was established, the United States is also the best 
country to trace the origin of the fraud rule. An analysis of the early 
development of the fraud exception, before the birth of the fraud rule, in the 
United States showed the importance of the fraud concept from the very 
beginning of the existence of the documentary credits system through case 
law. The seed of the fraud rule had already been planted during the early 
development of the documentary credits system. Turning the research to the 
practical application of the fraud rule in the United States, the landmark case 
5!z/<§/77 admitted the existence of the fraud rule as an exception to interrupt the 
payment in documentary credits. However, the most controversial issue, 
which is the standard of proof for the application, was not clearly settled in 
this case. As a consequence, even after the expression of the application of 
the fraud rule in Article 5-114(2) in UCC 1972, American courts applied 
different explanations to define the fraud in different cases during the 
application of the fraud rule. The different application in different cases only 
^ For a leading case In UK which recognizing the fraud rule, see UnitedC/ty Merchants v. 
Royal Bank of Canada (The American Accord) \V^ZZ\ A.C. 168 (HL); [1982] Q.B. 208 (CA), 
[1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep 267 (QB). 
" Sztejn V. J Henry Schroder Banldng Corp (1941) 31 NYS 2d 631. 
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offer a broad way to apply the fraud rule but did not solve the uncertainty of 
the position of the fraud rule. A clear standard of the application of the fraud 
rule was not settled until the appearance of Article 5-109 in UCC 1995. The 
materiality of the fraud was decided as the main test in applying the fraud rule. 
Nevertheless, from the study of many America cases, it seems that, although 
the "materiality test" has been applied by American courts, a "material fraud" 
is always defined as the same as an "egregious fraud", which caused the 
application of the fraud being very difficult. 
Compared with circumstances in the United States, the application of the 
fraud rule in England and Wales met with more obstacles. English law 
considered the autonomy principle in an even more important position. 
Nevertheless, the autonomy principle did not successfully stop the 
application of the fraud rule in English law. Reasons for the application are 
discussed during research. Because there is no statute law, similar to the 
UCC in the United States, to regulate the application of the fraud rule in 
English law (and the UCP focused on the autonomy principle rather than on 
the fraud rule), the general application of the fraud rule can only be traced 
from case law. The early development of the fraud rule in English law 
approved a very high standard of proof in applying the fraud rule in 
documentary credits. From the early cases such as Discount Records, Gian 
Singii, up to the very famous case United City l\^erciiants, the standard of 
proof of the fraud rule was raised up time by time. The standard of the 
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application has to be satisfied by several conditions: a clearly proven fraud, 
the involvement of the beneficiary and the knowledge of the bank. The 
extremely high standard of proof heavily limited the efficiency of the 
application of the fraud rule in early England and Wales. 
This chapter is generally a background study for the application and 
development of the fraud rule. By a comparison of the tests being applied to 
apply the fraud rule between American and English law, the thesis is trying to 
point out the advantages and the disadvantages of the application in both of 
the countries. A new thought regarding to the application of the fraud rule is 
floated at the end of this chapter. 
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/. The Definition of Fraud 
1.1. The deflnltfon of "fraud" in documentary credits 
Before entering the research of the fraud exception, it may be important to 
define the concept of "fraud" in the context of documentary credits. It is not 
easy to give a clear definition to "fraud" since there is even no statute for the 
common law fraud. In the case of Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v. Barclays 
Bank InternationalLtd.^, Lord Denning IVI.R., when expressed the application 
of the fraud rule in English law, said: 
"That case [Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking 
Corporatjon (1941) SIN.Y.S. 2d 631 ) shows that there 
is this exception to the strict rule: the bank ought 
not to pay under the credit if it knows that the 
documents are forged or that the request for payment 
is made fraudulently in circumstances when there is 
no right to payment."^ 
A test for an established fraud may be concluded from the above words. This 
test is also a good guide to define the term of "fraud" in documentary credits. 
According to the test, fraud in documentary credit transactions may be seen 
as established under two situations: forged documents are presented and 
fraudulent request are made. This test is quite similar to the term of "fraud by 
5 Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v. Barclays B3nl< International Ltd. [1978] Q.B. 159. 
* Ibid, 169. 
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representation" in "Fraud Act 2006"'', although it is a criminal law Act: 
"Fraud by false representation 
(1) A person is in breach of this section if he— 
(a) dishonestly makes a false representation, and 
(b) intends, by making the representation— 
(i) to make a gain for himself or another, or 
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another 
to a risk of loss. 
(2) A representation is false if— 
(a) it is untrue or misleading, and 
(b) the person making it knows that it is, or might 
be, untrue or misleading. 
(3) "Representation" means any representation as to 
fact or law, including a representation as to the 
state of mind of— 
(a) the person making the representation, or 
(b) any other person. 
(4) A representation may be express or implied. 
(5) For the purposes of this section a representation 
may be regarded as made if it 
(or anything implying it) is submitted in any form 
to any system or device 
designed to receive, convey or respond to 
communications (with or without 
human intervention)." 
It is an expressed false representation if a false document is presented, and it 
is an implied false representation if a fraudulent request is made. The 
payment is the "gain" which is intended to achieve by a false representation. 
However, the dishonesty may not be strictly required in documentary credits 
fraud as in criminal fraud. In this sense, the deceit in tort may be more close 
to a documentary credits fraud. 
^ Fraud Act (2006), Section 2, Fraud by false representation. The Fraud Act 2006 (2006 
C.35) is an Act of Parliament in the United Kingdom, affecting England and Wales and 
Northern Ireland. It was given Royal Assent on 8 November 2006, and came into effect on 
15 January 2007. 
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In the old case of William Deny, J. C. Wakefield, M. M. Moore, J. Pethick, and 
S. J. Wilde V. Sir Henry William Peek, Baronet (Deny v. Peek^, where the 
plaintiff bought shares in a company relying on a prospectus which was 
issued by the directors of the company, stating that they had the right to run 
trams on steam power. The directors believed the prospectus would be 
approved by the Board of Trade. However, the Board of Trade rejected it, and 
later the company was wound up. The plaintiff then brought an action in 
deceit. The House of Lords held that the deceit was not established. It was 
explained that, in an action of deceit, the plaintiff must prove actual fraud. 
Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made 
knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, without caring whether it 
be true or false. And a false statement, made through carelessness and 
without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, may be evidence of 
fraud but does not necessarily amount to fraud. Such a statement, if made in 
the honest belief that it is true, is not fraudulent and does not render the 
person making it liable to an action of deceit.^ 
For the elements of an establishment of fraud. Lord Herschell, expressed 
that: 
"... fraud is proved when it is shewn that a false 
representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) 
without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, 
careless whether it be true or false. Although I have 
treated the second and third as distinct cases, I 
8 Derryv. Peek{\%^<^') LR. 14 App. Cas. 337. 
« Ibid. 
51 
Lu Lu: The Exceptions in Documentary Credits in English Law. 
think the third is but an instance of the second, 
for one who makes a statement under such 
circumstances can have no real belief in the truth 
of what he states. To prevent a false statement being 
fraudulent, there must, I think, always be an honest 
belief in its truth. And this probably covers the 
whole ground, for one who knowingly alleges that 
which is false, has obviously no such honest belief. 
Thirdly, if fraud be proved, the motive of the person 
guilty of it is immaterial. It matters not that there 
was no intention to cheat or injure the person to 
whom the statement was made."" 
This judgment had a long-lasting effect in English Law for the definition of 
fraud in deceit cases. According to this judgment, reckless itself does not. 
amount to dishonesty. But where a person acts recklessly it is open for the 
court to find that whether the person had believed in the truth of their 
statement.''^ The person cannot be liable for a fraudulent misrepresentation if 
he believed the statement is true even the statement is actually untrue. In 
other words, the person who makes a false representation, which he knows it 
was forged, is liable for a fraudulent misrepresentation even he did not intend 
to defraud anyone. This principle was confirmed in the case of Brown 
Jenkinson & Co. Ltd. vPercy Dalton (London) Ltd.^^ by the Court of Appeal. 
In Brown Jekinson, it was held that the shipowners, by making in the bill of 
lading a representation of fact which they knew to be false, with intent that it 
should be acted upon were committing the tort of deceit, and that the 
defendants' promise to indemnify the shipowners against loss resulting from 
the making of that representation was accordingly unenforceable. 
10 Ibid. 374. 
" See Paul Richards, "Law of contract" (9* edn, Pearson Longman, 2009), p. 224. 
12 Brown Jenkinson & Co. Ltd. v Percy Dalton (London) Ltd. [1957] 2 Q.B. 621. 
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Pearce LJ said during the appeal that: 
"...recklessness is sufficient to make a man liable 
in damages for fraud. Here the plaintiffs intended 
their misrepresentation to deceive, although they 
did not intend that the party deceived should 
ultimately go without any just compensation. In an 
action based on deceit that state of mind would render 
them liable, no less than if they had been 
fraudulent The plaintiffs' rather haphazard 
belief that no one would be ultimately defrauded, 
though it affects their merits, does not in my view 
improve their legal position in this case.''^ ^ 
Morris LJ, in the same appeal, also concluded the elements in deciding the 
establishment of the fraudulent misrepresentation as follows: 
"But in my judgment all the elements were present 
which made the consideration illegal and the 
contract unenforceable. Those elements wore: (a) the 
making of a representation of fact, (b) which was 
false, (c) which was known to be false, (d) with 
intent that it should be acted upon."^^ 
Although those elements were expressed during the consideration of an 
illegal contact, the base of the illegal contact in this case was the fraudulent 
misrepresentation. According to the judgment of the above cases, especially 
the elements of the establishment of the fraud misrepresentation which were 
summarized during the judgments by both Lord Herschell and Morris LJ, the 
fraud may be defined as follows: 
First, there has to be a false representation, this element can be split into two 
parts: the first is there must be a representation, the second is the 
" Ibid, 640. 
" Ibid, 636. 
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representation must be false; ^ ^ 
Secondly, the representor must have the knowledge of the falsity of the 
representation. In other words, the representor must know that the 
representation is false or be reckless whether it be true or false. This element, 
which was established in Deny v. Pee/^^, made the proving of fraud being 
very difficult. On one hand, the knowledge of the representor as the internal 
idea of the representor is not easy to be known; on the other hand, it may be 
even harder to define the phrase of "reckless whether it be true or false". The 
term "reckless" is very often regarded as synonymous with negligence, and 
negligence must never be confused with fraud.''^ Nevertheless, this principle 
showed an important difference between the criminal fraud and civil fraud. In 
proving the civil fraud, the motive of the representor who made the false 
representation is irrelevant.''^ 
Thirdly, the false representation has to be acted upon. It was summarized by 
Morris LJ as one of the elements in establishing the fraud that the representor 
should have the intention that the misrepresentation will be acted upon. This 
requirement was discussed more clearly in Standard Chartered Bank v. 
Pakistan National Shipping Corp and others (No 2p. 
^^  A false representation has to be a misrepresentation of fact. For details of the definition 
of misrepresentation, see Paul Richards, "Law of contract", Chapter 9, supra note 11; Jill 
Poole, "Textbook on Contract Law" (lO'*' edn, Oxford University Press, 2010), Chapter 14. 
1^  Z?err/(1889) LR. 14 App. Cas. 337, supra note 8. 
'^ Paul Richards, "Law of contract". Chapter 9, p. 224, supra note 11. 
18 Also see case Polhill v. Wa/ter {1832) 3 B & Ad 114., where defendant was held liable in 
deceit by make a knowingly false representation although he had no intention making a 
profit for himself. 
1' Standard Chartered Bank V. Pakistan National Shipping Corp and others (No 2) il'^^l'] 1 
A.C. 959 (HL), [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep 218 (CA), [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 684 (QB). The House 
of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal on the issue of Mr. Mehra's personal 
liability, but issues relevant to cognizance of fraud, including the reliance principle, were 
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Standard Chartered Bank \% a documentary credits case involving both fraud 
and illegality, and in this sense this case is even more important in defining 
the fraud under the fraud exception. In this case, the plaintiff is a confirming 
bank(SCB) who sued for damages against shipowner(PNSC) on the basis of 
a false bills of landing. The fact of the case is unusual because the plaintiff 
had also claimed repayment from the issuing bank by presenting a false 
statement that the documents were presented in time. But the issuing bank 
rejected the documents by reference to other discrepancies without knowing 
the bill of lading was false and documents were presented out of the expired 
date. The Court of Appeal allowed the claim of SCB and held that, the fact 
that the loss might not have occurred but for SCB's decision to attempt to 
deceive the issuing bank was irrelevant, as SCB had suffered loss as a result 
of its reliance upon PNSC's false statements. During the judgment, Evans LJ, 
by reference to the judgement in Deny v Peelc^^, explained the fraudulent 
representation by the following statement: 
"It is not necessary that the maker of the statement 
was 'dishonest' as that word is used in the criminal 
law. The relevant intention is that the false 
statement shall be acted upon by a person to whom 
it is addressed. If the false statement was made 
knowingly and that intention is proved, then the 
basis for liability for the tort of deceit is 
established. That conduct and state of mind was 
described as 'dishonest' in Derry v Peek and may also 
be called 'fraudulent'; but that is not necessarily 
using those words in their criminal sense."^^ 
mainly discussed during the appeal. 
20 Z7err/(1889) 14 App Cas 337. 
21 Standard Chartered Bank [2QQ0'\ 1 Lloyd's Rep 218, 224 (CA), supra note 19. 
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For the issue of the fraudulent of the SCB in the current case, he said: 
"Once Mr Thompson admitted in evidence, as he did, 
that he knew that the letter would be sent to 
Incombank in the ordinary course of business and that 
it would contain a statement to the effect that the 
documents were presented in time, which he knew to 
be false (even if he thought it to be somehow 
irrelevant or unimportant) then, in my judgment, a 
false statement was made by SCB (on whose behalf the 
letter was signed) which was false to the knowledge 
of the person who authorised it to be sent (Mr 
Thompson). In those circumstances, SCB is liable if 
the remaining elements of the tort of deceit were 
established.... 
For these reasons, I would hold on what are mostly 
undisputed facts that the false statement made by 
SCB in its letter (dated 10 November) to Incombank 
that the documents were presented within the period 
limited by the credit was false to the knowledge of 
the maker, or was made recklessly, in circumstances 
which exposed SCB to liability in deceit, if the 
statement was acted upon by Incombank who thereby 
suffered loss."" 
The above words from Evans LJ clearly confirmed the required elements for 
a fraud representation which was established in Derry v Peek. And more 
importantly, besides discussing the essential of the knowledge and intention 
of the representor, he also pointed out the reliance test in judging a fraud 
issue. The reliance test is also required in the tort of deceit as the claimant 
must prove that they acted on the statement to their detriment.^ ^ 
In the current case, Evans LJ believed that "SCB relied on the accuracy not 
only of the bill of lading but also of other documents and upon Mr Mehra's 
" Ibid. 225. 
23 See John Cooke, "Law of Tort" (9'*^ edn, Pearson Longman, 2009), Chapter 22, p. 472. 
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breach of this undertaking in both respect. It is on that basis that the bank 
proceeds to consider whether or not the documents are in conformity with the 
credit". He further explain the detail of the reliance in fraud cases and citing 
from Edgington v. Fitzmauric^'^ that "it is not necessary to shew that the 
[deceitful] misstatement was the sole cause of acting as he did and that it 
was sufficient for the claimant to show that it 'materially contributed to his so 
acting'". However, the difficulty in defining the "materiality" may cause some 
other hazards in defining the reliance and further the fraud. What is clearly 
established is "in fraud cases, the claimant's negligence is ignored, 
notwithstanding that it was or may have been a contributory case"^^. 
According to the above discussion, common law fraud may be defined as a 
false misrepresentation which is made by a representor who knows the falsity 
of the representation or be reckless whether it be true or false, and intends to 
induce other parties to act upon the misrepresentation. For a claimant to 
claim under the fraud, the reliance between the false misrepresentation and 
the loss suffered has to be proved. In the context of applying the fraud 
exception in documentary credits, the fraud could either be in the documents 
or in the credit itself or the underlying contracts, and the representor, who 
normally is the beneficiary of the credit, has to have the knowledge of the 
falsity of the representation. And for the bank who relies on the fraud to reject 
payment or asks for damages induced by the fraud has to prove the reliance 
2" Edgington v FItzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459, 481. 
25 [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep 218 , 226. 
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between the fraudulent Issue and the damages (payment). In other words, 
the fraud has to be material in inducing the payment. The definition of the 
fraud is very important since the established fraud is a core requirement in 
applying the fraud rule in documentary credits. The intention of the 
beneficiary and the materiality of the fraud are two essentials in establishing 
a fraud in documentary credits cases. Those issues are discussed later in this 
chapter. 
1.2. The fraud In performance bonds and guarantees 
While documentary credits provides a security to the seller for the payment to 
be paid by the buyer, performance bonds and guarantees could reassure the 
buyer that the seller will perform his obligation under a contract. The buyer 
may require the seller to procure a guarantee or promise from a bank or third 
party to pay certain amount if performance is no made by the seller.^ ^ 
Typically, the performance bond involves a promise by a third party, which will 
usually be a bank, that the buyer will be compensated to a specified amount if 
the goods are not delivered.^^ But the seller may also ask for a performance 
bond from the buyer to rescue the payment under the contract. 
In the case of Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v Barclays Bank International 
2* Jason Chuah, "Law of International Trade" (4"^ edn, Seer & Maxwell, 2009), p. 438. 
" Janet Ulph, "Commercial fraud : civil liability for fraud, human rights, and money 
laundering" (Oxford University Press, 2006), Chapter 8, p. 510. 
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Ltd}^, Lord Denning while considering the claim on the performance 
guarantee said: 
"All this leads to the conclusion that the 
performance guarantee stands on a similar footing 
to a letter of credit. A bank which gives a 
performance guarantee must honour that guarantee 
according to its terms. It is not concerned in the 
least with the relations between the supplier and 
the customer; nor with the question whether the 
supplier has performed his contracted obligation, or 
not; nor with the question whether the supplier is 
in default or not. The bank must pay according to 
its guarantee, on demand, if so stipulated, without 
proof or conditions. The only exception is when there 
is a.clear fraud of which the bank has notice."^^ 
It is clear that banks' irrevocable obligation of payment applied similarly to the 
performance guarantees as to the letters of credit. This obligation applied 
independent from the underlying contracts between the applicant and 
beneficiary. But the fraud exception is also applied in the performance 
guarantees. The general principle remains that, unless fraud is clearly 
established, the bank should pay and the seller and buyer can sort out their 
dispute on the underlying contract as a separate matter. 
Although the autonomy principle and the fraud rule applied to the 
performance bonds the same as to the letter of credit, the fraud 
representation may be harder to be established or even noticed by the bank 
in a performance bonds case. It is probably because in letters of credit, banks 
are dealing with the documents, but in the case of performance guarantees, 
2* Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v Barclays Bani( International Ltd. [1978] Q.B. 159 
" Ibid, 169. 
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banks are dealing with no more than a statement in the form of a declaration 
to the effect that a certain event or default has occurred.^° It was observed by 
Lord Denning in Edward Owen'CCS'AX: 
"So, as one takes instance after instance, these 
performance guarantees are virtually promissory 
notes payable on demand. . . . the banks will rarely, 
if ever, be in a position to know whether the demand 
is honest or not."^^ 
It is more difficult for a bank to notice and further prove that a representation 
is fraudulent when there is a fraudulent demand rather than fraudulent 
documents, especially if the performance guarantee specified that the buyer 
could demand payment "without proof or conditions". That is exactly what 
happened in the case of Edward Owen. 
Nevertheless, the different expression of the fraud between letters of credit 
and performance guarantee does not influence the similar application of the 
fraud exception. Of course, in letter of credits, the fraud is normally 
documentary fraud, it is the statement in documents is fraudulently made and 
the beneficiary has the knowledge of the fraud when presenting documents 
for payment. But in performance bonds cases, the fraudulent issue may just 
be the request which was made by the beneficiary, and the bank may even 
be required to pay "without proof or conditions". It is clearly that the proving of 
the beneficiary's fraudulent intention as making the request is extremely 
^° See, Jason Chuah, "Law of International Trade", p. 442, supra note 26: This argument 
was mentioned during the discussion of the possible different application of the strict 
compliance principle in performance bonds case rather than in letters of credit. 
" Edward Owen, [1978] Q.B. 159, 171, supra note 28. 
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difficult. However, theoretically, there are still situations where the beneficiary 
is making request for payment by knowing he is not eligible to do it. In those 
situations, the fraud may be seen as established since the request itself is 
fraudulent. In this sense, the standard of proof for applying the fraud rule in 
both documentary credits and performance bonds should be exactly the 
same. Therefore, the discussion of the detailed application of the fraud rule in 
later thesis covers both the cases in letters of credit and performance 
guarantees. And the thesis assumes a similar rule applies to performance 
guarantees' cases while discussing the application of the fraud rule in letters 
of credit. 
2, The Early Development of the Fraud Exception in the 
United States Before the Birth of the Fraud Rule 
Although Sztejif^ is the landmark case of the establishment of the fraud rule 
in documentary credits, "the idea that fraud upsets the usual rules of credits 
is an old one''^ .^ As early as the 1760's, in the case of Pillans v. Van M/erop^, 
the possible influence of the fraud exception to the regular operation of 
documentary credits system had already been admitted by Lord Mansfield. 
^^  Sztejn, supra note 1. 
" Professor John F. Dolan, "The Law of Letters of Credits: Commercial and Standby Credits" 
(4'^ ' edition, A.S. Pratt & Sons, 2007), p. 7, 
3" Pillans V. Van Mierop (1765) 97 Eng Rep. 1035. 
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Pillan^^ was not a fraud involved case; the main issue of the case was a 
rejection of honoring a confirmed draught because of the insolvent of the 
applicant. White, who was a businessman in Ireland, draw upon a certain 
amount of money from two businessman, Pillans and Rose (the plaintiffs). He 
then applied for a confirmed credit from the defendant credit house. Van 
Mierop and Hopkins, to confirm the money in favor of the plaintiff. Both White 
and the plaintiffs asked the defendant whether they would agree with the 
arrangement in writing. And the defendants agreed. However, when the 
plaintiffs asked the payment from the defendants, they refused to honour the 
plaintiffs' bills, because White had become insolvent. 
On the trial, the judgment was for the defendant. However, on the appeal, the 
defendant's argument of the appropriation of the underlying transaction was 
rejected by Lord Mansfield. More importantly, for the issue of the fraud 
exception. Lord Mansfield said: 
"I was then of opinion, that Van Mierop and Hopkins 
were bound by their letter; unless there was some 
fraud upon them: for that they had engaged under their 
hands, in a mercantile action, ^to give credit for 
Pillans and Rose's reimbursement'. "^^ 
Subsequent to the acknowledgement of the fraud exception, he refused 
defendant's argument of the involvement of fraud in the current case, said: 
"If there was any kind of fraud in this transaction, 
the collusion and mala fides would have vacated the 
" Ibid. 
36 Ibid, 1036. 
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contract [the credit]. But from these letters it 
seems to me clear, that there was none... Both the 
plaintiffs and White wrote to Van Mierop and Company. 
They answered ^that they would honor the plaintiffs' 
draughts' . So that the defendants assent to the 
proposal made by White, and ratify it. And it does 
not seem at all that the plaintiffs then doubted of 
White's sufficiency, or meant to conceal anything 
from the defendant."" 
Pillans was decided over two hundred years ago. At that time, documentary 
credits itself was still developing at a primary stage. It was largely litigated 
and adjudicated as a case of contract, but not a case of the fraud rule. And 
the fraud was not established at all. Nevertheless, Lord Mansfield's statement 
during the appeal made a clear support to the view that fraud may disturb the 
ordinary operation of documentary credits. What is more, "Pillans 
demonstrated that fraud had never been tolerated in the letter of credit 
system, and the seed of fraud rule was planted at a time when letters of credit 
were barely born.''^ ^ 
Compared to the fraud non-established case Pillans, another oft-mentioned 
case in relation to letter of credits fraud was a more recent decision in Higgins 
V. SteinharderteP^. H^gins^Nas an early injunction case, in which the plaintiff 
brought an action to restrain both the beneficiary (the seller) from collection 
and the issuer of the letter of credit from payment. The alleged fact for the 
injunction was that the seller has defaulted on the contract by procuring the 
" Ibid, 1038. 
^^  Gao Xiang, "The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit" (Kiuwer Law International, 
2002), p. 34. 
39 H/ggins v. Ste/nharderter {1919) 175 NYS 279. 
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bill of lading falsely stating the shipment date"", and the issuer of the letter of 
credit was also alleged by the plaintiff that he had affirmed the presentation of 
the facially conforming documents despite the notice of the false statement. 
During the hearing, Finch J of the Supreme Court granted the injunction for 
the plaintiff by the reason that the late shipment date made the credit 
unusable. He further mentioned the involvement of the false document by 
rejecting the issuer's argument that it may have become obliged to pay drafts 
drawn against the credit in any event because of the transfer of such drafts to 
third parties and said: 
"As before stated, plaintiffs authorized payment 
only on account of a shipment made by a certain date. 
If defendant Monroe & Co's agent accepted in proof 
of such shipment a bill of lading which was in fact 
false as to the time of shipment, then such act of 
defendants' agent is proximate cause of any risk of 
loss by the issuance of drafts against the said 
credits. "<' 
In Higgins, the main issue advanced by the plaintiff was that the seller had 
defaulted on the contract but not the fraud of the seller; it was only mentioned 
in the complaint that the bill of lading presented contained a false statement 
about the date of the shipment. And the decision was also based on the 
payment against a bill of lading with a false statement would be 
"" The letter of credit which was used for payment in Higgfnsv^as subjected to a shipment 
of walnuts on or before 7'*^  November, 1918. However, it was found the walnuts were not 
shipped until December 1918. And the bill of lading was falsely stating the shipment was 
made on 30'^ October, 1918 by the seller. 
"1 Higg/ns {1919) 175 NYS 279, 280, supra note 39. 
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"unauthorized"''^ However, H/gginsvj^s decided during the time when the law 
of letter of credit as a whole was less developed and "the fraud rule in the law 
of letters of credit was so embryonic at least in the United States that even 
people in the financial centers like New York did not contemplate its 
relevance."^ Therefore, both of the plaintiff and the court did not pursue the 
case in accordance with the fraud rule, but found another way to meet the 
same result of the fraud rule. It was not difficult to see that the fact of this 
case was the seller's fraudulent conduct to predate the bill of lading. What 
have to be mentioned is, the innocent third parties' interests was not 
protected by the court in this case. It is very important, today, to protect the 
innocent parties' interests under both the English law and American law while 
applying the fraud rule. 
Another essential case which involved fraud, but did not use the fraud rule as 
an independent weapon to fight with the fraud, was 0/d Colony Trust Co. w. 
Lawyers' Title & Trust C&'\ In Old Colony, a letter of credit was issued by the 
defendant on the benefit of the plaintiff, who advanced a large sum of sugar 
to a sugar seller. The letter of credit required the drafts to be drawn only 
against "net handed weights", prior to 30 November 1920, and accompanied 
by negotiable delivery orders or warehouse receipts. Net landed weight could 
be ascertained only after the goods had been landed and weighed by 
customs officials to determine the duty payable on the importation, and 
« Ibid. 
"•^  Gao Xiang, "The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit", p. 35, supra note 38. 
"" Old Colony Trust Co. v. Lawyers'Title & Trust Co (1924) 297 F 152. 
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warehouse receipts could not be issued until the goods were in the actual 
possession of the warehouseman. All shipments did not in fact clear customs 
until 3 December 1920 at the earliest, but drafts accompanied by facially 
complying documents were presented for payment prior to the expiry date of 
the letter of credit. The defendant refused to honour of the drafts on the basis 
that the documents were not in conformity with the letter of credit. The 
plaintiffs sued to recover damages for the defendant's breach of contract, but 
the claim was rejected by the trial court. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed the original judgment and noted: 
"As this statement was false, there was failure of 
compliance with the letter of credit... Obviously, 
when the issuer for a letter of credit knows that 
a document, although correct in form, is, in point 
of fact, false or illegal, he cannot be called upon 
to recognize such a document as complying with the 
terms of a letter of credit. "<' 
The fact that the document contained a false statement was clear in Old 
Colony, and the judgment was only based on the false document, which 
according to the above words of the court, is not a conforming document with 
the terms of a letter of credit even it was facially correct. Therefore, it may be 
safe to say that Old Colony is a strong authority which applied the fraud 
exception to disturb the ordinary operation of documentary credits but on the 
basis of the principle of strict compliance principle rather than the fraud rule. 
Actually, there is always an arguable issue in modern law of whether a 
« Ibid, 156-158. 
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facially conforming document can be rejected by the bank if it contains a false 
statement, since the bank's duty under documentary credits system was only 
examining the face conformity of the document. In this sense, Maurice 
O'Meara v. National Park Banl^^ may be a good example to trace the origin 
of the application of the fraud rule in modern law. 
In i\/faurice O'Meara, the underlying contract was for selling an amount of 
newsprint paper with certain required quality. The payment against 
apparently conforming documents was rejected by the defendant issuing 
bank by the reason of "there has arisen a reasonable doubt regarding the 
quality of the newsprint paper"."'' The plaintiff, then, sued the issuing bank for 
the wrongful dishonour. 
The fact of Maurice O'Meara was quite similar to those in Oid Colony, 
documents presented to the issuer were both conforming documents on the 
face. The arguable issues were both that the statements in the documents 
were not complied with the actual conditions of goods. The two litigations 
were both brought by beneficiaries against issuers. Nevertheless, the 
decision of Maurice O'Meara'^as totally different from Old Colony. 
The defence of the low quality of the paper of the defendant issuer was 
rejected during the appeal by the following statement: 
"The bank was concerned only in the drafts and the 
« Maurice O'Meara v. A/ationa/Park Bank {192S) 146 NE 636. 
"' Ibid, 639. 
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documents accompanying them....If the drafts, when 
presented, were accompanied by the proper documents, 
then it was absolutely bound to make the payment under 
the letter of credit, irrespective of whether it knew, 
or had reason to believe, that the paper was not of 
the tensile strength contracted for.... To hold 
otherwise is to read into the letter of credit 
something which is not there, and this the court ought 
not to do, since it would impose upon a bank a duty 
which in many cases would defeat the primary purpose 
of such letters of credit. "^^ 
The reasoning of Maurice O'Meara in the above words is very similar to the 
thought of determining a documentary credit fraud case in modern law, 
especially in English law, where the courts normally first focus on the 
significant of the autonomy principle in documentary credits. And the banks' 
limited obligations of examining the face of documents with reasonable care 
may be another emphasis during the hearing. The high standard proof in 
applying the fraud exception was originated long time ago even before the 
establishment of the fraud rule. 
Of course, disputation arose at the same time even in Maurice O'Meara. 
Cardozo J, while affirming the general rule that the issuing bank had no duty 
to investigate the performance of the underlying contract, disagreed with the 
majority judgment said: 
"I dissent from the view that, if [the bank] choose 
to investigate and discovers thereby that the 
merchandise tendered is not in truth the merchandise 
which the documents describe, it may be forced by 
the delinquent seller to make payment of the price 
48 Ibid. 
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irrespective of its knowledge."" 
For the reason he carried on and stated: 
"We are to bear in mind that this controversy is not 
one between the bank on the one side and on the other 
a holder of the drafts who has taken them without 
notice and for value. The controversy aroused 
between the bank and a seller who has misrepresented 
the security upon which advances are demanded. 
Between parties so situated payments may be resisted 
if the documents are false".5° 
Cardozo J took the view that although the obligations of banks under 
documentary credits were only subject to the face conforming of documents, 
banks should be free to investigate the internal truth of documents. And if the 
internal false statement was found, banks should be able to refuse payments 
because the security interests of banks under documentary credits system 
may be harmed by the false statement. The security interest in documents 
was also a liability of sellers to banks. 
To disagree to the decision of the current case, Cardozo J further expressed: 
"... I cannot accept the statement of the majority 
opinion that the bank was not concerned with any 
questions as to the character of the paper. If that 
is so, the bales tenderedmight have been rags instead 
of paper, and still the bank would have been helpless, 
though it had knowledge of the truth, if the documents 
rendered by the seller were sufficient on their 
face."" 
Cardozo J's statement of "the bales tendered might have been rags instead 
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of paper" was suggested as "an invocation to the fraud rule because a 
misrepresentation might have to go as far as complete non-performance."" 
Greg A. Fellinger believed that "Justice Cardozo's dissenting 
opinion...envisions a scenario where there is a total lack of consideration in 
the underlying sales contract..."" 
The study of the historical development of the fraud exception cases in the 
United States showed a basic concept to the application of the fraud 
exception during the operation of documentary credits system. From Pillans 
to Maurice O'Meara, all the cases above were not adjudicated directly by the 
fraud rule, since the fraud rule was not well developed before the 1920s, 
even in the United States. However, a general idea had already been shown 
by the early fraud related cases, which is "the documents tendered by the 
beneficiary under a letter of credit had to be both genuine and honest and the 
issuer accordingly should not be forces to take documents which it knew to 
be false or fraudulent."s" The seed of the fraud rule had already been planted 
during the early development of the documentary credits system. While the 
case of Pillans pointed out the possibility of the fraud exception to disturb the 
ordinary operation of documentary credits payment system, both Higginsand 
Old Colony provided the support as authorities for the fraud exception to 
disturb documentary credits. The different approaches in the judgments of 
52 Gordon B. Graham, and Benjannin Geva, "Standby Credits in Canada", (1984) 9 CAN. 
BUS. LJ . 180,197. 
" Greg A. Felllnger, "Letters of Credit: The Autonomy Principle and the Fraud Exception", 
(1990) 1 J. BANKING & FIN.L & PRAC. 4, 11 . 
5'' Gao Xiang, "The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit", p. 39, supra note 38. 
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Old Colony 2X\^ O'Meara presented a modern tendency of the application the 
fraud exception in documentary credits cases in American and English law 
respectively. And Cardozo J's disagreement to the majority judgment in the 
case of O'Meara may be seen as a historical source of the argument on the 
banks' discretion in documentary credits during the application of the fraud 
rule. Of course, no clear principle considering the application of the fraud 
exception was stated in those cases, and controversial issues relevant to the 
extent of the exception, such as whether the materiality of the fraud is 
essential for the application of the fraud exception, or whether the fraudulent 
activity which was made by a third party but not the beneficiary would be 
covered by the fraud exception was not concerned deeply. Nevertheless, the 
historical development of the fraud exception in the United States provided a 
good source and evidence to the existence of the fraud concept in 
documentary credits system. It may also be seen as the guidance to the 
application of the fraud rule in early United States. 
J. The Early Application of the Fraud Rule in the United 
States (Before the UCC1995) 
It is always believed that the United States was the first country which applied 
the fraud rule as an independent exception to the autonomy principle in 
documentary credits. One of the main reasons could be the development of 
71 
Lu Lu: The Exceptions in Documentary Credits in English Law. 
the fraud exception during the "pre-fraud rule" period, which was discussed in 
the early part of the thesis. However, there is one much more essential 
reason which is the existence of American case—Sztejn v. J Henry Schroder 
Banking Corp. Sztejn is a landmark case for the application of the fraud rule, 
not only in the United States but also in England (and Wales) and other 
jurisdictions all over the common law world. 
3 .1 . The landmark case - Sztejn v. J Henry Schroder Bankins Corp^ 
In the case of Sztejn, the initial contract was a bristles sale contract between 
Transea Traders Ltd (the seller) and Sztejn (the buyer). And Schroder was 
the issuing bank who was asked by his customer, Sztejn, to issue a letter of 
credit for the payment to the seller, Transea. Transea then drew a draft to the 
order of a presenting bank, the Chartered Bank. When Chartered Bank 
presented the draft to the issuing bank for payment, Sztejn asked for an 
injunctive relief from the court to stop the issuer to pay on the ground that the 
beneficiary of the credit was actually put 50 cases of "cowhair, other 
worthless material and rubbish with intent to simulate genuine merchandise 
and defraud the plaintiff'.^e Sztejn also alleged that Charter Bank was only a 
collecting bank for Transea, but not an innocent holder of the draft for value. 
Charter bank defended that the presenting bank "is only concerned with the 
5^ Sztejn, supra note 1. 
56 Ibid., 633. 
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documents and on their face these conform to the requirements of the letter 
of credit".57 
During the hearing, Shientag J, followed to the tradition, first acknowledged 
the principle of Autonomy, said: 
"It is well established that a letter of credit is 
independent of the primary contract of sale between 
the buyer and the seller. The issuing bank agrees 
to pay upon presentation of documents, not goods. 
This rule is necessary to preserve the efficiency 
of the letter of credit as an instrument for the 
financing of trade. "=^  
To the issue of banks' relationship with the underlying contract, he 
emphasized that: 
"It would be a most unfortunate interference with 
business transactions if a bank before honouring 
drafts drawn upon it was obliged or even allowed to 
go behind the documents, at the request of the buyer 
and enter into controversies between the buyer and 
the seller regarding the quality of the merchandise 
shipped."" 
However, the judge soon entered into another stage to bring one much more 
important point of this case stated: 
"Of course, the application of this doctrine [the 
principle of independence] presupposes that the 
documents accompanying the draft are genuine and 
conform in terms to the requirements of the letter 
of credit. 
However, I believe that a different situation is 
" Ibid, 632. 
58 Ibid, 633. 
59 Ibid. 
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presented in the instant actions. This is not a 
controversy between the buyer and seller concerning 
a mere breach of warranty regarding the quality of 
the merchandise; on the present motion, it must be 
assumed that the seller has intentionally failed to 
ship any goods ordered by the buyer. In such a 
situation, where the seller's fraud had been called 
to the bank's attention before the drafts and 
documents have been presented for payment, the 
principle of the independence of the bank's 
obligation tinder the letter of credit should not be 
extended to protect the unscrupulous seller... 
Although our courts have used broad language to the 
effect that a letter of credit is independent of the 
primary contract between the buyer and seller, that 
language was used in cases concerning alleged 
breaches of warranty; no case has been brought to 
my attention on this point involving intentional 
fraud on the part of the seller which was brought 
to the bank' s notice with the request what it withhold 
payment o the draft on this account."" 
The above words of Shientag J formed the original application of the fraud 
rule. The judgment of Sztejn was that the Chartered Bank's motion for 
dismissing the plaintiffs complaint was dismissed. And the injunction was 
granted to the plaintiff on the basis of the allegations that "Transea was 
engaged in a scheme to defraud the plaintiff..., that the merchandise shipped 
by Transea is worthless rubbish and that Chartered Bank is not an innocent 
holder of the draft for value but is merely attempting to procure payment of 
the draft for Transea's account"«i was true. 
Unlike earlier cases, which decided on the principle of the law of contract, 
Sztejn \Na& based on an independent rule under the law of letters of credit -
60 Ibid. 634-635. 
" Ibid, 633. 
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the fraud rule. It pointed an exceptional way to applicants who have been 
defrauded by dishonest beneficiaries to protect their interests. Nevertheless, 
Sztejn is a too typical fraud case, in which the fraudulent conduct was 
assumed to be so clear and serious. The judgment was all established on the 
basis of the assumption of the allegation of the fraudulent conducts of 
shipping worthless rubbish on the part of the seller was true. The details of 
the application of the fraud rule was left as a loophole in Sztejn. 
However, two additional issues were discussed during the hearing: 
One is the bank's security interest, which may be seen as one of the reason 
for the application of the fraud rule. Shientag J analyzed the possible effect of 
the fraudulent conducts of the beneficiary to the issuing bank's security 
Interest, said: 
"While the primary factor in the issuance of the 
letter of credit is. the credit standing of the buyer, 
the security afforded by the merchandise is also 
taken into account. In fact, the letter of credit 
requires a bill of lading made out to the order of 
the bank and not the buyer. Although the bank is not 
interested in the exact detailed performance of the 
sales contract, it is vitally interested in assuring 
itself that there are some goods represented by the 
documents. "«^  
The other one is the possibility of the exemption of a holder in due course 
during the practical application of the fraud rule. The judge discussed the 
presenting bank's (the Chartered Bank) position while affirming the 
" Ibid. 634-635. 
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exemption of a holder in due course: 
"On this motion only the complaint is before me and 
I am bound by its allegation that the Chartered Bank 
is not a holder in due course but is a mere agent 
for collection for the account of the seller charged 
with fraud. Therefore, the Chartered Bank's motion 
to dismiss the complaint must be denied, if it had 
appeared from the face of the complaint that the bank 
presenting the draft for payment was a holder in due 
course, its claim against the bank issuing the letter 
of credit would not be defeated even though the 
primary transaction was tainted with fraud."" 
The decision of Sztejn established the basic principles for the application of 
the fraud rule: First, payment under a letter of credit may only be interrupted 
in a case of fraud. But the fraud has to be proven or established; mere 
allegation of fraud should not be an excuse for such an interruption. 
Secondly, the demand of payment from the holder in due course or a 
presenter with similar status may not be defeated even the fraud is clearly 
proved. 
However, the standard of proof for an approved fraud was left as one of the 
most controversial arguments in applying the fraud rule. Some commentators 
believe Sztejn sent forth a test of "intentional fraud''^ " or "egregious fraud"^^ 
to justify the fraud in applying the fraud rule. The "egregious fraud" test was 
even prevailing as a main test for the application of the fraud rule after 
" Ibid. 
" E. L. Symons, "Letter of Credit: Fraud, Good Faith and tine Basis for Injunctive Relief" 
(1980) 54 TuL L Rev 338, 340. 
" H. Harfield, "Enjoining Letter of Credit Transactions" (1978) 95 BLJ 596, 603. 
76 
Lu Lu: The Exceptions in Documentary Credits in English Law. 
Sztej'n.^^ This may somehow because of Shientag J's words that "this is not 
a controversy between the buyer and seller concerning a mere breach of 
warranty regarding the quality of the merchandise; on the present motion, it 
must be assumed that the seller has intentionally failed to ship any goods 
ordered by the buyer...where the merchandise is not merely inferior in quality 
but consists of worthless rubbish"^?. However, the Sztejn case happened in a 
special situation, where the fraud has already been proved and there is no 
doubt that it should be blamed on the beneficiary. The detailed issues 
relevant to the standard of proof for an established fraud in applying the fraud 
exception was not necessarily to be discussed in this case. Shientag J when 
discussed about the autonomy principle in documentary credits also 
expressed the presupposition that "the documents are genuine", but he did 
not explain the real meaning of a "genuine document". Is a false document 
becoming a "genuine document" only because the false statement was not 
put into the documents by the beneficiary himself? He neither explained the 
difference between the "alleged breaches of warranty" and an "established 
fraud" although he believed the alleged breaches of warranty is not an 
established fraud. 
Therefore, Shientag J was possibly only making an adjustment for the Sztejn 
case, where the fraud had already been proved and there was no doubt that 
it was on the part of the beneficiary. Of course, Shientag J was strongly 
^^  See section 3.2.1 and 3.2.4 of this chapter. 
" Ibid. 
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believed that a bank should not consider the underlying contracts while 
performing its payment obligation. He said: 
"it would be a most unfortunate interference with 
business transactions if a bank before honouring 
drafts drawn upon it was obliged or even allowed to 
go behind the documents, at the request of the buyer 
and entered into controversies between the buyer and 
the seller regarding the quality of the merchandise 
shipped"" 
The word "allowed" was even against banks' freedom to investigate the 
possible fraud in the underlying contract. However, he also admitted banks' 
security interest by saying "although the bank is not interested in exact 
detailed performance of the sales contract, it is vitally interested in assuring 
itself that there are some goods represented by the documents." The banks 
should be, at least, entitled to concern the security interests which is 
represented by the documents by investigating the true performance of the 
underlying contract. 
For all the above consideration, the thesis is more inclined to agree to IVIr 
Megrah's view that "judgment [in Sztejn] does not tell what degree of 
knowledge of fraud is necessary to justify the issuing bank in refusing to 
pay"69, Sztejn may be regarded as the seminal case in the development of the 
fraud rule, there was no clear answer to the standard of proof to an 
established fraud. It is even possible that a flexible standard of proof would 
68 Sztejn (1941) 31 NYS 2cl 631, 633, supra note 1. 
65 Mr. Megrah , "Risk Aspects of the Irrevocable Documentary Credit", (1982) 24 Ariz L Rev 
255, 258. 
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be approved if the situation in Sztejn was different. 
3.2. Different test for an established fraud In early case law In the 
United States 
Since Sztejn left a loophole to the standard of proof for the application of the 
fraud rule, the identification of fraud always raise lots of arguments during the 
application. Different tests were applied in different cases. Although the UCC 
1972 used Article 5-114(2)™ to express the application of the fraud rule, the 
details of application was not clear, there were lots of varied tests for an 
established fraud in American law^ ^ before the appearance the Article 5-109 
in the UCC 1995. 
3.2 .1 . The "egregious fraud" test 
"Egregious fraud" is not a term which commonly used by courts in connection 
°^ The UCC (1972 version), Article 5-114(2), unless otherwise agreed when documents 
appear on their face to comply with the terms of a credit but required document does not in 
fact conform to the warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of title(Article 
7-507) or of a certificated security (Article 8-306) or is forged or fraudulent or there is fraud 
in the transaction: (a) the issuer must honour the draft or demand for payment if honour is 
demanded by a negotiating banl< or other holder ofthe draft or demand wliich had tal<enthe 
draft or demand under the credit and under circumstance which would make it a holder in 
due course (Article 3-302) and in an appropriate case would make it a person to whom a 
document of title has been duly negotiated (Article 7-502) or a bona fide purchaser of 
certificated security (Article 8-302); and (b) in all other cases as against customer, an issuer 
acting in good faith may honour tlie draft or demand for payment despite notification from 
the customer of fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent on the face of the documents 
but a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honour. 
^^  Gao Xiang, in his book "The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit" classified the 
standard of fraud in early United States into several catalogues: Egregious Fraud, 
Intentional Fraud, the Letter of credits Fraud, Constructive Fraud and Flexible Fraud, see 
supra note 38. The thesis cited part of the classification. 
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with the fraud in documentary credits.^ = It was established during the 
discussion of the application of the fraud rule in cases by judges. Different 
suggestions for the explanations of the "egregious" were also advocated by 
many commentators." But generally, the test of "egregious fraud" is an 
extreme or outrageous nature of fraud, in which a simply intent to deceive is 
not sufficient.^" 
The case which actually mentioned the term of "egregious fraud" was New 
York Life Insurance Co. v. Hartford National Bank & Trust CoJ^ In this case, 
there was a mortgage loan agreement between the plaintiff and a real estate 
company. According to the agreement, the real estate company committed to 
borrow a certain sum of money from the plaintiff. There was one term in the 
agreement that the real estate company would pay the plaintiff a sum of 
money as damages if he failed to borrow the agreed loan. And this term was 
guaranteed by a standby letter of credit. When the company failed to take up 
the loan, the plaintiff asked for the damages under the credit by presenting 
the required documents under the credit. However, the payment was refused, 
then the plaintiff sued the defendant for a wrongful dishonour. During the 
hearing, the Supreme Court of Connecticut rejected defendant's several 
^^  Gao Xiang and Ross P Bucl<ley, "A Comparative Analysis of tiie Standard of Fraud 
Required Under the fraud rule in Letter of Credit Law", (2003) Oxford U Comparative L 
Forum 3 at http://ouclf.iuscQmp.Qrg/articlg5/gao-buckley,shtml. (Last accessed December, 
2010). 
3^ E.g., Henry Harfield,"Enjoining Letter of Credit Transactions", (1978) 95 BANKING LJ 596; 
Jack B. Justice, "Letters of Credit: Expectations and Frustrations (Pt.l)", (1977) 94 
BANKING L] 424; Jack B. Justice, "Letters of Credit: Expectations and Frustrations 
(Pt.2)",(1977) 94 BANKING L.J. 493. 
'" Kerry L. "Macintosii, Letters of Credit: Dishonour When a Required Document Fails co 
Conform to the Section 7-507(b) Warranty", (1986) 6 J.L & COIM. 1, 6. 
" New York L/fe Insurance Co. v. HartfordNationa/Bank a Trust Co. (1977) 378 A 2d 562. 
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defenses on the basis that none of the defenses involved the plaintiff's fraud. 
And the "egregious fraud " was mentioned by the following statement: 
"Only in rare situations of egregious fraud would ... 
have justified the issuer, on the facts presented 
here, in going behind apparently regular, conforming 
documents; such fraud 'must be narrowly limited to 
situations of fraud in which the wrongdoing of the 
beneficiary has so vitiated the entire transaction 
that the legitimate purposes of the independence of 
the issuer's obligation would no longer be 
served. '...There is no such evidence in the record of 
this case, and the [lower] court correctly found that 
the documentation presented by New York Life 
complied fully with the terms of the letter of 
credit. "^« 
The above words did not only express the application of the "egregious fraud" 
as a test in justifying the fraud in the context of the fraud rule, but also 
explained the term of "egregious fraud" as a fraud "in which the wrongdoing 
of the beneficiary has so vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate 
purposes of the independence of the issuer's obligation would no longer be 
served". Obviously, "egregious fraud" is an extremely serious fraud, the 
possibility of the application of the fraud rule would be very rare if the 
"egregious fraud" would be accepted as the main test to assess the fraud. 
This test was quite popular to be cited by the courts especially in those cases 
where no fraud was involved. 
In another oft-mentioned case Intraworld Industries v. Girard Trust Bank''', 
where the letter of credit was issued in favour of a lessor as the beneficiary to 
6^ Ibid, 557. 
^^  IntraworldIndustries V. G/rard Trust Bank {197S) 336 A. 2d 316. 
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guarantee a rental payment of the lessee, who was the applicant of the credit. 
The applicant was attempting to stop the issuer from payment when the 
beneficiary presented a facially compliant document. The applicant alleged 
that there were false and fraudulent statements in the document. However, 
the court found that the fraud did not exist in that case, and the underlying 
contract indicated that the beneficiary could draw under the letter of credit 
and terminate the lease if the applicant failed to pay the rent. Therefore, there 
was no fraud involved at all. But the court, by rejecting the applicant's claim 
for an injunction, also concluded the reason as follows: 
"We think the circumstance which will justify an 
injunction against honor must be narrowly limited 
to situations of fraud in which the wrongdoing of 
the beneficiary has so vitiated the entire 
transaction that the legitimate purposes of the 
independence of the issuer's obligation would no 
longer be served."''^  
Although the term of "egregious fraud" was not mentioned in this case, but 
the test which the court approved was similar to the meaning of the 
"egregious fraud" in New York Life. The court recognized the existence of the 
fraud rule but was very reluctant to allow its interference with the payment in 
documentary credits. Actually, this is also the main attitude in Sztejn ca^e. 
Although Sztejn itself is only an example of the application of the fraud rule, it 
did not establish a clear standard proof for the application, Shientag J 
suggested his view about the test for an established fraud in another case 
s^ Ibid, 324-325. 
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one year later. 
In the case of AsburyPark & Ocean Grove Bank v. National City Bank of New 
Yorfc^, the underlying contract was a clothing purchase of which the payment 
was to be made by letters of credit. The plaintiff issued a letter of credit by the 
buyers' request to the benefit of the seller. It was then requested by the seller 
that further letters of credit should be issued by some other banks since the 
huge amount of money. Therefore, the plaintiff applied the issuing of other 
letters of credit from the defendant. Later, before the expiration of the credits, 
the plaintiff found that the seller was holding the documents instead of 
presenting for payment after the shipment. And the payment was not asked 
by the seller until the buyer was seemed unable to pay. The plaintiff then 
requested the defendant to stop further payment under the credits. However, 
the defendant rejected the plaintiff's requesting and carried on payment on 
the ground that the documents were in compliance with the terms of the 
credits. The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages. 
Shientag J rejected the plaintiffs allegation of the fraud in this case and 
observed: 
"The authorities...agree that the letters of credit 
are contracts which are independent of the contract 
of purchase •between the seller and the 
purchase...unless there was such a fraud on the part 
of the seller that there were no goods shipped...."^ " 
^' Asbury Park & Ocean Grove Bank v. National City Bank of New york{1942) 35 N.Y.S. 2d 
985. 
80 Ibid, 988. 
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It seems Shientag J, when cited the authority from his own judgment in Sztejn, 
also applied the test of "egregious fraud" which is "there was such a fraud on 
the part of the seller that there were no goods shipped". He also expressed 
his own view about the application of the fraud rule by saying "the common 
law fraud action is one of the most difficult to prove, and the issuing bank 
cannot be expected to evaluate the soundness of the correspondent bank's 
claim."81 Shientag J's reluctant attitude to the application of the fraud rule 
may be the best reason why the "egregious fraud" test is so popularly applied 
by the courts in applying the fraud rule in the United States even after the 
UCC 1995. 
3.2.2. The "intentional fraud" test 
Although the "egregious fraud" test was applied broadly by the courts in early 
United States, the arguments for the appropriate test were not stopped. One 
of the very important test which was suggested by cases in the United States 
was the "intentional fraud" test. 
The idea of "intentional fraud" was raised in the case of NMC Enterprises v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System Inc}^. In NI\/IC, the underlying contract was 
for a purchase of stereo. The letter of credit was issued for the payment of the 
purchase. And an injunction was sought by the buyer (plaintiff) to restrain the 
seller(defendant) from presenting documents for payment on the ground that 
" Ibid, 999. 
82 NMC Enterprises v. Columbia Broadcasting System Jnc{\'ilA) 14 U.C.C. REP.SERV. 
1427. 
84 
Lu Lu: The Exceptions in Documentary Credits in English Law. 
the technical performance specifications for the receivers was substantially 
below those specified in brochures. The plaintiff also alleged that the 
defendant was aware of the non-conformity of documents. 
The injunction was granted by the New York Supreme Court, it was stated: 
"Where no innocent th i rd pa r t i e s are involved and 
where the documents or the underlying transact ion 
are ta inted with in tent ional fraud, the draft need 
not be honored by the bank, even though the documents 
conform on the i r face and the court may grant 
injunctive r e l i e f res t ra in ing such honor. "^ ^ 
The above words did not only mention the term of "intentional fraud", but also 
confirmed the application of the "intentional fraud" test in assessing the fraud 
in applying the fraud rule. The "intentional fraud" is very similar to common 
law fraud, which requires:" (1) a false presentation of the fact; (2) knowledge 
or belief on the part of the defrauder; and (3) an intention to induce the other 
party to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation."^^ 
Considering that the fraud rule is to stop dishonest beneficiaries from abusing 
the letter of credit system, the "intentional fraud" test seems to be an 
appropriate test. Nevertheless, NWCEnterprises \Nd& a special case in which 
the beneficiary's knowledge of non-conformity in the documents was proved 
to the court. In practical operation, the proofing of the fraudster's intention 
can be extremely difficult, which has already proved by the current 
application of the fraud rule in English law. The difficulties appeared similarly 
" Ibid, 1429. 
8* Derry {1889) 14 App Cas 337, 347, per Lord Herschell, supra note 8. 
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in the United States, for example, in the case o\ American Bell International v. 
Islamic Republic oflraif^. 
The fact of American Bell was quite complex. There was a service contract 
between American Bell and the Ministry of War of the Imperil Government of 
Iran. According to the contract, American Bell would provide consulting 
service and telecommunications equipment to the Imperil Government. A 
down payment was involved, and Bell's liability to return the down payment 
would be reduced in proportion to the work completed. A bank guarantee was 
issued by Bank Iranshahr to protect the down payment. And the bank 
guarantee was subsequently "confirmed" by a standby letter of credit which 
was issued by Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company. Later, following to a 
coup, the Imperial Government was replaced by the Islamic Republic in Iran. 
Then Bank Iranshahr requested for payment of the remaining balance of the 
down payment under the credit. American Bell asked for a preliminary 
injunction against the honoring of the credit by alleging that the demand was 
fraudulent because the contract should be repudiated by the movement of 
the government in Iran. The application of American Bell was rejected by 
Macmahon J, the Judge said: 
"Even if we accept the proposition that the evidence 
does show repudiation, plaintiff is still far from 
demonstrating the kind of evil intent necessary to 
support a claim of fraud. Surely, plaintiff cannot 
contend that every party who breaches or repudiates 
his contract is for that reason culpable of fraud... 
^^  American Bell International V. Islamic Republic of Iran (1979) 474 F. Supp. 420. 
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[T]he evidence is ambivalent as to whether the 
purported repudiation results from non-fraudulent 
economic calculation or from fraudulent intent to 
mulct Bell...On the evidence before us fraud is no more 
inferable than an economically rational decision by 
the government to recoup its down payment,..."" 
Macmahon J, while confirmed the intention is essential for the application of 
the fraud rule. It is not hard to see the difficulty to reach standard of proof for 
an intentional fraud, it can be extremely hard to prove the evil intent of the 
party. However, the intention of the beneficiary has already confirmed as an 
essential in the application of the fraud rule in English law. '^ 
3.2.3. The "equitable fraud" test 
While both "egregious fraud" and "intentional fraud" meet difficulty to be 
applied to test the fraud during the application of the fraud rule^ ,^ another test, 
which is the "equitable fraud" test, was suggested in the case of Dymanics 
Corp. of America v. Citizens & Soutiiem Nat'i Banl^'^. 
Dynamics Corp. was a case in which politics was involved. The plaintiff 
(Dymanics) contracted with Indian government to supply some 
defence-related equipment. The obligation of the supply was guaranteed by a 
standby letter of credit which was issued by the Citizens & Southern National 
Bank (the defendant). According to the credit, the defendant promised to pay 
86 Ibid, 425. 
8^  See the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of Un/ted C/ty Merch3nts[19S3] 1 A.C. 
168 (HL), supra note 3. 
8^  While for "egregious fraud", the standard seems too high, and for "intentional fraud", 
although it might be reasonable to the purpose of protecting innocent parties, the intention 
of beneficiaries was so difficult to prove. 
8' Dymanics Corp. of America v. Citizens & Soutiiern Nat'i Banic {1973) 356 F. Supp. 911 
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Indian Government (a certificate and some relevant documents were 
required) if the plaintiff failed to do certain obligations under the contract. 
Later on, a war between Indian and Pakistan broke out. The military 
equipment supplied became illegal by the announcement of the U.S 
government. The Indian government presented the required certificate 
documents to apply for the payment under the credit. The plaintiff then sought 
for an injunction to prevent the defendant from payment on the ground of the 
fraud of the Indian government. 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, while 
granting the injunction, settled a very rare test for the fraud in the fraud rule: 
"The law of ' fraud' is not static and the courts have, 
over the years, adapted it to the changing nature 
of commercial transactions in our society... [I]n a 
suit for equitable relief—such as this one—it is not 
necessary that plaintiff establish all the elements 
of actionable fraud required in a suit for monetary 
damages. "Fraud had broader meaning in equity [than 
at law] and intention to defraud or to misrepresent 
in not a necessary element. Fraud, indeed, in the 
sense of a court of equity properly includes all acts, 
omissions and concealments which involve a breach 
of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence. 
Justly reposed, and injurious to another, or by which 
an undue and unconscious advantage is taken of 
another. "50 
According to the above judgement, "any conduct of the beneficiary that 
breaks even an equitable duty may lead to the application of the fraud rule".^ ^ 
9° Ibid, 998 to 999, citing SEC K Cap/ta/ Gains Research Bureau Inc. (1953) 375 US 180, 
193 to 194. 
'1 Gao Xiang and Ross P Buckley, "A Comparative Analysis of the Standard of Fraud 
Required Under the fraud rule in Letter of Credit Law", supra note 72, 
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Looking back to the original purpose of having the fraud exception, which is 
"the principle of the independence of the bank's obligation under the letter of 
credit should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous seller..."92, the 
equitable fraud test seems to be too low as a standard of proof in applying the 
fraud exception in documentary credits system. If the test is set in such a low 
position, the inherent commercial functions of documentary credits, such like 
prompt payment, shared security, will be heavily destroyed. "In the 
commercial world, there are almost limitless ways in which an applicant's 
bargain with a beneficiary may go sour. When this happens, the applicant will 
be tempted to use every means to escape from its original bargain; 
exploitation of the fraud rule may be one of its choices."^^ The low standard 
may become a useful weapon for the applicant to abuse the fraud rule to 
avoid a letter of credit contract. The utility of documentary credits would be 
ruined. The purpose of the fraud rule, which was to avoid fraud in 
documentary credits, will not be satisfied and may cause unfairness in 
another direction. Therefore, the equitable fraud test may not be proper one 
in the fraud rule. 
3.2.4. Discussion 
According to the above analysis, the standard of proof in proofing a fraud was 
not a settled issue either in the landmark case Sztejn or the UCC Article 5 of 
" Sztejn, at 634, supra note 1. 
" Gao Xiang and Ross P Buckley, , "A Comparative Analysis of the Standard of Fraud 
Required Under the fraud rule in Letter of Credit Law", supra note 72. 
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version 1972. The unclear test caused different applications in different cases. 
Some courts stuck to a strict and restrictive approach and adopted an 
"egregious fraud" test, while others took a much different approach by 
adopting an "equitable fraud" test. In comparison to two contradictive 
standards, the "intentional fraud" test might be in a more reasonable position. 
Because all the fraud should be intentional in some sense, to avoid the 
embarrassing situation in approving different tests in justifying the fraud 
during the application of the fraud rule in documentary credits cases, some 
neutral ideas of application were raised during the early development of the 
fraud rule in the United States. 
In the case of United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp?\ where 
the beneficiary, Duck, fraudulently shipped "old, unpadded, ripped and 
mildewed gloves" instead of "new gloves" which was required in the 
underlying sale contract with a presentation of facially complying document to 
ask for payment, an interlocutory injunction to prevent the issuer from 
payment was granted to the plaintiff purchaser. The issuer, Pakistani 
Financing Banks, claimed that they "were holders in due course of the drafts 
and hence were entitled to the proceeds thereof irrespective of any defenses 
against the beneficiary"^^ But the petition was rejected by the Court of Appeal. 
The New York Court of Appeals introduced a flexible test by saying: 
"It should be noted that the drafters of section 5—114, 
9" United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp. (1976) 392 N.Y.S. 2d 265. 
95 Ib id . 
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in their attempt to codify the Sztejn case and in 
utilizing the term 'fraud in the transaction', have 
eschewed a dogmatic approach and adopted a flexible 
standard to be applied as the circumstance of a 
particular situation mandate. It can be difficult 
to draw a precise line between cases involving breach 
of warranty (or a difference of opinion as to the 
quality of goods) and outright fraudulent practice 
on the part of the seller. To the extent, however, 
that Cambridge established that Duck was guilty of 
fraud in shipping, not merely nonconforming 
merchandise, but worthless fragments of boxing 
gloves, this case is similar to Sztejn,'"' 
The flexible test may be reasonable in adapting in different cases while 
applying the fraud rule. The application of different tests in different cases 
may offer a broader way to apply the fraud rule. However, the range of the 
flexibility was not solved at the same time. The flexible test was only a wise 
manner to avoid the embarrassment of the uncertain rule for the application 
of the fraud rule in earlier United States. 
4. The Application of the Fraud Rule after the UCC1995 
After a long period of the unclear application of the fraud rule. Article 5-109 of 
the UCC in 1995 version first statutorily regulated the fraud rule as an 
exception in documentary credits.^ ^ This article is also applied in the later 
9« Ibid, 271. 
" The most recent version is the UCC (2004 version). SECTION 5-109. FRAUD AND 
FORGERY. 
(a) If a presentation is made that appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms and 
conditions of the letter of credit, but a required document is forged or materially fraudulent, 
or honor of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer 
or applicant: (1) the issuer shall honor the presentation, if honor is demanded by (i) a 
nominated person who has given value in good faith and without notice of forgery or 
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versions of the UCC.^ ^ 
Besides a listing of four types of parties who may be immune from the fraud 
rule, there is one essential in Article 5-109 that the "material fraud" test has 
been settled as the test to assess the fraud while applying the fraud rule. And 
Official Comment on Article 2-109 also offered some explanations for the 
"material fraud". For commercial letters of credit, it indicated that material 
fraud "requires that the fraudulent aspect of a document be material to a 
purchaser of that document or that the fraudulent act be significant to the 
participants in the underlying transaction"ss. And for standby letters of credit, 
the Official Comment states that "material fraud by the beneficiary occurs 
only when the beneficiary has no colourable right to expect honor and where 
there is no basis in fact to support such a right to honor".'^ 
The "material fraud" test made the seriousness of the fraud been the only line 
material 
fraud, (ii) a confirmer who has honored its confirmation in good faith, (iii) a holder in due 
course of a draft drawn under the letter of credit which was taken after acceptance by the 
issuer or nominated person, or (iv) an assignee of the issuer's or nominated person's 
deferred obligation that was taken for value and without notice of forgery or material fraud 
after the obligation was incurred by the issuer or nominated person; and (2) the issuer, 
acting in good faith, may honor or dishonor the presentation in any other case, (b) If an 
applicant claims that a required document is forged or materially fraudulent or that honor of 
the presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or 
applicant, a court of competent jurisdiction may temporarily or permanently enjoin 
the issuer from honoring a presentation or grant similar relief against the issuer or other 
persons only if the court finds that: (1) the relief is not prohibited under the law applicable 
to an accepted draft or deferred obligation incurred by the issuer; (2) a beneficiary, issuer, 
or nominated person who may be adversely 
affected is adequately protected against loss that it may suffer because the relief is granted; 
(3) all of the conditions to entitle a person to the relief under the law of this State have been 
met; and (4) on the basis of the information submitted to the court, the applicant is more 
likely than not to succeed under its claim of forgery or material fraud and the person 
demanding honor does not qualify for protection under subsection (a) (1). 
'* The most recent version is the UCC 2004. The Article relevant to the fraud rule is 
SECTION 5-109. FRAUD AND FORGERY. 
'5 Official Comment 1, para.2. 
1"° Ibid. 
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to decide the establishment of the fraud. And following to the official 
explanation the connection between the fraud and the underlying contract 
becomes the criteria to decide the materiality in commercial letters of credit. A 
"significant" influence to the underlying transaction was explained as a 
material connection. The thesis considers the "material fraud" test as a quite 
reasonable test to assess the fraud in applying the fraud rule. Of course, the 
"material fraud" test focused on the effect of the fraud rather than the 
intention of the fraud. But comparing to the confused application in early time 
in the United States, at least, a unified approving of the material fraud test 
can make the application of the fraud rule being achievable. And it is not 
difficult to explain the application of the materiality fraud test in the United 
States. In the early landmark case Sztej'n, although the standard of proof for 
an established fraud in applying the fraud rule'was not clearly discussed, the 
influence of the fraud conduct to the whole documentary credit transaction 
had already been seen as a main criterion to decide the reasonability of the 
application of the fraud rule. Although the intention of the beneficiary was 
mentioned by the judge as a factor which may affect the application of the 
fraud rule, and the concept of "intentional fraud" was popular in America Law, 
Shientag J's position was always on the side of "egregious fraud" rather than 
the "intentional fraud"''°^ Shientag J's approval of "egregious fraud" was 
clearly expressed in his judgment in another case Asbury Parlc°^. In other 
words, traditionally, American courts emphasized the seriousness of the fraud 
101 See section 3.1 of this chapter. 
'"^  Asbury Park & Ocean Grove Bank {Vi A,!) 35 N.Y.S. 2d 985, supra note 79. 
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rather than the intention of the beneficiary while considering the application of 
the fraud rule. However, the materiality issue Itself is more like a flexible issue 
rather than a certain one. The Official Comments expressed clearly that 
courts must decide the breadth and width of "materiality."^°3 Consequently, 
the courts' discretion may be essential to the judgment in different cases. 
According to the two recent cases, the material fraud test was not easy to 
achieve at all. 
In Mid-America Tire v. PTZ Trading Ltd Import and Export Agent°\ which 
happened in 2000, a transaction was financed by a letter of credit, and the 
quality, quantity and price of the goods were all negotiated and specified in 
the credit. However, the quality, quantity and price were all failed to match the 
requirement. The buyer sought an injunction to prevent the payment under 
the letter of credit on the basis of the fraud. Although the trial court granted 
the injunction on the ground of the misrepresentation, the decision was 
reversed by during the appeal, it was decided that the applying of the fraud 
rule "must be narrowly limited to situations of fraud in which the wrongdoing 
of the beneficiary has ...vitiated the entire transaction".^"^ The material fraud 
was explained in this case as a fraud which has to vitiate the entire 
transaction. This test was much higher than that of a significant influence to 
the underlying transaction. A similar situation was happened in a standby 
1°^  Official Comment 1, para.2. 
104 Mid-America Tire K PTZ Trading Ltd Import and Export Agent 2QQQ Ohio App. LEXIS 
5402; (2000) 43 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 964. Judgment delivered by Young PJ, 
Walsh J concurred, Valen J dissented. 
^°^ Gao Xiang, "The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit", p. 87, supra note 38. 
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letter of credit case. New Orleans Brass v. Whitney National Bank and the 
Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District'^. 
In that case, a standby letter of credit was issued by the Whitney Bank to 
guarantee the rental payments to the Louisiana Stadium and Exposition 
District (LSED) from New Orleans brass (Brass). When LSED asked for the 
payment under the credit by presenting required documents. Brass asked for 
an injunction from the court to prevent the payment on the ground that there 
were some false statements in the documents. The request was rejected 
during the trial. Then Brass appealed. During the appeal, the decision was 
affirmed by the reasoning of no "material fraud" was found in the case. The 
"material fraud" was defined during the judgment as the fraud can only be 
invoked when the demand for payment has "absolutely no basis in fact" or 
the beneficiary's conduct has "so vitiated the entire transaction that the 
legitimate purposes of the independence of the issuer's obligation would no 
longer be served". 
It seems that, in both the commercial letters credit and standby letters credit 
cases, the "material fraud" was explained by the court as a fraud which 
vitiated the entire transaction. This explanation is exactly the same as which 
was made by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in New York Life'^^'^, but for 
the "egregious fraud". Clearly, American courts are still applying the 
106 i\iew Orleans Brass v. Whitney National Bank and the Louisiana Stadium and Exposition 
District [2QQ2) La. App. LEXIS 1764. 
107 See section 3.2.1. of this chapter. 
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"egregious fraud" test to assess the fraud during the practical consideration 
for the application of the fraud. This extremely high test left the application of 
the fraud rule back to the dark again.^ "^  
5. The Early Development of the Fraud Rule in English law 
5.1 Reasons of the application of the fraud rule 
In English law there is no statute Law specifically admits the existence of the 
fraud rule. Even in the latest version of the UCP, UCP 600, the fraud 
exception is not even mentioned while the autonomy principle is in an 
irreplaceable position.^ o^ The application of the fraud rule can only be traced 
in case law. Actually, the old case law also showed a reluctant approach of 
English Courts to interfere with the operation of documentary credits. 
In the old case of Hamzeh Ma/as & Sons v. British /max Industrial Ltd.''''^, 
although it was not a fraud related case, the English Court's approach in 
interfering in documentary credits cases has been expressed. In British Imex, 
^°* For more recent relevant cases in the United States, see Jaffie v. Bank of Am. N.A., (2010) 
U.S. App. LEXIS 18496, also Sava Gumarska in Kemijska Industria D.D. v. Advanced 
PolymerScis., Inc., (2004) Tex. App. LEXIS 958. 
^° ' The UCP 600, Article 4. Credits v. Contracts a. A credit by its nature is a separate 
transaction from the sale or other contract on which it may be based. Banks are in no way 
concerned with or bound by such contract, even if any reference whatsoever to it is included 
in the credit. Consequently, the undertaking of a bank to honour, to negotiate or to fulfil any 
other obligation under the credit is not subject to claims or defences by the applicant 
resulting from its relationships with the issuing bank or the beneficiary. A beneficiary can in 
no case avail itself of the contractual relationships existing between banks or between the 
applicant and the issuing bank. 
"0 Hamzeh Ma/as & Sons v. British Imex Industrial Ltd. [1958] 2 Q.B. 127. 
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the plaintiff was a buyer who contracted with the defendant seller to buy the 
steel rods by installments. The payment was arranged by two confirmed 
letters of credit which were issued by the Midland Bank Ltd. After the 
payment against the first instalment, the plaintiff sought an injunction to 
prevent the defendant from asking for payment by alleging that the first 
instalment was defective. 
Jenkins LJ rejected the plaintiffs application for the Injunction in the Court of 
Appeal, and expressed his view on the autonomy of the credit as follows: 
"We have been referred to a number of authorities, 
and it seems to be plain enough that the opening of 
a confirmed letter of credit constitutes a bargain 
between the banker and the vendor of the goods, which 
impose upon the banker an absolute obligation to pay, 
irrespective of any dispute there may be between the 
parties as to whether the goods are up to contract 
or not. An elaborate commercial system has been built 
up on the footing that bankers' confirmed credits 
are of that character, and, in my judgment, it would 
be wrong for this court in the present case to 
interfere with that established practice. "'^^ 
The above words of Jenkins LJ clearly showed that English courts have 
traditionally been hesitant to interfere with the operation of documentary 
credits in respect to the autonomy of credits. A confirmed letter of credit 
"imposed upon the banker an absolute obligation to pay, irrespective of any 
dispute there may be between the parties as to whether the goods are up to 
the contract or not''.'^ ^ However, English courts' reluctant attitude does not 
1" Ibid, 129 
"2 Ibid. 
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lead to a rejection to the fraud rule in English law. In opposition, Sellers LJ, in 
the same case after expressing his approval to Jenkins LJ's submission, 
admits that "there may well be cases where the court would exercise 
jurisdiction as in a case where there is a fraudulent transaction."^^^ 
In fact, except for the strong principle of autonomy, an acceptance of the 
fraud rule has sufficient reason ability. On the reverse, a rejection of the fraud 
rule may cause many problems. 
Firstly, according to the autonomy principle in documentary credits, all the 
parties under a letter of credit are dealing with documents, not goods. If 
documents tendered appear on their face to be in strict compliance with the 
terms and conditions stipulated in the credit, the issuer will pay despites any 
disputes or claims relevant to the underlying transaction. The bank is only 
responsible to the applicant to take reasonable care to ensure that the 
documents tendered are on their face complying with the terms and 
conditions of the credits. This doctrine no doubt promotes the smooth of the 
operation of documentary credits. The efficiency of documentary credits 
system is also mainly achieved from this doctrine. Nevertheless, in 
accordance with the autonomy principle, beneficiaries may not be required to 
show that they have properly performed their duties under the underlying 
contract, which is normally to deliver the proper goods or provide the proper 
service, all they have to do is to present conforming documents. A separation 
1" Ibid, 130. 
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between documents and the actual performance of the underlying contract 
leaves a space to those unscrupulous sellers to abuse the system by their 
fraudulent conducts. "From the criminal point of view, the beauty of 
documentary fraud is that there is no need to have the correct amount or type 
of cargo on board the ship before presenting the 'proof of loading which will 
enable them to claim payment. In fact, it is not even necessary to have a 
ship.""" Therefore, to avoid the abuse of the credit, it is necessary to have 
some rule to restrict the seller's rights when a fraud happens. With the fraud 
rule in place, the gap between the documentary credits system and 
fraudulent conduct may be narrowed, though it may not prevent all the 
possible fraudulent activities that may happen during the operation. 
Secondly, the documentary credits system does not only offer the seller a 
safe environment to do business, it is also crucial to both the applicant and 
the bank. For the applicant, documents are proof of the performance of the 
underlying contract of the beneficiary; and for the bank, documents may also 
be seen, more or less, as security interests. What is more, if there is a chain 
contract, the genuineness of documents in documentary credits may be more 
important because of the possible effect on other parities. A serious false 
statement may cause a total nullity of a document. Because of the central 
position of documents in documentary credit system, a null document may 
also heavily influent the utility of the credit. 
Thirdly, it is well known that, it is a basic obligation of the beneficiary to 
" " Barbara Conway, "the Piracy Business" (Hamlyn, 1981), p. 23-25. See also Barbara 
Conway, "Maritime Fraud" (Lloyd's of London Press, 1990), p. 8-9. 
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present complying documents in documentary credits. Banks are only liable 
to examine the documents on their face. However, according to the historical 
development of the fraud exception in the United States, it was always being 
argued that whether a document containing a false statement could be seen 
as a conforming document, even before the birth of the fraud rule. In the case 
of Higg/ns, the court made the decision on the basis that payment against a 
bill of lading with a false statement would be "unauthorized", and believed the 
credit which contained a false shipment date was an unused credit. A false 
statement may cause the collapse of a credit. In a later case of O/d Co/ony^^, 
the court also made its decision on the basis that fraudulent documents could 
not be considered as complying documents. "When the issuer of a letter of 
credit knows that a document, although correct in form, is, in point of fact, 
false or illegal, he cannot be called upon to recognize such a document as 
complying with the terms of a letter of credit." The judgment was made in 
view of the internal fraudulent but not the face incompliance, which means 
although the facial compliance is a requirement by the documentary credits 
system, there is a clear support by the court for concerning the inside content 
of documents before the birth of the fraud rule. 
Last but not the least; although a documentary credit contract is separated 
from the underlying contract, in the end, it is only a means of payment for the 
underlying contract. The performing of the letter of credit is also a part of the 
performance of the underlying contract. A false statement or other fraudulent 
" ' Old Colony, (1924) 297 F 152, supra note 44. 
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issues during the operation of documentary credits is no doubt contrary to the 
fundamental principle of the underlying contract. The existence of the fraud 
rule is absolutely crucial to both the underlying transactions and documentary 
credits. 
5.2. The early application of the fraud rule In English law. 
5.2.1. The case of Discount Records 
By applying the decision of the case of Sztejn in Edward Owen^''^, the fraud 
exception was accepted in English law as an exception in documentary 
credits. The most often mentioned case which admitted the judgment of the 
America case Sztejn was Discount Records Ltd v. Barclays Bank Ltd and 
Barclays Bank InternationalLtd^''. 
In Discount Records, the plaintiffs, Discount Records Ltd., ordered a number 
of cassettes and gramophone records specified by numbers in 
accompanying lists from a French company, Promodisc. On May 17, 1974, 
the plaintiffs signed instructions to the first defendant bank for an irrevocable 
documentary credit with full cash cover, the credit being made through the 
second defendant. The beneficiaries of the credit were named as the French 
company and the credit was for 44,175 francs. The goods were delivered to 
"« [1978] Q.B. 159. See section 1.2 of this chapter. 
"^ Discount Records Ltd i/. Bare/ays Bank Ltd and Barclays Bank International Ltd [I'^IS] 
Lloyd's Re p. 444. 
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the plaintiffs on June 16. It was found by the plaintiff that the goods did not 
comply with the order and further that the numbers on the boxes had been 
altered to comply with the specifications. Accordingly, the plaintiff alleged that 
the French company was guilty of fraud. The plaintiffs therefore instructed the 
first defendants to reject the payment under the credit. By letter dated June 
24, the first defendants stated that there was no way that they could avoid 
making payment and refused to give an undertaking not to pay since the 
credit was an irrevocable confirmed credit. Then plaintiffs brought a motion 
for an interlocutory injunction against both defendants to restrain them from 
payment. 
During the judgment, Megarry J, after emphasizing the fact of the case, 
mentioned the fraud rule which was established in the case of Sztejn, said: 
"...there was no English authority directly on the 
point or anywhere nears it, but he did put before 
me the case of Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking 
Corporation, 31N.Y.S. 2d. series, 613 (1941), a case 
which is summarized in Gutteridge and Megrah, The 
Law of Bankers' Commercial Credits (4th ed. 1968), 
pp. 133, 134. There, it was alleged that the seller 
had shipped rubbish and then passed his draft for 
collection. At p. 633 Judge Shientag referred to the 
well-established rule that a letter of credit is 
independent of the primary contract of sale between 
the buyer and the seller, so that unless the letter 
of credit otherwise provides, the bank is neither 
obliged nor allowed to enter into controversies 
between buyer and seller regarding the quality of 
the merchandise shipped. However, the learned Judge 
(and I use the phrase as no eaopty conqpliment) 
distinguished mere breaches of warraAty of quality 
from cases where the seller has intentionally failed 
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to ship any of the goods ordered by the buyer. In 
relation to the latter case, at p. 634 the Judge 
uttered a sentence (quoted in the book) upon which 
Mr. Pain placed great reliance. 
. . . where the seller's fraud has been called to 
the bank * s attention before the drafts and documents 
have been presented for payment, the principle of 
the independence of the bank:' s obligation under the 
letter of credit should not be extended to protect 
the unscrupulous seller. "^^^  
Although the fraud rule was admitted as itself, and it was proved by the 
plaintiff that "there were 94 cartons, but of these two were empty, five were 
filled with rubbish or packing, 25 of the record boxes and three of the cassette 
boxes were only partly filled, and two boxes labelled as cassettes were filled 
with records; instead of 825 cassettes, as ordered, there were only 518 
cassettes and 25 cartridges. Out of the 518 cassettes delivered, 75 per cent 
were not as ordered; instead of 112 different records as ordered, only 12 
different records were dispatched; and, in total, out of the 8625 records 
ordered, only 275 were delivered as per order. The rest were not as ordered 
and were either rejects or unsalable""^ the judge did not apply the fraud rule 
in this case by relying on that the fraud was not clearly established, he 
explained the reason as follows: 
"However, it is important to notice that in the Sztejn 
case the proceedings consisted of a motion to dismiss 
the formal complaint on the ground that it disclosed 
no cause of action. That being so, the Court had to 
assume that the facts stated in the complaint were 
true. The complaint alleged fraud, and so the Court 
was dealing with a case of established fraud. In the 
118 Ibid. 446-447. 
1 " Ibid, 444, 446. 
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present case there is, of course, no established 
fraud, but merely an allegation of fraud. The 
defendants, who were not concerned with that matter, 
have understandably adduced no evidence on the issue 
of fraud. Indeed, it seems unlikely that any action 
to which Promodisc was not a party would contain the 
evidence required to resolve this issue. Accordingly, 
the matter has to be dealt with on the footing that 
this is a case in which fraud is alleged but has not 
been established. "^=° ' 
It can be seen from the above words that the test for the establishment of the 
fraud applied by the court was quite different from the "materiality fraud" test, 
which applied in the UCC Article 5 in the United States. The evidence which 
was proved by the plaintiff showing that a great proportion of the shipment 
was either rubbish or empty cartons, and the evidence was affirmed by the 
judge. However, the fraud was still considered as not being established, but 
merely an allegation of fraud. The reason was because "Promodisc was not a 
party", and the matter has not been dealt with "on the footing". The 
involvement of the beneficiary has been seen as a footing requirement for the 
application the fraud rule in English law. The fraud rule may not be applied no 
matter how material the fraud is as long as the beneficiary was not involved in 
the fraud. The test applied in Discount Records vja& similar to the intentional 
fraud test in early United States, in which the intention of the fraudulent party 
is concerned as a main condition for the application of the fraud rule. 
It is interesting that, the court rejected the plaintiffs petition of the injunction 
also by considering that "the injunction against the two defendants if granted, 
120 Ibid. 447. 
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would not achieve IVIr. Pain's avowed purpose, which was to prevent 
Promodisc from being paid. Promodisc, indeed, may already have been paid 
by discounting the bill. All that the injunction would do would be to prevent the 
banks concerned from honouring their obligations".^ ^^ Clearly, the balance of 
convenience has already been considered by English courts in the early 
application of the fraud rule, and the bank's independent position under the 
letters of credits was treasured during the judgement. 
5.2.2. The case of Ghn Singh 
A more clear approach of English courts to attach the weight to the bank's 
autonomy obligation and title under the credit was shown by the case of Giar) 
Singii & Co. Ltd. v. Banque de L 'idociiine Judiciai Committee of tiie Pn'vy 
Council''^. 
The facts of the case were as follows: 
The plaintiff company requested the defendant bank to open an irrevocable 
letter of credit in favour of Thai Lung Ship Machine Manufactory of Taiwan (T). 
The credit was required to meet the purchase price of a fishing vessel to be 
constructed by the beneficiary. It was a specific condition of the letter of credit 
that a certificate, which has to be signed by Balwant Singh, holder of 
Malaysian passport no. E. 13276 and countersigned by the defendant bank, 
to certify that the vessel had been built according to specifications and was in 
121 Ib id . 
122 Gian Singh & Co. Ltd. v. Banque de L Idochine Judiciai Committee of the Privy Council 
[1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1. 
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a fit and proper condition to sail, must be produced to the defendant's agent 
in Taiwan before payment. The defendants paid T under the credit. The 
plaintiffs then discovered that the vessel was 14 years old. They, accordingly, 
sued the defendants by claiming that the defendants had wrongfully debited 
their account by the following reasons: (i) Balwant Singh's signature to the 
certificate stating that the vessel had been built according to the specification 
and was in a fit and proper condition to sail had been forged; and (ii) Balwant 
Singh 's signature ceased to be his signature within the meaning of the credit 
in view of the fact that he had signed between the rubber stamped words 
stating the name of the plaintiffs and the word "director". 
During the trial, it was held by the Supreme Court of Singapore that the 
plaintiffs has not clearly established that the signature was a forgery . Then 
the plaintiffs appealed. On the appeal, the finding that the signature on the 
certificate was not a forgery was reversed. However, the appeal was still 
dismissed because the certificate had complied with the terms of the credit. 
During the appeal, all the judges agreed that the plaintiff company had 
proved that the signature on the certificate was forged. But the three different 
judges coincidently dismissed the appeal for similar reasons. 
"...it is the identity of the person who is to certify 
which is of importance and this requirement must be 
strictly adhered to. 
In my judgment the certificate that was produced 
complied exactly and strictly with the condition 
stipulated in the letter of credit and the bank 
conformed strictly to the instructions it received. 
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Accordingly I am of the opinion that the t r i a l Judge 
was r ight in dismissing the appel lan t ' s claim and 
I would dismiss the appeal with cos t s . " (Wee Chong 
J i n , C . J . ) i " 
"...the fact that the signature on the c e r t i f i c a t e was 
not the genuine signature of Balwant Singh does not 
avail the p l a in t i f f company as in the circumstances 
of t h i s case the defendant bank's agent in Taiwan, 
i . e . , the paying bank was in no posi t ion to be aware 
of the forgery. 
The crucial question to be decided in th i s appeal 
i s whether the c e r t i f i c a t e which was tendered to the 
paying bank complied with the terms of the l e t t e r 
of c r ed i t . " (Mr. Just ice Tan Ah Tah)i2< 
"In my opinion the p l a in t i f f successfully proved 
that the c e r t i f i c a t e in question was a forgery but 
that fact alone i s not of much assis tance to the 
p l a in t i f f because the paying bank, i . e . , the 
defendant's agent in Taiwan, had no knowledge of the 
forgery and i t was en t i t l ed to assume that the 
c e r t i f i c a t e was genuine when there was nothing on 
the face of i t to indicate anything to the contrary. 
The main issue before the t r i a l Court was, as in th i s 
appeal whether the c e r t i f i c a t e tendered was in 
accord with the terms of the l e t t e r of c red i t . " (Mr. 
Just ice Choor Singh)'" 
The above reasons, which were expressed by different judges during the 
appeal, cleared showed the court's approaches in dealing with cases where a 
forgery involved in a letter of credit case: the bank is only obliged to pay 
reasonable care to examine the facial conformity of the documents; the bank 
is not liable to examine the inside genuineness of documents, so the bank is 
in no position to aware of a forgery; the bank is entitled to assume that 
documents are genuine when there was nothing on the face of the 
1 " Ibid. 2. 
12" Ibid. 3. 
"5 Ibid. 4-5. 
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documents indicating anything of contrary. After all, a document may be seen 
as a complying document by the bank even there is an inside forgery as long 
as the forgery was not on the face of the document and was not known to the 
bank at the time of payment. 
The decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed by the Privy Council later by 
Lord Diplock. He expressed his point of view after a review of judgments both 
in the trial and the appeal: 
"The fact that a document presented by the 
beneficiary under a documentary credit, which 
otherwise conforms to the requirements of the credit, 
is in fact a forgery does not, of itself, prevent 
the issuing bank from recovering from its customer 
moneys paid under the credit. The duty of the issuing 
bank, which it may perform either by itself, or by 
its agent, the notifying bank, is to examine 
documents with reasonable care to ascertain that 
they appear on their face to be in accordance with 
the terms and conditions of the credit. The express 
provision to this effect in article 7 of the Uniform 
Customs and Practice for documentary credits does 
no more than re-state the duty of the bank at common 
law. In business transactions financed by 
documentary credits banks must be able to act 
promptly on presentation of the documents. In the 
ordinary case visual inspection of the actual 
documents presented is all that is called for. The 
bank is under no duty to take any further steps to 
investigate the genuineness of a signature which, 
on the face of it, purports to be the signature of 
the person named or described in the letter of 
• credit. "i2« 
And the final decision of Gian Singh ^ as, that the forgery of the certificate was 
126 Ib id , 1 1 . 
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proved by the evidence, however, the plaintiff was not succeeded in showing 
the incompliance of the documents and the defendant bank was not liable for 
the forgery. The appeal was dismissed again in the end. 
Gian Singh was a case in which the forgery was clearly proved during the 
judgment. Although the fraud rule was not clearly mentioned in this case as a 
separate rule, it may be seen from this case that there is one important 
condition in applying the fraud exception which is the fraud has to be noticed 
by the bank. It is not the bank's responsibility to detect the fraud in the 
transaction or assess inside genuineness of the documents. The bank is only 
obliged to examine the facial compliance of the document. In another word, 
the bank is eligible to get the reimbursement from his client even the payment 
was paid against a forged document or even there is a fraud as long as the 
face of the document was complying with the credit and the bank was not 
aware of the forgery or the fraud. 
Discount Records and Gian Singti showed a clear approach of the 
application of the fraud rule in English law. In Discount Records, the evidence 
of the nonconforming of the goods was very clear; however, the beneficiary's 
non-involvement to the fraud led the court to decline the establishment of the 
fraud in this case. In Gian Singii, the fraud was established, but the 
application of the fraud rule still failed because the bank had no knowledge of 
the fraud at the time of payment. It might be concluded from the two cases 
that there were two essentials in applying the fraud rule in English law: the 
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involvement of the beneficiary and the knowledge of the bank. The decisions 
of the two cases implied a rough trend for the application of the fraud rule, 
however, the rule has not been clearly established until the famous case of 
United City l\/lervtiants Ltd. and Glass Fibres and Equipments Ltd. v. Royai 
Ban/( of Canada Respondents. '^ ^ 
5.2.3. United City Merchants 
The facts of United City l\/ferciiants relevant to the issue of the application of 
the fraud rule was as follows: 
In 1975, Glass Fibre and Equipment Ltd (GFE) contracted with a Peruvian 
buyer to sell a certain amount of glass fibre making equipment. The payment 
was arranged by an irrevocable letter of credit which was issued by the 
Banco Continental SA of Peru. The credit was later confirmed by the Royal 
Bank of Canada (RBC). As the beneficiary of the credit, GFE assigned its 
rights under the credit to United City Merchants (UCM). The banks were all 
aware of the assignment. According to the bill of lading, which was one of the 
most important required documents under the credit the latest shipment date 
was 15"^  December 1976. The shipment was then carried out by a broker 
after GFE sent the goods for a temporary storage to its agent. GFE also told 
the forwarding agent and the employee of the broker the requirements of the 
bill of lading, including the latest shipment date. However, the shipment was 
not completed until 16^ ^ of December 1976, while it was stated on the bill of 
' " United City Merchants [19Q3'\ 1 A.C. 168 (HL), supra note 3. 
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lading that the shipment date was 15"^  of December. At the time of payment, 
RBC rejected the document on the ground that the shipment date on the bill 
of lading was not true. GFE then sued RBC for wrongful dishonour. During 
the trial, it was confirmed by the court that the shipment date on the bill of 
lading was rendered by the broker without the notice of GFE and its assignee 
UCM. Mocatta J affirmed the principle that the letter of credit composed the 
bank an absolute obligation to pay against conforming documents 
irrespective of any underlying contractual disputes by accepting the 
exception of "the bank ought not to pay under the credit if it knows that the 
documents are forged or that the request for payment is made fraudulently in 
circumstances where there is no right to payment".^ ^a 
Mocatta J held that the plaintiffs were innocent of the brokers' fraud; the 
defendants were not entitled to reject the documents by relying on the fraud 
rule. But the contract and the letters of credit were unenforceable because 
the contract of sale and purchase was a disguise for exchanging currencies. 
Then the plaintiffs appealed. 
5.2.3.1. Court of Appeal 
During the appeal, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court relevant 
to the application of the fraud rule and held that, fraud such as to entitle a 
banker to refuse to pay under a letter of credit notwithstanding the strict 
general rule requiring payment where the documents were in order on their 
128 UnitedC/ty Merchants [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep 267, 276 (QB), supra note 3. 
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face, included fraud to which the seller or beneficiary was not party and, 
accordingly, the defendant were right to refuse to pay on the ground that the 
document presented having been fraudulently completed, did not comply with 
the terms of the letter of credit. 
The Court of Appeal introduced a new concept named "a halfway house" and 
explained it as "between fraud and accuracy, namely inaccuracy in a material 
particular".""^^ Stephenson LJ believed, although a simple inaccuracy in the 
documents may not been seen as a fraud, it may entitled banks to reject 
payment if the inaccuracy is material to their liability to pay.^ ^° 
During the judgment, Stephenson LJ stated: 
"... I do not think that the courts have a duty to 
assist international trade to run smoothly if it is 
fraudulent any more than when it violates an 
international agreement. Banks trust beneficiaries 
to present honest documents; if beneficiaries go to 
others (as they have to) for the documents they 
present, it is important to all concerned that those 
documents should accord, not merely with the 
requirements of the credit but with the facts; and 
if they do not because of the intention of anyone 
concerned with them to deceive, I see good reason 
for the choice between two innocent parties putting 
the loss upon the beneficiary, not the bank or its 
customer. "'^' 
Stephenson LJ also believed that there was no authority, in English law, 
"directly deciding that the fraud of a third party, such as the maker of a false 
129 [1982] Q.B. 208, 231, supra note 3. 
"0 Ibid, 239. 
"1 Ibid, 234. 
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document, is or is not a good defence to a claim to be paid in accordance 
with the terms of a letter of credit".^^^ He, therefore, decided that a bank 
should be entitled to reject payment if it knows that any of the documents is 
forged in a material particular, even the fraud was not on the part of the 
beneficiary. His decision was somehow based on some American authorities, 
he further developed the test which was applied in the United states by the 
following words: 
"We should not apply it only to 'situations of fraud 
in which the wrongdoing of the beneficiary has so 
vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate 
purposes of the independence of the issuer's 
obligation would no longer be served. [Intraworld 
Industries Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank*"] ' ... It should 
also be applied to any fraud which, if known to the 
issuing or confirming bank, would entitle it to 
refuse payment. In that situation the bank owes no 
duty to the beneficiary to pay and, I would say, owes 
a duty to the customer not to pay.""< 
Stephenson LJ clearly applied the "material fraud" test to assess the fraud in 
applying the fraud rule. The "material fraud" test was actually established in 
the UCC in the United States but being applied more like the "egregious 
fraud" test by American courts.""^ ^ In this sense, Stephenson LJ's judgment 
may be seen as a typical case for the application of the "material fraud" test in 
applying the fraud rule in documentary credits. According to this test, the 
materiality of the inaccuracy in documents may be seen as a very important 
1 " Ibid, 234. 
"3 Jntrawor/dIndustries,{1975) 336 A. 2d 316, 324-325, supra note 77. 
" " Ibid, 239. 
135 See section 4 of this chapter. 
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point to assess an establishment of a fraud. Although a simple inaccuracy 
may not been seen as a fraud, it may lead an application of the fraud rule if 
the inaccuracy is material to the underlying contracts. 
The "half way house" theory was also accepted by both Ackner LJ and 
Griffiths LJ during the Court of Appeal. Both of the judges added another 
essential, which is banks' security interests, to further explain the reason of 
their decisions. 
"Moreover, the bank is prepared to provide finance 
to the exporter because it holds shipping documents 
as collateral security for the advance and, if 
necessary, can take recourse to the buyer as 
instructing customer and the exporter as drawer of 
the bill. The bank invariably asks for the delivery 
of a full set of original bills of lading; otherwise 
a fraudulent shipper would be able to obtain payment 
under the documentary credit on one of them and 
advances from other banks on the security of the other 
originals constituting the set: see Schmitthoff' s. 
The Export Trade, 6th ed. (1975), p. 216. It is 
therefore of vital importance to the bank not to take 
up worthless documents. " (Ackner LJ)^^^ 
"What is the position if the bank is presented with 
documents that appear on their face to be in order 
but which the bank knows to be forgeries? The bank 
takes the documents as its security for payment. It 
is not obliged to take worthless documents. If the 
bank knows that the documents are forgeries it must 
refuse to accept them. It may be that the party 
presenting the documents has himself been duped by 
the forger and believes the documents to be genuine 
but that surely cannot affect the bank's right to 
refuse to accept the forgeries. The identity of the 
forger is immaterial. It is the fact that the 
documents are worthless that matters to the 
136 [1982] Q.B. 208, 247, supra note 3. 
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b a n k . " ( G r i f f i t h s L J ) i " 
Both of the judges believed that banks should be entitled to refuse forgery 
documents which may affect their security Interests. It's true that the innocent 
seller who did not do the fraud might not be seen as a fraudulent party in the 
fraud rule; however, it may also be wield to ask a bank to accept a document 
which has been known to him as forgery only because the seller is not liable 
to the document. The protection of an innocent seller should not be satisfied 
at the sacrifice of bank's security interest.''^^ 
Generally, the judgment of the court of appeal was based on the "half way 
house" theory and banks' security interests. Nevertheless, none of the two 
points was approved by Lord Diplock in the House of Lords. 
5.2.3.2. House of Lords 
The House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and held 
that "fraud such as to entitle a banker to refuse to pay under a letter of credit 
notwithstanding the strict general rule requiring payment when the 
documents were in order on their face, did not extend to fraud to which the 
seller or beneficiary was not party, and accordingly, prima facie the 
defendants should have paid on presentation of the documents."^^^ Lord 
Diplock started his analysis with a rejection of the "halfway house" theory 
said: 
"7 Ibid, 247-248. 
"^ Banks' security Interests Is discussed in details in Chapter 5 of tine thesis, where the 
nullity exception is mainly analysed. See Chapter 5, section 4.2. 
139 [1983] 1 A.C. 168, 169, supra note 3. 
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"...for the proposition upon the documentary credit 
point, both in the broad form for which counsel for 
the confirming bank have strenuously argued at all 
stages of this appeal and in the narrower form or 
"halfway house" that commended itself to the Court 
of Appeal, there is no direct authority to be found 
either in English or Privy Council cases or among 
the numerous decisions of courts in the United States 
of America to which reference is made in the judgments 
of the Court of Appeal in the instant case."^" 
He believed that the autonomy principle led to an establishment of several 
autonomous interconnected contractual relationships in documentary credits. 
Consequently, he confirmed the bank's responsibility to the applicant in 
documentary credits by the following words: 
"It has, so far as I know, never been disputed that 
as between confirming bank and issuing bank and as 
between issuing bank and the buyer the contractual 
duty of each bank under a confirmed irrevocable 
credit is to examine with reasonable care all 
documents presented in order to ascertain that they 
appear on their face to be in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of the credit, and, if they do 
so appear, to pay to the seller/ beneficiary by whom 
the documents have been presented the sum stipulated 
by the credit, or to accept or negotiate without 
recourse to drawer drafts drawn by the 
seller/beneficiary if the credit so provides."i" 
Lord Diplock accepted the fraud exception but restricted its application to the 
situation "where the seller, for the purpose of drawing on the credit, 
fraudulently presents to the confirming bank documents that contain, 
expressly or by implication, material representations of fact that to his 
!'«' Ibid, 182. 
1"! Ibid, 184. 
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knowledge are untrue" '^* .^ He, accordingly, regarded the instant case as not 
falling within the fraud exception because of the finding that the sellers had 
been unaware of the inaccuracy of the date. 
Lord Diplock also specifically rejected the "material fraud" test and believed 
the application of this test is to destroy the autonomy principle. He said: 
"It is conceded that to justify refusal the 
misstatement must be "material" but this invites the 
query: "material to what?" The suggested answer to 
this query was: a misstatement of a fact which if 
the true fact had been disclosed would have entitled 
the buyer to reject the goods; date of shipment (as 
in the instant case) or misdescription of the goods 
are examples. But this is to destroy the autonomy 
of the documentary credit which is its raison d'etre; 
it is to make the seller's right to payment by the 
confirming bank dependent'upon the buyer's rights 
against the seller under the terms of the contract 
for the sale of goods, of which the confirming bank 
will have no knowledge. "^^^  
Regarding banks' security interests. Lord Diplock decided, the security 
interests would not justify the confirming bank's refusal to honour the credit in 
the instant case. Because the realisable value of goods could not be in any 
way affected by its having been loaded on board a ship on December 16, 
instead of December 15"^ ' 1976.""*" 
There is no defence to Lord Diplock's decision for United City l\/lerctiants. The 
"material fraud" test for the fraud rule in English law if English court considers 
i « Ibid, 183. 
"3 Ibid, 185. 
" " Ibid, 186. 
117 
Lu Lu: The Exceptions in Documentary Credits in English Law. 
the application of the fraud exception as a clear application of the maxim ex 
turpi causa non oritur acticf'^^. The beneficiary may be deprived from payment 
if he is not trying to benefit from his own fraud. The security interest was not 
seriously affected by the forgery in the document either. However, some 
issues discussed during the judgement may cause arguments. 
On one hand, it is true that the bank has no duty to go behind the facial 
conformity of the documents, but it is arguable that the contractual duty owed 
by banks to the applicant should be matched by the contractual liability of 
banks to the beneficiary. Lord Diplock, while discussing bank's responsibility 
to the applicant also said: 
"It would be strange from the commercial point of 
view, although not theoretically impossible in law, 
if the contractual duty owed by confirming and 
issuing banks to the buyer to honour the credit on 
presentation of apparently conforming documents 
despite the fact that they contain inaccuracies or 
even are forged, were not matched by a corresponding 
contractual liability of the confirming bank to the 
seller/beneficiary (in the absence, of course, of 
any fraud on his part) to pay the sum stipulated in 
the credit upon presentation of apparently 
confirming documents. Yet, as is conceded by counsel 
for the confirming bank in the instant case, if the 
broad proposition for which he argues is correct, 
the contractual duties do not match. ""' 
The contractual relationship among parties in documentary credits has been 
'^'^  The principle of" ex turpi causa" \Nas first pointed by Lord Mansfield the case of Ho/man 
V Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341. This principle is discussed in details in section 2.2.1 of 
Chapter 4. 
!"« [1983] 1 A.C. 168, 184 to 185, supra note 3. 
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clearly regulated by the UCP '^*^ . As between the issuing bank and the 
applicant, the bank owes the applicant buyer a duty of examining the facial 
conforming of documents. The bank also owes the applicant a duty of not 
paying against a facially nonconforming documents. In other words, the 
issuing bank is not responsible to the internal genuineness of documents; As 
between the issuing bank and the beneficiary, the issuing bank undertake an 
absolute obligation to pay the seller beneficiary as long as the documents of 
title presented by the documents are in order, the documents are complying 
to the credit. However, the issuing bank's obligation of payment is subject to 
the beneficiary's responsibility of presenting conforming documents. The 
bank is obliged to pay the beneficiary against conforming documents but not 
only facially conforming documents. It is clear that the facial conformity does 
not equal to conformity. Therefore, the contractual duty owed by banks to the 
applicant is definitely not matched by the contractual liability of banks to the 
beneficiary. In this sense, although the bank is not liable to go behind the 
documents to detect the fraud, it does not follows that the bank is not allowed 
to go behind the documents to investigate whether there was a fraud.'''^ ^ It 
would be even more irrational to force the bank to pay against facially 
conforming but internal fraudulent documents. 
On the other hand, Lord Diplock, while considering the security interests 
"^ UCP 600, Article 3, 7, 9, 14, and 16. For detailed discussion of the relationships among 
the banl<, applicant and beneficiary, see Chapter 1, section 2.1 to 2.3. 
1*8 See Cardozo J.'s dissent judgment in Maurice OMeara. (1925) 146 NE 636, supra note 
46.It was discussed in section 2 of this chapter. 
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was not affected by the forgery in the document, also said: 
"I would not wish to be taken as accepting that the 
premise as to forged documents is correct, even where 
the fact that the document is forged deprives it of 
all legal effect and makes it a nullity, and so 
worthless to the confirming bank as security for its 
advances to the buyer. This is certainly not so under 
the Uniform Commercial Code as against a person who 
has taken a draft drawn under the credit in 
circumstances that would make him a holder in due 
course, and I see no reason why, and there is nothing 
in the Uniform Commercial Code to suggest that, a 
seller/beneficiary who is ignorauit of the forgery 
should be in any worse position because he has not 
negotiated the draft before presentation. I would 
prefer to leave open the question of the rights of 
an innocent seller/beneficiary against the 
confirming bank when a document presented by him is 
a nullity because unknown to him it was forged by 
some third party; for that question does not arise 
in the instant case.""" 
Lord Diplock suggested that the innocent seller should not be in a worse 
position than a holder in due course, therefore, he might not be liable for the 
fraud he did not do even if "document is forged deprives it of all legal effect 
and makes it a nullity, and so worthless to the confirming bank as security for 
its advances to the buyer". However, in a normal third party fraud situation, 
there may be three innocent parties: the seller, the buyer and the banks. The 
allocation of risk may become a complex issue under this circumstance. The 
decision of whether the seller or the buyer should take the responsibility may 
vary in cases. But it is too rash to leave the seller totally out of the 
responsibility anyway. It is also worthy of consideration whether an innocent 
"9 [1983] 1 A.C. 168, 186, supra note 3. 
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seller should be seen as a holder in due course under the UCC. Stephenson 
LJ's following statement during the Court of Appeal may be seen as a clear 
objection to Lord Diplock's "holder in due course" theory: 
"Banks trust beneficiaries to present honest 
documents; if beneficiaries go to others (as they 
have to) for the documents they present, it is 
important to all concerned that those documents 
should accord, not merely with the requirements of 
the credit but with the facts; and if they do not 
because of the intention of anyone concerned with 
them to deceive, I see good reason for the choice 
between two innocent parties putting the loss upon 
the beneficiary, not the bank or its customer. 
Even though the judge was not able to find that Baker 
was the plaintiffs ' agent in making the bill of lading 
for presentation to the defendants, the plaintiffs 
were the innocent party who put him in the position 
in which he made the bill, and made it fraudulently, 
and in my judgment it is they rather than the 
defendants, already impoverished by the dollars 
remitted to the United States of America, who should 
bear the loss."^^" 
The thesis considers Stephenson LJ's analysis through the beneficiary's 
obligations of presenting truly conforming documents made a strong 
argument for Lord Diplock's "holder in due course" theory. This is issue may 
be better understood in terms of a study in the nullity exception in 
documentary credits.^ ^•' Actually, Lord Diplock himself also left the question 
of "the rights of an innocent seller/beneficiary against the confirming bank 
when a document presented by him is a nullity because unknown to him it 
150 [1982] Q.B. 208, 234-240,supra note 3. 
151 The issues relevant to the allocation of risks In documentary credits are discussed in 
Chapter 5, section 4.3 and 5.2. 
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was forged by some third party"^ 2^ open in his judgment. 
United City i\4erviiants left many issues unresolved to the application of the 
fraud rule. However, the decision of House of Lords in this case was still in a 
prominent position during the early development the fraud rule in England 
and Wales. The high standard of proof made the application of the fraud rule 
being extremely difficult. Firstly, the fraud has to be clearly established; 
secondly, it has to be proved that the fraud is on the part of the beneficiary, a 
third party's fraud may not cause an application of the fraud rule; Thirdly, the 
banks' knowledge of the forgery or fraud has to be proved as well, the fraud 
rule may not be applied in the case of where the bank did not notice the fraud 
at the time of payment. The test applied to assess an established fraud by 
Lord Diplock may be seen as an extensive application of the "intentional 
fraud" test applied in early United States. While in early United States, the 
"intentional fraud" test required the fraudulent intention has to be proved, in 
English law, the "intention fraud" test further required the fraudulent intention 
has to be proved as from the beneficiary. The most unfortunate situation 
would be that a bank had to accept a forged document which he knows might 
cause a total loss of his security interest only because the seller was not 
liable to the fraud. This could probably be a reason why banks chose to rely 
on the principle of strict compliance to reject documents all the times. 
It is hard to explain the reason why English courts applied a different test in 
1 " Ibid. 
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applying the fraud rule rather than the "material fraud" test of the United 
States, when the root of the fraud rule in England and Wales was from the 
America case Sztejn}^"^ It may be caused by the dominant position of the 
autonomy principle in the UCP; in contrast, the fraud rule was not even 
mentioned in the latest version of UCP. 
Lord Diplock's decision in United City Merchants, which exempted the third 
party fraud from the application of the fraud rule expressed the application of 
the "intentional fraud" test in English law. The beneficiary's fraudulent 
Intention becomes one of the main conditions in applying the fraud rule. 
Although the high standard of proof made the application of the fraud rule 
being extremely difficult, the early development of the fraud rule in England 
and Wales was not too negative. The dawn happened in the case of 
Bolivlnter Oil S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, Commercial Bank of Syria and 
General Company ofHoms Refinery^. 
5.2.4. The case of BoUvinter Oil 
In Bolivinter Oil S.A, the plaintiff, Bolinvinter Oil S.A., made a contract with the 
third defendant (Homs) to procure the carriage of about 2.38 million tons of 
Iranian crude oil from Iran to Syria in the summer of 1982. The contract 
provided for a daily penalty of U.S. $25,000 in the event of delay during 
153 Of course, both of the application may be seen as reasonable since the both the 
materiality of the fraud and the intention of the representor are essentia! elements in 
common law fraud. Generally see the section 1 of this chapter. 
i^'' Bolivinter Oil S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, Commercial Bank of Syria and General 
Company of Homs Refinery IVi^AI 1 Lloyd's Rep. 251. 
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performance. The plaintiffs also agreed to furnish Homs with a performance 
guarantee for U.S. $1 million. The guarantee was provided by the second 
defendants (CBS) to Homs; a letter of credit was provided by the first 
defendants (Chase) in favour of CBS and a counter indemnity and cash 
deposit was provided by the plaintiffs in favour of Chase. In the event there 
were delays in the performance of the freight contract and Homs indicated 
claims of U.S. $25 million subsequently reduced to between U.S. $2 million 
and $12 million. In November, 1982, the plaintiffs and Homs entered into a 
second freight contract on similar terms to that of June, 1982, save as to 
freight and the amount of oil carried. During the currency of the second freight 
contract Homs withheld freight to the extent of about $22 million. The 
plaintiffs then alleged that negotiations followed and it was agreed that Homs 
would pay the plaintiffs about $8.5 million, would establish a letter of credit to 
cover the freight, demurrage and insurance on the final shipment under the 
second contract, and would establish a further letter of credit of $4.3 million to 
cover disputed items. Finally it provided that the guarantee would be released 
upon the arrival of the last vessel carrying oil to Syria under the second 
contract. 
Shortly after the arrival of the last vessel the plaintiffs notified Chase that the 
guarantee had been released by agreement with Homs. Chase then sought 
confirmation from CBS that their letter of credit had been cancelled and that 
Chase was released from all liability. However, CBS informed Chase that 
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Homs had demanded $1 million under the CBS guarantee due to the 
plaintiffs' breaches of the June, 1982 agreement. On Oct. 31, 1983 the 
plaintiffs obtained injunctions restraining Homs from claiming on the CBS 
guarantee and restraining CBS from paying under that letter of credit. 
Staughton J discharged the injunctions on Nov. 29, 1983. Then the plaintiff 
appealed. During the appeal, although the Court of Appeal accepted that it 
was clearly debatable whether Homs have acted fraudulently in making their 
claim on the CBS guarantee or whether they have merely acted in breach of 
their release agreement with the plaintiff, the injunctions affecting Chase and 
CBS, the two banks, were discharged, the decision of granting an injunction 
restraining Homs from demanding was held to continue. The reason of 
keeping the injunction against Homs was "there is no appeal against the 
decision of the learned Judge to grant an injunction restraining Homs by 
themselves"^ 55_ but Sir John Donaldson said during the appeal: 
"The continuation of the Homs injunction, because 
no one has asked us to discharge it, creates a problem. 
If, as is common in the context of Mareva injunctions, 
a defendant is enjoined from dealing with moneys 
standing to the credit of a bank account and the bank 
has notice of the injunction, it is itself in contempt 
of Court if it acts on its customers' instructions 
and thereby aids and abets a breach of the injunction. 
Where does that leave CBS? The injunction which 
expressly bound them not to pay under the guarantee 
has been discharged by the learned Judge and we have 
affirmed that decision. Is it now to be said that 
they are indirectly bound to refrain from paying Homs 
notwithstanding that the Court has refused any 
1" Ibid, 256. 
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direct order prohibiting them from so doing? 
This point was not brought to the learned Judge's 
attention or for that matter ours, but, it having 
occurred to us, we think that we should deal with 
it. For present purposes it will suffice if, in 
dismissing the appeal, we make it clear that nothing 
in the injunction granted by the learned Judge 
against Horns is in any way to inhibit the freedom 
of CBS to make payment in accordance with its 
contractual obligations under the performance 
guarantee if it is minded so to do.""= 
Sir John Donaldson distinguished between interlocutory injunctions which 
restrained the beneficiary from claiming and mareva injunctions which 
restricted the beneficiary dealing with the money, and expressed that the 
interlocutory injunction which prevent the beneficiary from claiming may not 
affect the bank's freedom of making payment. He further illuminated the 
exceptionality of an injunction to prevent a bank from payment by the 
following words: 
"Before leaving this appeal, we should like to add 
a word about the circumstances in which an ex parte 
injunction should be issued which prohibits a bank 
from paying under an irrevocable letter of credit 
or a purchase bond or guarantee. ... 
In requesting his bank to issue such a letter, bond 
or guarantee, the customer is seeking to take 
advantage of this unique characteristic. If, save 
in the most exceptional cases, he is to be allowed 
to derogate from the bank' s personal and irrevocable 
undertaking, given be it again noted at his request, 
by obtaining an injunction restraining the bank from 
honouring that undertaking, he will undermine what 
is the bank's greatest asset, however large and rich 
it may be, namely its reputation for financial and 
contractual probity. Furthermore, if this happens 
156 Ibid, 257. 
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at all frequently, the value of all irrevocable 
letters of credit and performance bonds and 
guarantees will be undermined.""'' 
Sir John Donaldson pointed the autonomous position of banks under letters 
of credits or performance bonds, other than the applicants or beneficiaries, 
which may invoke innovative thinking concerning a different standard of proof 
in applying the fraud as between different parties, especially in injunction 
cases. Sir John Donaldson's judgment is very important for the later 
development of the application of the fraud rule. It indicated the contractual 
relationships among the parties under letters of credits or performance bonds 
may influence the courts' decisions in granting interlocutory injunctions in 
fraud rule cases. An analysis to the application of the fraud rule in injunctions 
cases may be a good start point to explore the recent development of the 
fraud rule in English law. 
1 " Ibid. 
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Summary: 
The early development of the fraud rule, in both American and English law, 
presented authorities of the interference of the fraud exception to the ordinary 
operation of documentary credits payment system, though the standard of 
proof for applying the fraud rule are not the same in the two common law 
countries. The reasonability of the existence of the fraud rule had been 
proved with no doubt. There are advantages and disadvantages in both the 
"material fraud" test in the United States and the "intentional fraud" test^ ^^ in 
England and Wales. The "material fraud" test in the United States, which was 
legalized by the UCC, is the first and probably the only test for the application 
the fraud rule that was recognized by statute law. 
The establishment of the "material standard" pointed out a clear criterion for 
the application of the fraud rule in the United States. Because the "material 
fraud" test emphasized on the seriousness of the fraud, the effect of the fraud 
to the whole underlying contract might be highly considered by the court in 
the United States. The clear focus may provide a route for the court of the 
United States to apply the fraud rule reasonably. However, considering the 
principle autonomy principle in documentary credits, the material standard 
may have a highly negative impact on the separation of the documents and 
^^ ^ Here, the "Intentional fraud" refers to the test establish by Lord Diplock in United City 
Merchants, which requires the fraudulent intention has to be further proved as from the 
beneficiary. 
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the underlying contract. It is difficult to justify the materiality of the fraud 
without considering the underlying contract. Actually, the Official Comment on 
Article 2-109 itself explained the "material fraud" without avoiding the 
considering the underlying contract.^ ^^ To justify the materiality of the fraud by 
considering the impact of the fraud to the underlying contract may be 
reasonable in the sense of business interests, but it may also require the 
bank to know more about the underlying contract while processing the 
payment. In other words, the bank has to justify whether the fraud rule should 
be applied to reject the payment by considering the performance of the 
underlying contract. The expanding of the bank's obligation to the underlying 
contract is totally against the basis of the documentary credit payment 
system, which is a separation of the underlying contract and the documents. 
In this case, this test applied for the application of the fraud rule in English law 
may be in a better position. 
The juristic basis of the fraud rule in English law is the maxim "ex turpi causa 
non oritur actio", which may be translated in English as "no action can arise 
from a base cause" or "no action arises from an unworthy cause". The 
essence of the test in applying the fraud rule in English law is the intention of 
the beneficiary. To apply the fraud rule to reject payment, the fraudulent 
intention of the beneficiary has to be proved. Otherwise, as long as the 
documents are facially complying with the credit, the bank has to pay to the 
^^ ^ Official Comment 1, para.2. Also see earlier part of this chapter, section 4. 
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beneficiary even the bank noticed there is a forgery in the documents. The 
"intentional fraud" test made the application for the fraud rule most complied 
with the autonomy principle in documentary credits, the bank need not to 
investigate the underlying contract at all to justify the reasonability of payment. 
However, the intentional standard is not that perfect as it intends to be. Firstly, 
the intention of the beneficiary, as a moral activity, is very hard to prove, 
especially for the bank without investigating the underlying contract; Secondly, 
a documentary credit is a functional system for payment in international trade. 
The benefit for the bank during the operation of documentary credits is highly 
depending on the security interests provided by the documents. Although the 
interests of the bank may not be influenced by the performance of the 
underlying contract as long as the reimbursement is paid by the buyer, the 
buyer's bankruptcy may cause a totally different situation. When the buyer 
goes bankrupt, the interests which the bank may receive by operating the 
documentary credit payment system is nothing comparing with the security 
interests the bank may lose if the documents lose its value because of an 
inaccuracy in the documents (most of time, the nullity of the documents is 
caused by the false statement in the document). It is hard to explain why the 
loss should be borne by the bank but not the beneficiary. It is even more 
unreasonable to ask the bank to ignore a false statement only because there 
is no evidence to prove the fraudulent intention of the beneficiary. 
Because the negative issues caused by the "intentional fraud" standard, the 
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actual efficiency of the fraud rule was not satisfying In early England and 
Wales. In contrast, the material fraud standard in the United States was more 
reasonable in considering the security interests of banks. A fraud may not 
affect the bank's security interest if it is not material enough. But according to 
the practice in the United States, because of the subjective characteristic of 
the material standard, the fraud rule was not that efficient in early America 
either. American courts seem to explain the "material fraud" the same as the 
"egregious fraud" during the practical consideration for the application of the 
fraud. 
Nevertheless, the injunction case iffo//i///7/(9A<9//provided a fresh guidance to 
considering the application the fraud rule in English law. And actually, new 
approaches of applying the fraud rule emerged from 1990s in England and 
Wales. 
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Chapter Three: The ^plication of the Fraud Rule 
at the Pre-trial Stage in English Law 
Preface: 
As an exception to the general rule in documentary credits, the fraud rule was 
born in Sztejn v. J Henry Schroder Banking Corp in the United States. The 
application of this new exception in the United States was developing by both 
case law and the UCC. After lengthy deliberation, a standard of proof which 
depends on the materiality of the fraud^ was established in UCC Article 5. 
However, the clear expressed standard was not as efficient^ as it was 
supposed to be in the legal practice in the United States. In many cases, an 
"egregious fraud" standard was still dominant." The conflict between the 
fraud rule and the autonomy principle of documentary credits is the main 
reason for the difficulties in applying the fraud rule in documentary credits. 
^ Sztejn V. J Henry Schroder Banking Corp (1941) 31 NYS 2d 631. Sztejn is the leading case 
which recognizing the fraud rule in the United States, and the first case in the world. 
^ Official Comment on Article 2-109 explained the concept of the "material fraud". For 
commercial letters of credit, it indicated that material fraud "requires that the fraudulent 
aspect of a document be material to a purchaser of that document or that the fraudulent act 
be significant to the participants In the underlying transaction". 
^ Article 5-109 of the UCC 1995 applied the "material fraud" as the main standard of proof 
in applying of the fraud rule in the United States, however, the materiality issue itself is 
more like a flexible issue rather than a certain one. See Chapter 2 section 4. 
* Generally, "egregious fraud" is an extremely serious fraud, in which a simply intention is 
not enough. As a standard of proof in applying the fraud rule, the effect of the "egregious 
fraud" has to be a vitiation of the entire transaction, and the legitimate purposes of the 
independence of the issuer's obligation would no longer be served. See New York Life 
Insurance Co. v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Co. [l^ll) 378 A 2d 562. Also see Chapter 
2 section 3.2.1. 
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Compared with the application of the fraud rule in the United States, the fraud 
rule was even more limited in the English law. English courts were very 
reluctant to intervene in a documentary credit transaction. The autonomy 
principle takes an extremely important place in every version of the UCP. In 
contrast, the fraud rule has never been even mentioned in the UCP. The 
application of the fraud rule as an independent exception in documentary 
credits in English law can only be traced in case law. The American case 
Sztejn is also the origin of the fraud rule in England and Wales.= 
From the very beginning of the establishment of the fraud rule in England and 
Wales, the standard of proof for the application was very high.^ In general, 
the early development of the fraud rule restricted its application at the trial 
stage in English law to three conditions: 
First, the fraud has to be clearly established; a mere allegation of fraud is not 
sufficient; 
Secondly, the bank is only obliged to examine the facial compliance of the 
document, it is not the bank's responsibility to examine whether there is a 
fraud in the underlying transaction. The bank is eligible to get the 
reimbursement from his client even the payment was paid against a forgery 
^ It is hard to explain why are the US courts not convinced by the autonomy arguments, and 
arguments for security of banks, that impress the English courts. The UCP may not be the 
proper answer since it is also adopted by the American banks. However, the difference of 
the legal practice between England & Wales and the United States may be a possible reason. 
Revocable credits are common in the US, or at least were until recently. Perhaps there, the 
security aspect of the transaction is less important. 
* S&Q. Discount Records Ltd V. Barclays Bank Ltd and Barclays Bank International Ltd. [1975] 
Lloyd's Rep. 444. But the high standard proof is applied at the trial stage for the application 
of the fraud rule. 
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document and the fraud was later proved, as long as the face of the 
document was complying with the credit and the bank was not aware of the 
fraud; 
Thirdly, the intention of the beneficiary is also one of the essentials for the 
application of the fraud rule. This condition does not only mean that a lack of 
intention may cause a failure of establishment of a fraud itself. In English law, 
even a fraud is clearly established, the fraud rule may still not be applied if the 
beneficiary was not a party of the fraud.^ In other words, a fraud caused by a 
third party may not lead to an application of the fraud rule. 
Those three conditions made the successful application of the fraud rule in 
documentary credits at the trial stage extremely difficult in English law. 
However, from the late 1990s, English courts started to consider details of the 
application of the fraud rule, and some different tests were applied by English 
Courts at the pre-trial stage. This chapter will focus on the different 
application of the fraud rule at the pre-trial stage. 
' This principle was established in United City f^erchants\V^^'3,'\ 1 A.C. 168. by Lord Diplock. 
See Chapter 2, section 5.2.3. for a detailed discussion of this case. 
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/. The Recent Apptkatlon of the Fraud Rule at the Pre-trial 
Stage 
The early development of the fraud rule in England and Wales, which was 
discussed in the second chapter, was totally based on English case law. 
There was no statute law which admitted the fraud rule as an independent 
exception in documentary credits system. Similar to the prior situation, the 
recent application also appeared and developed in the case law. Therefore, 
the analysis of the pre-trial application of the fraud rule is also relying on a 
series of examples of cases, which include both interlocutory injunction cases 
and summary judgment cases. 
1.1. The case of United Trading Corp 
Although the first case, in which the judgment clearly applied a different 
approach in applying the fraud rule, was Themehelp Ltd v. We^^, the case of 
United Trading Corp SA v. Allied Arab Bank Ltd in 1985 had already showed 
some new trends for the application of the fraud rule. 
In United Trading Corp, the plaintiff was trading with an Iraq State 
Establishment corporation ("Agromark") for foodstuffs' supply. By the request 
of Agromark, the plaintiffs, through its own bank Allied Arab Bank Ltd. 
8 Themehelp Ltd V. We5^[1996] Q.B. 84. 
9 United Trading Corp SA v. AiiiedArab BanJ^ ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep 554 (CA). 
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("Allied"), acquired a performance bond from Rafidain Bank ("Rafidain") in 
favour of Agromark. Because of some disagreements relevant to 
performance of the contracts, Agromark made demands on the performance 
bond. The plaintiffs feared that, if their own accounts came to be debited 
against the demanding, they would have no hope of recovering the 
equivalent sums from Agromark or its banker, Rafidain. Therefore the 
plaintiffs sought injunctions to restrain the Allied Bankers from payment by 
alleging that the demands which made by Agromark on the performance 
bonds was fraudulent. 
The decision of this case was not different from the old cases in applying the 
fraud rule in English law. It was held that no injunctions was granted because 
there was no clear fraud on the side of Agromark to Allied Bankers' 
knowledge. However, Ackner LJ said during the judgment: 
"Have the plaintiffs established that it is 
seriously arguable that, (arguable) on the material 
available, the only realistic inference is that 
Agromark could not honestly have believed in the 
validity of its demands on the performance bonds?"^° 
The above words provided a different standard of proof in injunction cases in 
applying the fraud rule, which is to establish a seriously arguable fraud on 
ttie part of beneficiary. This standard is obviously lower than the one which 
was established in Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v. Barclays Bank 
10 Ibid, 5 6 1 . 
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InternationalLtd.^^ The previous one was that "The evidence of fraud must 
be clear, both as to the fact of fraud and as to the [guarantor's] knowledge. 
The mere assertion or allegation of fraud would not be sufficienf^^ Although 
the new standard of proof did not lead to an application of the fraud rule in 
United Trading Corp, it heavily influenced decisions of later cases in applying 
the fraud rule. 
1.2. The case of Themehelp^^ 
Themehelp Ltd. v. West was also a case about the enforcement of a 
performance guarantee. In this case, the plaintiff was a buyer who agreed to 
purchase the defendant seller's business under a contract which provided the 
payment by three separate instalments. The third and also the largest 
instalment was secured by a third party by a performance guarantee. After 
the first instalment had been paid the buyers brought an action for rescission, 
alleging fraudulent misrepresentation by the seller, who denied the allegation 
and proposed to give notice to the guarantors to enforce the guarantee. The 
buyers applied for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the sellers from giving 
notice to the guarantors, who were not a party to the action, until trial. The 
judge granted the injunction on the basis that the evidence was sufficient to 
" Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v. Barclays Banl< International Ltd. [1978] Q.B. 159. 
^^  There was no dear explanation for the difference between the "seriously arguable fraud" 
and a "clearly proved fraud". But literally, the "seriously arguable fraud" may be understood 
as there is sufficient evidence for the plaintiff to argue that there is a fraud, this is lower 
than a "clearly proved fraud" in which the evidence has to be sufficient to establish a fraud. 
" Themehelp [1996] QB 84, supra note 8. 
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raise a seriously arguable case that the only reasonable inference that could 
be drawn from the circumstances was that the sellers had been fraudulent. 
The seller then appealed. 
During the appeal, Waite LJ distinguished two different legal circumstances 
for granting an interlocutory injunction in the performance guarantee cases 
by applying the fraud rule. One is where at the date of the application there 
has already been a claim under the guarantee by the beneficiary, the other is 
where a default has occurred but the beneficiary has not yet claimed under 
the guarantee. He admitted, as for the first circumstance, letters of credit, 
performance bonds and guarantees are all subject to the general principle 
that they must be treated as autonomous contracts, whose operation is not to 
be interfered with by the court on grounds extraneous to the credit or 
guarantee itself.^ " However there is a sole exception for the guarantor to 
refuse to pay, which is the fraud on the part of the beneficiary. And a 
performing party may apply for an injunction to restrain enforcement of a 
performance guarantee by the beneficiary if he can prove fraud on the part of 
the beneficiary.^ 5 Q^^^ "the evidence of fraud must be clear, both as to the fact 
of fraud and as to the [guarantor's] knowledge. The mere assertion or 
allegation of fraud would not be sufficient".^^ Nevertheless, for the second 
'^' Ali Maiek, David Quest, Jack Raymond and Jonathan Davies-Jones, "Jack, Documentary 
credits: tiie law and practice of documentary credits including standby credits and demand 
guarantees" (4* edn, Tottel Pub., 2009). 
p. 220-226, paras. 9.28-9.3. 
15 Edward Owen [1978] Q.B. 159, supra note 11; Bollvinter OilS.A. v. Chase Manhattan 
BankN.A. [1984] 1 W.LR. 392. 
16 BolivinterOIIS.A. [1984] 1 W.LR. 392, supra note 15. 
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circumstance, Waite LJ believed that there was "no authority stating the 
principles to be applied when, as in this case, the party in default under the 
main contract seeks, without involving the guarantor in the proceedings at all, 
to restrain the beneficiary from taking any step to enforce the performance 
guarantee.''^' He then agreed with Mr. Maurice Kay Q.C in the Queen's 
Bench Division, that the present case was exceptional, in that here the relief 
was sought at an earlier stage, that is to say a restraint against the 
beneficiary alone in proceedings to which the guarantor is not a party, to 
prevent the exercise by the beneficiary of his power to enforce the guarantee 
by giving notice of the other party's alleged default in discharging the liability 
which was the subject-matter of the guaranteeJ^ Therefore, the judge had 
the power to grant an injunction to restrain the demanding without proof of 
fraud as between the defendant and the banks, and the standard of proof of 
fraud should be the establishment of an arguable prospect of satisfying the 
court at trial that the only realistic inference to draw is that of fraud. For the 
issue of destroy the autonomy of the performance guarantee, he said: 
"In a case where fraud is raised as between the 
parties to the main transaction at an early stage, 
before any question of the enforcement of the 
guarantee, as between the beneficiary and the 
guarantor, has yet arisen at all, it does not seem 
to me that the slightest threat is involved to the 
autonomy of the performance guarantee if the 
beneficiary is injuncted from enforcing it in 
proceedings to which the guarantor is not a party. 
One can imagine, certainly, circumstances where the 
1^ Themehelp [1996] QB 84, 91-92, supra note 8. 
18 Ibid, 97. 
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guarantor might feel moved to express alarm, or even 
resentment, if the buyer should obtain, in 
proceedings to which the guarantor is not a party, 
injunctive relief placing a restriction on the 
beneficiary's rights of enforcement. But in truth 
the guarantor has nothing to fear. There is no risk 
to the integrity of the performance guarantee, and 
therefore no occasion for involving the guarantor 
at that stage in any question as to whether or not 
fraud is established. "^^ 
Although Evans LJ disagreed with Waite LJ by relying on the ordinary view to 
the application of the fraud rule in English law, it did not influence the decision 
of this case. From Themehe/p, one of the different approaches to the 
application of the fraud rule may be stated: where there Is a case for 
granting an interlocutory injunction between the buyer and the 
beneficiary, in another words, where the banic or the guarantor is not 
involved in the injunction, the standard of proof for applying the fraud 
rule may be lowered as a seriously arguable case of fraud, other than a 
clearly proved fraud. 
This different approach is not hard to explain. It is well known that one of the 
most important reasons for the strictness of applying the fraud rule in 
documentary credits may be the conflict between the fraud rule and the 
autonomy principle. And the bankers' independent position in documentary 
credits is always one of the most essential expressions of the autonomy 
principle. The elaborate commercial system was built up on the footing that a 
confirmed letter of credit constituted a bargain between the banker and the 
19 Ibid, 98 -99 . 
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vendor of the goods, which imposed upon the banker an absolutely obligation 
to pay, irrespective of any dispute there might be between the parties 
whether or not goods were up to contract, bankers were not expected to have 
the knowledge of the underlying contract, or to be aware of whether there are 
any fraudulent issues during the business process. The obligation to pay 
against documents is rooted from its interests during the operation of 
documentary credits, and it is also an expression of the banker's reputation. 
The fraud rule is exceptional because according to it, the conflicts in 
underlying contractions which should not affect banks' payment obligation 
may entitle a bank to reject payment if the conflict is a fraud on the part of the 
beneficiary. It is an exceptional situation which allows the bank to breach his 
obligation of payment under documentary credits. However, where the 
applicant is asking for an injunction to prevent the beneficiary from payment 
by relying on the fraud rule, the bank is not involved in the action or involved 
in the application of the fraud rule, and the documentary credits system may 
not be disturbed at all. In other words, the obligations of all the parties in 
documentary credits may not be varied even if the demanding for payment is 
prohibited by the courts. In such circumstances, where the autonomy 
principle has not been involved in, the plaintiff does not have to establish that 
the payment enjoined would constitute a breach of contractual duty owed to 
the plaintiff by the bank; the plaintiff only has to show that his legal rights are 
threatened by the fraud of the beneficiary.^o 
^° Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc. v. Standard Bank London Ltd. [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 
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Therefore, the standard of proof in applying the fraud rule for granting an 
injunction between the application and the beneficiary to restrain the 
beneficiary from from demanding payment may be the establishment of a 
seriously arguable case of fraud on the part of the beneficiary rather than a 
clearly proved fraud. Although there are still some arguments about this 
exception,^^ the thesis argues that this new approach is reasonable, and that 
the decision in Themehelp may be seen as a good example which relaxed 
the strictness of the standard of proof for the application of the fraud rule, 
while avoiding interrupting the autonomy principle under documentary credits. 
However, the unique situation of an injunction, which normally happens 
before the exact trial, is an essential condition of applying the lower standard. 
The general law in granting an interlocutory injunction has already provided a 
lower requirement for evidence in English law; there is no reason why the 
standard of proof should be increased only because the case involving the 
application of the fraud rule in documentary credits.22 
Themehelp is a very important case on the application of the fraud rule in 
documentary credits. It is the first case which relaxed the standard of proof in 
applying the fraud rule in English law. The decision of Themehelp shows a 
big possibility for the development of the fraud rule in documentary credits. 
187. 
^^  Evans U disagreed with Waite U since tlie ordinary view of applying the fraud rule in 
Themehelp. Also in Group JosiRe v. Walbrook Insurance Co. Ltd. [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 
1162. Staughton LJ disagreed to the decision of Themehelp by saying the effect on the 
lifeblood of commerce will be precisely the same whether the bank is restrained from paying 
or the beneficiary is restrained from asking for payment. 
" The general rule in interlocutory injunction cases is analysed in section 2 of this chapter. 
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1.3. The case of Solo Industries 
While in both the United Trading Corp and Ttiemefielp, the approach of 
applying a lower standard of proof in applying the fraud rule was approved in 
interlocutory injunction cases, the case of Solo Industries UK Ltd v. Canara, 
Bank^^ reflected a broader application of the lower standard of proof. 
In Solo Industries, the claimant was the beneficiary of a performance bond 
issued by the defendant bank. On the claimant's application for summary 
judgment in proceedings on the bond, the bank sought to avoid the claim on 
the ground that the issue of the performance bond was induced by fraudulent 
conspiracy or misrepresentation to which the claimant was a party. The judge 
held that the "cash principle" whereby performance bond obligations were to 
be treated like promissory notes, bills of exchange or cash had no application 
where the challenge was to the validity of the bond, rather than to the 
propriety of any demand under it. Although the evidence did not clearly 
establish fraud, he refused summary judgment on the ground that the bank 
had a real or reasonable prospect of success in justifying avoidance of the 
bond. 
During the appeal, Mance U applied Sir John Donaldson M.R's dictum in 
" So/o Industries UK Ltd V. Canara Bank [2001] 1 W.LR 1800. 
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Bolivinter. "the first task of any judge faced with an application for interim 
injunctive relief was to 'ask whether there was any challenge to the validity of 
the instrument' and 'if there is not or if the challenge is not substantial, prima 
facie no injunction should be granted'''.^" Mance LJ then explained 
"substantial" in modern terms as it must have a "real prospecf'.^s 
He took the view that the cash principle, which means that "any claim that a 
bank may acquire against a beneficiary making a fraudulent demand must be 
pursued separately and subsequent to payment, and cannot normally be 
used as a defence or set-off to avoid payment", is only applied on the 
assumption of "the integrity of the instrument that the bank has issued";^^ 
and accordingly: 
"It does not follow that banks accept the risk that 
the instrument itself has been induced by conspiracy 
between, or misrepresentation by, their customers 
and the beneficiaries. The mere appearance of a valid 
instrument cannot commit a bank. Take the case of 
a forgery. The bank must be able to advance a defence 
with a real prospect of success that an instrument 
relied upon is a forgery by the beneficiary. 
The problems inherent in Solo's case can be 
illustrated: if, on an application for summary 
judgment, the court were to apply the principle for 
which Solo contends and to give judgment upon a demand 
because the invalidity of the bond was not 
sufficiently 'established' at that stage, the bank 
or other issuer of the instrument could still 
continue with proceedings to establish that it had 
in fact validly avoided the instrument. "^'^  
2" Ibid, 1813. 
5^ Ibid. 
26 Ibid, 1814. 
" Ibid. 
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Mance LJ applied the "real prospect of establishing fraud", which is the 
ordinary civil test, as the standard of proof to justify the bank's claim of 
avoiding the credit. He extended the application of the lower standard of 
proof into the summary judgment cases where the alleged fraud affected the 
validity of the credit. According to his decision, a bank may not be forced to 
pay by a summary Judgment as long as it has a real prospect of 
success to claim that there was a misrepresentation by the beneficiary 
directed at persuading the bank to enter into the letter of credit 
The application of the lower standard of proof is also based on the 
non-involvement of the autonomy principle. It is well known that the 
autonomy principle is applied specifically to documentary credits, so it exists 
only when there is a valid letter of credit^^. Banks are one of the main parties 
in documentary credit transactions; their participation is essential for the 
validity of the credit. If the bank was induced to enter into a credit by 
misrepresentation then rescission would render the credit invalid from the 
very beginning, which could mean that there was no longer any valid the 
letter of credit at all. It follows that there is no autonomy principle either. Thus, 
the bank cannot be forced to perform its obligations under the letter of credit. 
The bank is also entitled to avoid the instrument, which can be either a letter 
of credit or performance bond, by relying on the invalidity of the instrument. In 
this circumstance, where the beneficiary is asking for a summary judgment to 
^^  Similar for performance bonds or guarantees. 
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force the bank to pay, the general rule for the standard of proof in summary 
judgment cases should be applied. The bank may not be enforce to payment 
as long as he has a "real prospect of success in proving his claim"29, which is 
the invalidity of the letter of credit. Furthermore, a letter of credit is also a 
contract which is constructed by law between the issuing bank and the 
beneficiary. The law has developed the cash principle and the limited fraud 
exception in response to perceived commercial need.'" There is no reason 
why the establishment of the letter of credit can be inconsistent with the 
general contractual principle. 
The decision of So/o is not only essential for the development of the different 
approaches in applying the fraud rule; Mance LJ's position of applying 
general contractual principles in invalid letter of credit cases may also be 
seen as a basis for the illegality exception in documentary credits. 
During the judgment, Mance LJ also mentioned the decision of another case, 
Safa Ltd. v. Banque Du Cair&\ He applied part of the judgment in Safa to 
support his decision. However, he was reserved in extending the application 
of the lower standard of proof to the application of the fraud rule under some 
other circumstances. 
^' This is according to CPR r 24.2(a) (ii). The general rule for granting a summary judgment 
is discussed in the case of Safa Ltd. v. Banque Du Caire [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep.600. See 
section 1.4 of this chapter. 
30 Solo [2001] 1 W.LR 1800, 1815, supra note 23. 
3^  Safa Ltd. V. Banque Du Caire [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep.600. 
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1.4. The case of Safa Ltd. 
While in Solo, the lower standard of proof is restricted to apply in the sole 
situation that the letter of credit is invalid because of the beneficiary's fraud, 
the decision of Safa Ltd. v. Banque Du Cair^^ may be seen as a big 
extension in applying the lower standard of proof in summary judgment 
cases. 
In Safa, the plaintiffs were assignees of two letters of credit. Under the two 
letters of credit, the bank was obliged to pay against the presentation of a 
financial insurance guarantee. And the bank was involved in the 
establishment of the financial insurance guarantee. When the plaintiff asked 
for payment under the letters of credit, the bank refused to pay by alleging 
that the beneficiary was acting fraudulently in establishing the financial 
insurance guarantee. The plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to the entire 
proceeds under the letters of credit and applied for a summary judgment to 
force the bank to pay. The summary judgment was rejected by the court, then 
the plaintiffs appealed. During the appeal. Waller LJ first mentioned CPR 24.2 
which is the rule for giving summary judgment: 
"The Court may give summary judgment against a 
defendant on the whole of claim if 
(a) it considers that -
(ii) that defendant has no real prospect of 
successfully defending the claim. . .; and 
(b) there is no other reason why the case or issue 
Ibid. 
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should be disposed of at a trial.."" 
Then he pointed out that in documentary credits cases, the summary 
judgment should be refused "if the bank can raise an actual defence with a 
real prospect of success as opposed to a counterclaim, and/or if it appears as 
it might In exceptional circumstances that there is a compelling reason why 
there should be a trial of the issue of liability on the letter of credit or bill of 
exchange"^" 
Waller U believed, in the current case, the bank was trying to raise a fraud 
defence to against the summary judgment application while he has no clear 
evidence of fraud at the time of the presentation of documents.^^ He decided 
the issue is similar to that in Balfour Beatty Civil Engineering Ltd. v. Technical 
& General Guarante^^. Balfour Beatty was concerned with a performance 
bond and an allegation that the beneficiary had made a fraudulent demand, 
albeit it was common ground that on any view the surety had no evidence of 
the same as at the date of the demand. Waller U affirmed his own opinion in 
Balfour Beatty that it would absurd for a court to be forced to grant a 
summary judgment to force a bank to pay a fraudulent beneficiary because 
the bank had no sufficient knowledge of the fraud at the time of the demand, 
though the fraud was clearly proved at the time of hearing. He believed the 
bank should have its own remedy directly against the fraudulent beneficiary 
" Ibid, 605. 
3" Ibid, 606. 
35 Ibid. 
3^  Ba/four Beatty CM/Engineering Ltd. v. Technica/& Genera/Guarantee [IQOQ^C.L.C. 252, 
but the judgment was delivered on 14 October 1999. 
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in such circumstances. He summarised his own views in Balfour Beatty BS, 
follows: if the evidence of fraud was "powerful", but not sufficient to justify 
summary judgment, the bank could in his view seek either a stay of execution 
in respect of its liability on the instrument or a deferral of any judgment on the 
instrument until after trial of its counterclaim; if, on the other hand, the 
evidence was less than powerful, the bank would simply be left to pursue a 
claim or counterclaim against the beneficiary for reimbursement or its remedy 
against its customer." 
Back to Safa, Waller LJ accepted the submission that a seriously arguable 
case which a fraudulent demand has been made with a real prospect of 
success would entitle the bank to resist an application for summary judgment. 
In other words, where the beneficiary claims summary judgment, he will fail if 
the claim can be shown to be fraudulent at any time up to the time of 
judgment. This is simply an application oi"ex tu/picausa non orituractid\ 
Furthermore, he took the view that there was not a big different between the 
words "the powerful evidence" and "real prospect of success". Therefore, 
"where the bank can raise a set-off as a defence the question whether it has 
a 'real prospect of success' is the appropriate test''^ ^ jp applying the fraud rule 
in this case. 
" Safa [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 600, 607, supra note 3 1 . 
38 Ibid. 
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By referring to several other authorities^^, Waller LJ expressed his own view 
in the current case and said: 
"Gathering the threads from the above authorities 
and adapting them to the circumstances of this case, 
my view is as follows: 
1. The principle that letters of credit must be 
treated as cash is an important one, and must be 
maintained. 
2. It is however unusual for a bank which has opened 
a letter of credit to be involved in the related 
transaction to the extent this bank was. 
3. When a bank is involved inthe related transaction 
it may be unjust for that bank to be forced to pay 
on a summary judgment where it has a real prospect 
of succeeding by reference to a claim on the 
underlying transaction, and particularly if that 
claim is a liquidated claim, the court should not 
give summary judgment either because a set-off has 
a reasonable prospect of success or because there 
is a compelling reason to have a trial of the letter 
of credit issue. 
4. If a bank can establish a claim with a real 
prospect of success, either that the demand wag 
fraudulent even if it had no clear evidence of fraud 
at the time of demand, or that there was a 
misrepresentation by the beneficiary directed at 
persuading the bank to enter into the letter of credit, 
it may also be unjust to enter summary judgment 
against the bank either because the bank has a 
reasonable prospect of succeeding in a defence of 
set-off or because there is a compelling reason for 
a trial of the letter of credit issue."" 
Waller LJ's analysis broke the old idea of applying the fraud rule in English 
law; it brought many new situations in applying a lower standard of proof in 
applying the fraud rule. 
^' Including: Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corpn v. Kloeckner & 07-4(7 [1990] 2 QB 
514. and Clovertogs Ltd v. Jean Scenes Ltd (unreported) 5 March 1982; Court of Appeal 
(Civil Division) Transcript No 566 of 1982 
'^° Ba/fourBeatty [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 600, 608, supra note 36. 
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First of all, when a bank is involved in the related underlying 
transaction, it may not be forced to pay on a summary Judgment as long 
as the bank can establish a claim that it has a real prospect of 
succeeding by reference to a claim on the underlying transaction. 
Secondly, a bank may not be forced to pay by a summary Judgment if it 
can establish a claim with a real prospect of success that the demand 
was fraudulent even if it had no clear evidence of fraud at the time of 
demand. 
Thirdly, a bank may not be forced to pay by a summary judgment as 
long as it has a real prospect of success to claim that there was a 
misrepresentation by the beneficiary directed at persuading the bank to 
enter into the letter of credit 
However, except for the third point, which was later confirmed in Solo, the 
other two points both caused arguments in English law. 
For example, Mance LJ, in the case of Solo, while discussing the second 
point above said: 
"I would not consider that this low test can be 
justified on the basis that the Safa case concerned 
the relationship between bank and beneficiary, 
rather than between customer and bank or between the 
parties to the underlying cominercial relationship. 
If instruments such as letters of credit and 
performance bonds are to be treated as cash, they 
must be paid as cash by banks to beneficiaries.'"'^ 
41 Solo [2001] 1 W.LR 1800, 1812, supra note 23, 
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Before a discussion of Mance LJ's view above, it may be necessary to recall 
the bank's title and obligation to the beneficiary under a letter of credit since 
all the new approaches established in Safa are applied between the bank 
and beneficiary.^2 3y issuing an irrevocable letter of credit, the bank 
undertakes an absolute obligation to pay the seller beneficiary against the 
presentation of conforming documents under the credit. The autonomy 
principle requires the bank to make the decision of whether paying totally 
relying on the conformity of documents. The bank is not required to concern 
the disputes in the underlying contracts between the applicant and 
beneficiary. The bank has to pay against conforming documents, in other 
words, the bank cannot reject payment by relying on conflicts in the 
underlying contract. The fraud rule is exceptional because it entitles the bank 
to reject documents where there is a fraud on the part of the beneficiary even 
the fraud is in the underlying contract.^ According to the fraud rule, the bank 
is entitled and also obliged (to the applicant) to reject to pay a fraudulent 
beneficiary as long as the fraud has been known to the bank. In this sense, it 
seems unreasonable to consider the bank's participation in the underlying 
transaction as a significant point in applying the lower standard of proof when 
applying the fraud rule. The bank may have other contractual relationships 
besides those under the letter of credit, with both the applicant and the 
*^  The contractual relationships under documentary credits are mainly discussed in Chapter 
1, section 2.1 to 2.3. Only several involved issues are mentioned here. 
" See Sztejn (1941) 31 NYS 2d 631, 634-635, supra note 1: "where the seller's fraud had 
been called to the bank's attention before the drafts and documents have been presented 
for payment, the principle of the independence of the bank's obligation under the letter of 
credit should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous seller". 
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beneficiary, if he is involved in the underlying contracts. However, under the 
principle of autonomy, the bank is not allowed the reject documents by relying 
on any disputes in the underlying contracts (except to the fraud rule). This 
should not change merely because the bank is involved in the underlying 
contract. The bank's obligation under the letter of credit cannot be influenced 
by its other title or obligations under the underlying contracts. This is a simple 
application of the autonomy principle. It would be questionable to applying a 
lower standard of proof in a summary judgment case to the application of the 
fraud rule solely because the bank was involved in the underlying 
transactions in documentary credits. The bank is not entitled to reject 
payment by relying on any disputes between itself and the beneficiary 
although its involvement in the underlying contracts may offer it separate 
defence against the beneficiary. The only possible explanation may be that, 
the bank is comparatively better able to find the evidence of fraud as one of 
the parties in the underlying contract. But it is not clear whether this 
explanation is strong enough to support the application of a lower standard of 
proof. 
However, referring to another new approach established in Safa, under which 
a bank may not be forced to pay by a summary judgment if it can establish a 
claim with a real prospect of success that the demand was fraudulent even if 
it had no clear evidence of fraud at the time of demand, it seems that the 
bank's participation in the underlying transaction is not important or even 
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necessary to apply the lower standard of proof in a summary judgment case 
between the bank and beneficiary. According to the judgement of Safa, the 
bank is only required to prove a seriously arguable case of fraud to defend 
the beneficiary's summary judgment application, even he is not involved in 
the underlying transaction. This is also the new approach which gave rise to 
many arguments. Mance LJ thought the different relationship between the 
bank with beneficiary, and the applicant with bank, cannot justify the 
reasonableness of the new approach. However, the thesis respectfully 
disagrees. 
It is true that the letter of credit and performance bonds are treated as cash 
according the autonomy principle in documentary credits; however, the 
different contractual relationships between different parties certainly will 
affect every party's title and obligation under the credit. Where a beneficiary 
is asking for a summary judgment to force a bank to pay, it must follow that 
the bank is in breach of obligations to the beneficiary by not paying. Under a 
letter of credit, the bank is obliged to pay against conforming documents. But 
the fraud rule also entitles the bank to reject payment by relying on the fraud 
of the beneficiary. Of course, the fraud rule does not require the bank to go 
behind the document to detect the fraud. But it does not mean that the bank 
is not allowed to go behind the document to find the fraud if he suspected a 
possibility of fraud. The bank cannot reject payment by relying on any 
conflicts in underlying contracts unless the conflict is a fraud of the beneficiary. 
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Certainly, the bank is liable for damages to the beneficiary because of a 
wrongful dishonour if the fraud is not clearly proved at the trial. However, 
before the trial, where the beneficiary is asking for a summary judgment from 
the court to force the bank to pay, the bank is entitled to not being forced to 
pay by a summary judgment as long as it can establish a claim with a real 
prospect of success that the demand was fraudulent. This is a simple 
application of the general rule for summary judgment. And the bank's right to 
reject the documents against a fraudulent beneficiary is given by the fraud 
rule, which is an exception in documentary credits. Therefore, bank's 
rejecting of payment by relying on the fraud rule cannot be seen as a breach 
of obligations under documentary credits transactions. The application of the 
lower standard of proof in this case is because of the specific contractual, 
relationship between the bank and beneficiary. To apply the general rule for 
granting a summary judgment in such a situation does not contradict to the 
fraud rule, nor the autonomy principle in documentary credits. The situation 
would be totally different if the action was between the applicant and bank, for 
example, where an applicant is asking for an injunction to prevent the bank 
from payment by alleging there is a fraud on the beneficiary. One of reasons 
is that, by asking for the injunction, the applicant is asking a court to force the 
bank to breach its obligation of payment to the beneficiary under the credit. 
The general rule for granting an interlocutory injunction can be an essential 
issue which has to be considered in this situation. 
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Actually, the above cases, which involved in the application of the lower 
standard of proof in applying the fraud rule, are either summary judgment 
cases or injunction cases. While the application of the general rule for 
granting a summary judgment in documentary credits cases has been 
discussed in Saf^, it is still not clear that how the general rule of granting an 
interlocutory injunction is applied in documentary credits cases, essentially 
the fraud rule cases. 
2. The Application of the General Interlocutory Injunction 
Rule in Fraud Documentary Credits Cases. 
2 .1 . The general rule in granting an Interlocutory injunction in 
English law 
It is well known that the purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to maintain 
the "status quo" pending trial.'*^ "Status quo" or, more fully, "status quo ante," 
means in Latin "the existing state of things", exists before a particular point of 
time.'*^ It is common ground that the courts can only intervene by way of 
injunction to prevent the alleged breach of a legal duty owed by the defendant 
to the plaintiff, or by way of ancillary relief required by a party to proceedings 
"•^ Ba//vurBeatty [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 600, 605, supra note 36. 
*5 Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, "Interlocutory injunctions on tlie merits", [1991] Law Quarterly 
Review 196, 195-197. 
"6 Alfred Dunhill Limited and Another V. SunopticS.A. and Anotiier [1979] F.S.R. 337. 376. 
156 
Lu Lu: The Exceptions in Documentary Credits in English Law. 
who asserts a cause of action against the other party. '^' Although the test for 
an interlocutory injunction tends to be flexible, the most frequently used 
approach to injunctions before 1975 was that in the House of Lords decision 
in J. T. Stratford & Son Ltd v. Lindley^"^, whereby a plaintiff must establish that 
he or she had a prima facie case against the defendant to succeed in 
obtaining an interlocutory injunction. This is actually a test of merits which 
focuses on testing the strengths of the parties, and quite a difficult hurdle to 
mount successfully. 
However, in the House of Lords in American Cyanamid Co. Appellants v. 
Ethicon Ltd. Respondents^ in 1975, Lord Diplock rejected the previous high 
test for granting an interlocutory injunction said: 
"... there is no such rule. The use of such 
expressions as ' a probability', ' a prima facie case', 
or 'a strong prima facie case' in the context of the 
exercise of a discretionary power to grant an 
interlocutory injunction leads to confusion as to 
the object sought to be achieved by this form of 
temporary relief. The court no doubt must be 
satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or 
vexatious, in other words, that there is a serious 
question to be tried. "^ ^ 
He then emphasized on the essential of the principle of "balance of 
convenience" by saying: 
"... unless the material available to the court at 
'•'' Siskina, The (H.L.) [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1, 6. Lord Diplock said: "The right to obtain an 
interlocutory injunction Is merely ancillary and incidental to the pre-existing cause of 
action . . . " 
••^  American Cyanamid Co. Appeiiants v. Etiiicon Ltd. Respondents [1975] A.C. 396. 
"9 Ibid. 407. 
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the hearing of the application for an interlocutory 
injunction fails to disclose that the plaintiff has 
any real prospect of succeeding in his claim for a 
permanent injunction at the trial, the court should 
go on to consider whether the balance of convenience 
lies in favour of granting or refusing the 
interlocutory relief that is sought." 
He also added that the "balance of convenience" only arises "where there is 
doubt as to the adequacy of the respective remedies in damages available to 
either party or to both". 
Lord Diplock's decision gave rise to the notion that at the interlocutory stage 
the courts are only concerned with whether the plaintiff has an arguable case 
and not with whether the plaintiffs case is stronger than that of the defendant. 
And once a plaintiff could establish that there was a serious question to be 
tried, the court has to move on to examine whether, if the plaintiff were to 
succeed in the end, he or she would be compensated by adequate damages. 
Clearly, the balance of convenience becomes the central issuing in 
interlocutory injunction cases. 
There was much argument on the principles of "the adequacy of damages" 
and "balance of convenience" in granting interlocutory injunctions during 
three decades after the guidance had been ruled out by Lord Diplock in 
American Cyanamicfi^. Recently, Laddie J even interpreted American 
5° The decision in American Cyanam/d has been quite heavily criticised (see Gray 
C.,"Interim injunctions since American Cyanamid", (1981) 40. Cambridge Law Journal at 
307; Zuckerman, A., "Interim Injunctions on the merits", (1991) 107. Law Quarterly 
Reports at 197; I.R.Scott, 'Re-assessing American Cyanamid', (2002) 2 1 . Civil Justice 
Quarterly 190.). There are also many cases which did not follow the rules of American 
Cyanamid {&.q. NWL Ltd v. Woods [1979] 1 WLR 1294, Cambridge Nutrition Ltd v. BBC 
[1990] 3 All ER 523; Series5Software v. Clarke & Ors [1996] 1 All ER 853.). 
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Cyanamid as meaning that Lord Diplock "did not intend to exclude 
consideration of the strength of the cases in most applications for 
interlocutory relief'^''. Lord Diplock himself, in the case of N.W.L. Ltd v 
Wood^"^, also admitted that there are exceptional cases in which the 
interlocutory injunction will be the final stages. In other words, the court 
should consider the respective merits of parties in deciding injunction 
cases In which the decision will be decisive and the matter will not go to 
a final trial. There are also other exceptions which are concerned in English 
case law.^ ^ Essentially, an exception concerning the fraud issue was 
mentioned in Alfred Dunhill Ltd v. Sunoptic S.A.^. The court allowed an 
appeal for applying an interlocutory injunction , although on the basis of the 
principle established in American Cyanamid, said that it would be proper to 
consider the respective merits of the parties' cases in interlocutory 
cases if there was no substantial disputes as to the facts, in particular 
as to the allegation of fraud. This case is certainly important in considering 
the application of the general rule of injunction in fraud cases. However, it 
may not be followed by an application of the "prima facie" test in injunction 
cases to the application of the fraud rule in documentary credits. 
" Series 5Software Ltd V Clarke & Ors [1996] 1 All E.R. 853, 865. 
" N.W.L. Ltdi^ Woods[1979] 1 W.LR. 1294. 
" For example: DeFaIco v. Craw/eyBC [1980] 1 Q.B. 460 (CA); Leisure Data v. Bell[19Z8] 
F.S.R. 367; Cambridge Nutrition Ltd v. BBC[1990] 3 All E.R. 523 at 534 (CA); Dougias v. 
Heilo Ltd [2001] Q.B. 967. Emmanuel Francis v. The Royal Borough of Kensington and 
Chelsea [2003] WL 933 (CA). For detailed discussion of examples see J. Martin, Hanbury 
and Martin's Modern Equity, (17"^ edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), at p. 784-790; Andrew 
Keay, "Whitlier American Cyanamid? : interim injunctions in tlie 21st century", [2004] Civil 
Justice Quarterly, volume 23, 132, 138. 
" Alfred Dunhill Ltd V. Sunoptic S.A. [1979] F.S.R. 337, supra note, 46. 
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2.2. An analysis to the application of the general injunctions rule in 
the fraud rule cases 
According to the above research, the general rule itself for granting an 
interlocutory injunction is not so clear in English law. The application of the 
American Cyanamid principle is still a matter of argument, and the "prima 
facie" test is still being applied by the judges in many cases. Therefore, to 
understand the test for granting an interlocutory injunction in the fraud rule 
cases, it may be useful to consider the recent judgments of the fraud rule 
cases which are concerned with those essential tests. 
2.2.1. The "prima fade test" 
The "prima facie test" is actually a test of merits which focuses on testing the 
strengths of the parties. In the fraud rule cases, the prima facie test may be a 
test of whether the defendant can make a seriously arguable case of fraud on 
the part of beneficiary. 
In United Trading Corp, Ackner LJ, while discussing the standard of proof in 
the current case, said: 
"Have the plaintiffs established that it is 
seriously arguable that, on the material available, 
the only realistic inference is that Agromark could 
not honestly have believed in the validity of its 
demands on the performance bonds?"" 
" United Trading [IQSS] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 554, 561, supra note 9, see previous this chapter, 
section 1.1. 
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In Themehelp, Balcombe LJ also considered the standard of proof in applying 
the fraud rule "between the buyer and seller" as "whether the buyers had 
established that it was seriously arguable that on the material available the 
only reasonable inference was that the sellers were fraudulent in relation to 
the share sale agreement". 
In both of the injunction cases, the courts applied the seriously arguable case 
of fraud as the standard of proof in applying the fraud rule. Consequently, it 
may be right to say that the "prima facie test" is considered by the courts as a 
main principle in granting an interlocutory injunction by applying the fraud rule 
in documentary credits. However, the application of the "prima facie test" may 
not be seen as a breach of "the balance of convenience" test which was 
established in American Cyanam/daccording to the following research. 
2.2.2. The test of "balance of convenience" 
The "balance of convenience test", which was established by Lord Diplock in 
American Cyanamid, only required the plaintiff to establish that "there was a 
serious question to be tried", but asked the courts to focus on considering the 
"the adequacy of damages" to the parties to make the decision of whether 
granting an interlocutory injunction. This test is comparatively a lower test to 
the "prima facie test". Although the seriously arguable case fraud had been 
mainly applied as the standard of proof in the injunction cases while applying 
the fraud rule, the "balance of convenience test" was not ignored according to 
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most of the judgments. Waite LJ said in Themehelp: 
"It is unnecessary for the purposes of this appeal 
to decide whether the 'sole realistic inference' 
test propounded by Ackner LJ in United Trading 
Corporation S.A. v. Allied Arab Bank Ltd.^' involves 
a more burdensome standard of proof than the standard 
generally applied to proof of fraud, namely that 
fraud must be established on the balance of 
probabilities after weighing the evidence with due 
regard to the gravity of the particular allegation; 
or to decide whether the judge was right to have 
treated the former test, rather than the latter, as 
applying in this case. That is because Mr Craig for 
the buyers has not sought to argue in this appeal, 
though he would reserve the right to do so in another 
case, that the judge adopted too stringent a test 
of fraud."" 
It seems that Waite LJ was trying to avoid the question of whether it is 
reasonable to apply the "prima facie test" in the current case. He believed it 
was unnecessary to make a decision on this point because this issue was not 
argued by the buyer. He only mentioned the test applied in United Tradinga^ 
involving a more burdensome standard of proof than the general law, but he 
did not say the test was wrong. However, he concluded in his judgment that 
"the judge was entitled, in my judgment, to take all this into account in 
reaching his conclusion that the buyers had satisfied the onus of showing, for 
the purposes of interlocutory relief, that they had an arguable case at trial that 
fraud was the only realistic inference",^^ then turned to discuss "the 
appropriateness of relief by way of injunction". In the end, he granted the 
56 Ibid. 
" Themehelp [1996] QB 84, 100, supra note 8. 
58 Ibid. 
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injunction on the basis of othenwise the plaintiff might be in peril of being 
forced to indemnify the guarantor and of then being unable to recover its 
outlay from the fraudulent beneficiary even if fraud was ultimately proven at 
trial. 
Waite LJ's decision of granting the injunction is the same as Balcombe LJ's; 
however, his judgment was clearly relying on the test of "balance of 
convenience". In this sense, his decision may also be seen as an application 
of the test of "balance of convenience" in fraud rule injunction cases. It is 
interesting that, in Themehelp, the same conclusion can be made by applying 
a different test. It is even more interesting that the test of "balance of 
convenience" was also considered by Ackner LJ in United Trading Corp. 
Following to the conclusion that the plaintiff did not establish "a good 
arguable case that the only realistic inference is that the demands were 
fraudulent", Ackner LJ cited Kerr J's "insuperable difficulty theory" from R. D. 
l-iarbottle Ltd. v. Nationai WestminsterBanl<Ud.^^ as follows: 
"The plaintiffs then still face what seems to me to 
be an insuperable difficulty. They are seeking to 
prevent the bank from paying and debiting their 
account if the threatened payment is in breach 
of contract, which the plaintiffs' writs do not even 
allege and as to which they claim no declaratory 
relief, then the plaintiffs would have good claims 
for damages against the bank. In that event the 
injunctions would be inappropriate, because they 
interfere with the bank's obligations to the 
Egyptian banks, because they might cause greater 
damage to the bank than the plaintiffs could pay on 
59 /?. D. Harbottle Ltd. v. National Westminster Bank Ltd. [1978] Q.B. 146. 
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their undertaking as to damages, and because the 
plaintiffs would then have an adequate remedy in 
damages. The balance of convenience would in that 
event be hopelessly weighted against the 
plaintiffs. "6° 
Ackner LJ agreed with Kerr J's opinion that where an applicant is "seeking to 
prevent the bank from paying and debiting their account", "the balance of 
convenience would in that event be hopelessly weighted against the 
plaintiffs". He further explained this opinion in the current case by the 
following words: 
"...even given the injunctions they seek, they are 
bound to experience difficulties in raising further 
sums from their own bank or from other banks to whom 
they would have to disclose their potential 
liabilities arising from the performance bonds 
issued on their instructions. 
The grant of an injunction would not be upon the basis 
that they had established fraud, but only on the basis 
that on the available evidence it was seriously 
arguable that fraud had occurred. Such a finding does 
not indicate success in the final action, nor does 
the failure to obtain an interim injunction 
predicate failure when the case is ultimately 
heard. "^ ^ 
The above words are a clear consideration of the test of "balance of 
convenience". Although Ackner LJ applied the "seriously arguable fraud" as 
the standard of proof in applying the fraud rule, he did not consider it as the 
only factor for justifying the reasonability of granting the injunction. In contrast, 
he further expressed that the injunction may not be granted even if the 
plaintiff can established a good arguable case because of the issue of 
60 Ibid , 1 5 1 . 
«i United Trading [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 554, 565 to 566, supra note 9. 
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balance of convenience: 
"Thus, even if we had concluded that the plaintiffs 
had established a good arguable case on the issue 
of liability and had decided this appeal purely on 
the issue of the balance of convenience, we would 
have found against the plaintiffs in the result."^^ 
Ackner LJ's judgment clearly shows that the test of "balance of convenience" 
is a crucial test for granting an interlocutory injunction. An injunction may not 
be granted even if the applicant can satisfy the "prima facie test" by 
establishing a seriously arguable case of fraud, as long as the balance of 
convenience is weighted against the plaintiff. This point was further proved by 
the decision of Tukan Timber v. Barclays Bank P/cP It was held that the 
plaintiffs were not entitled to an injunction to restrain a bank making 
payments under an irrecoverable letter of credit on the ground of fraud 
because they could not show that a further fraudulent demand would be 
made notwithstanding that fraudulent demands had already been made. In 
this case, the plaintiff was seeking an injunction to prevent his own bank to 
pay under a letter of credit, and the bank had already twice rejected a 
demand on the ground of forgery. The courts believed there was a heavy 
burden of proof on the plaintiff to show that there was fraud on the part of the 
beneficiary, in other words, the plaintiff had proved much more than a 
seriously arguable case of fraud; however the injunction was rejected on the 
ground that the damage the bank might sustain to its reputation could not be 
" Ibid, 566. 
" Tukan Timber v Barclays Bank Pic. [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 171. 
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properly compensated by the plaintiff if the injunction should not have been 
granted. 
Tukan T/mber\Nas a typical example of applying the "balance of convenience 
test" for granting an interlocutory injunction in documentary credits. At this 
stage, it may be concluded: "a seriously arguable case of fraud" may only be 
seen as a lower standard of proof in applying the fraud rule in injunction 
cases. Where there is an application for granting an interlocutory injunction in 
documentary credits transactions, which may relevant to the appliance of the 
fraud rule, the standard of proof in applying the fraud rule may be lowered to 
that of "a seriously arguable case of fraud" rather than "a clearly proved 
fraud". However, the applying of the fraud rule does not necessarily lead to a 
result of granting an interlocutory injunction. The "balance of convenience 
test" is still a decisive test to grant an interlocutory injunction in documentary 
credits cases. 
Nevertheless, the application of the "balance of convenience test" in 
documentary credits may not be seen as a simple application of American 
Cyanamid. While American Cyanamid^Nas being seen as a decision which 
relaxed the high test of the "prima facie case" for granting an interlocutory 
injunction, the application of "the balance of convenience test" in 
documentary credits increased the difficulty to achieve an interlocutory 
injunction. The plaintiff, who is seeking an injunction by alleging a fraud under 
documentary credits, can only win this case by satisfying both the fraud rule 
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and "the balance of convenience test". It does not appear that the courts 
would grant an injunction simply by considering the balance of convenience 
in documentary credit cases in which the application of the fraud rule is 
essential^^. In other words, although the lower standard of proof is applied in 
injunction cases to apply the fraud rule, the injunction can still be very difficult 
to achieve because both the "prima facie test" and the "balance of 
convenience test" have to be satisfied. But even if the courts only applied the 
"balance of convenience test" in considering granting an injunction in 
documentary credits cases, the "the balance of convenience would in that 
event be hopelessly weighted against the plaintiffs"^^. Themehelp is one of 
these exceptional cases. In that case, a default had occurred before the 
beneficiary claimed under the guarantee. And there was no authority stating 
the principles to be applied in this situation, where the guarantor was not 
involved in the proceedings at all, to restrain the beneficiary from taking any 
step to enforce the performance guarantee.^ s Hence, there was no risk to the 
integrity of the performance guarantee to grant an injunctive relief to restrict 
the beneficiary's rights of enforcement between the applicant and the 
beneficiary. Although Waite LJ granted the injunction by relying on the test of 
"balance of convenience", the judgment may not be seen as in indication of 
the courts will grant an injunction simply by considering the balance of 
^'' Of course, there will be injunction applications in documentary credits cases which are 
pleading on other exceptions rather than the fraud rule. In this case, the applicant will be 
required to prove the relative issues rather than the fraud. For examples, see Group JosiRe 
V. WalbrookInsurance Co. Ltd. [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152. Also see Chapter 4 , section 5 and 
Chapter 5, section 4 and 5 for detailed discussion of this issue in illegality and nullity 
exceptions. 
" R. D. Harbottle, [1978] Q.B. 146, 151, supra note 59. 
" Themehelp [1996] QB 91-92, supra note 8. 
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convenience in ordinary documentary credits cases. 
Nevertheless, there is another exceptional case, Kvaemer John Brown Ltd v. 
Midland Bank plc^"^ In this case, Cresswell J refused to discharge a pre-trial 
injunction restraining Midland Bank from making payment under a letter of 
credit on the ground of the beneficiary's manifest fraud in certifying to the 
bank the giving of a required notice to the plaintiff when it had not done so. 
Cresswell J's decision was arrived at without a consideration of the balance 
of convenience.^^ But Cresswell J said at the same time in this case: 
"the courts would refuse to grant an injunction to 
restrain a bank from paying in the case of a first 
demand bond or standby credit, save where there was 
clear and obvious fraud of which the bank had."^^ 
The thesis wonders whether this case could be seen simply as being 
contradictory to the application the "balance of convenience test"? 
First, the courts believed that there was clear and obvious fraud to the bank's 
knowledge, and accordingly there would be a breach of obligation to the 
applicant for the bank to pay the fraudulent beneficiary. Secondly, there will 
be no appreciable risk that the claim of fraud cannot be wholly satisfied since 
it has already been satisfied. Thus there will be no possibility for the bank to 
claim any damage from the applicant as the result of having to delay payment; 
in contradiction, it may cause many more trials since the applicant will 
" Kvaerner John Brown Ltd V. M/d/andBankp/c [199Q] C.L.C. 446. 
8^ Czarnikow-Rionda, [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 187, 190, supra note 20. 
" Kvaerner John Brown, [1998] C.L.C. 446, supra note 67. 
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certainly reject reimbursement to the bank by relying on the fraud rule if the 
injunction is discharged. Last by not the least, the thesis wondered whether 
this case could be justified as one of exceptional cases in which the 
interlocutory injunction will be the final stages.''° 
If the above analysis is correct, Kvaemer John then may be seen as an 
exceptional case which deviated from American Cyanam/d\N\ih reasons. In 
fact, Kvaemer John \N^'& also an unusual case because the applicant had a 
clear cause of action to achieve an injunction against the bank. Ordinarily, the 
cause of action is a stumbling block in the way of the applicant to seek an 
interlocutory injunction to prevent a bank from paying or debiting their 
account. 
2.2.3. A cause of action 
According to "the Siskina principle"7\ the plaintiff has to have a cause of 
action against the defendant to ask an injunction against it. This rule has also 
been applied widely in injunctions in documentary credits while considering 
the application of the fraud rule. 
In United Trading, Ackner LJ believed that an injunction could only be granted 
in aid of a cause of action against the injuncted party. He, subsequently. 
''° Lord Diplock himself, in tlie case of N. W.L Ltd v Woods, supra note 51, admits that there 
are exceptional cases In which the interlocutory injunction will be the final stages. See 
section 2.1 of this chapter. 
'1 See Siskina, The (HL) [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1, 6, supra note 47. Lord Diplock said: "The 
right to obtain an interlocutory injunction is merely ancillary and incidental to the 
pre-existing cause of action . . ." 
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analysed three potential caused of action for the plaintiff before the 
discussion of other essential issues, such like the "prima facie test" and 
"balance of convenience test"/^ The cause of action was also pointed out by 
e Kerr J in the case of R. D. Harbottle Ltd. v. National Westminster Bank Ltd?^ 
as one of the crucial Issues in considering to grant interlocutory injunctions 
against the bank: 
"They [the plaintiffs] are seeking to prevent the 
bank from paying and debiting their account. It must 
then follow that if the bank pays and debits the 
plaintiffs' account, it is either entitled to do so 
or not to do so. To do so would either be in accordance 
with the bank's contract with the plaintiffs or a 
breach of it. If it is in accordance with the contract, 
then the plaintiffs have no cause of action against 
the bank and, as it seems to me, no possible basis 
for an injunction against it."'" 
It is clear that there are no exceptions in applying "the Siskina principle" in 
documentary credits while considering granting an interlocutory injunction by 
relying on the fraud rule. For instance, where an applicant is asking for an 
injunction to prevent the bank from payment, it has to prove its own cause of 
action. In another word, the applicant has to prove the bank is in breach of his 
mandate to the applicant as paying against the document or demanding. 
Otherwise, it is not entitled to the injunction. This is also one of the reasons 
'^ United Trading Corporation, [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 554, 560, supra note 9. The cause of 
action was approved by the courts as the bank is threatening to commit a breach of a duty 
owed to the plaintiff in tort. This decision was based on Anns v. Merton London Borougti 
Councii [I^IS] A.C. 728. But it is doubtful whether such an argument would be accepted 
today since the further developments in the law of negligence. Also see Czarniicow-Rionda 
[1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 187, 199, supra note 20. 
" /?. D. Harbottie, [1978] Q.B. 146, supra note 59. 
7" Ibid, 155. 
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why, in Czamikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc. v. Standard Bank London Ltdj^ 
an injunction of restraining a bank from giving instructions for payment under 
three letters of credit was discharged by Rix J In fact, Rionda is also the most 
important case in considering the reasonability of applying a lower standard 
to apply the fraud rule in both injunctions and summary judgments cases. 
Previous to an intensive study to the new approaches in applying the fraud, it 
is essential to make a conclusion to the rules for granting an interlocutory 
injunction in documentary credits relevant to the fraud rule. 
The above analysis shows: the general rules for granting interlocutory 
injunctions are basically applied in the fraud rule cases. Nevertheless: 
The "Siskina principle" is applied equally in the fraud rule cases for granting 
an interlocutory injunction. The plaintiffs are unable to obtain an interlocutory 
injunction unless they can prove there is a clear cause of action against the 
defendants. In other words, the plaintiff has to prove that the defendant would 
be in breach of mandate to the applicant if the injunction is not granted. 
The "balance of convenience test" is also applied similarly in the fraud rule 
cases. The courts are always considering the balance of convenience for 
granting an interlocutory injunction by applying the fraud rule in documentary 
credits. To obtain an interlocutory injunction by relying on the fraud rule, the 
plaintiff first has to prove there is an arguable case of fraud by the beneficiary. 
" Czarnikow-Rionda [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 187, supra note 20. 
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And once a plaintiff could satisfy the requirement, the court has to examine 
whether. If the plaintiff were to succeed in the end, he or she would be 
compensated by adequate damages. The "balance of convenience test" is a 
central issue for granting an injunction in the fraud rule cases as which in 
normal injunction cases. However, the "balance of convenience test" may not 
reduce difficulties for the applicant to achieve an interlocutory injunction in the 
fraud rule cases as it does in normal injunction cases. Because even the 
"balance of convenience test" was passed, the plaintiff is still required to 
satisfy the "prima facie test". 
The "prima facie test" is applied, in addition to the "balance of convenience 
test", in the fraud rule cases. Although there are arguments against 
abandoning the "prima facie test", it is not the general rule for the courts to 
consider the strength of the cases in injunction cases in English law since 
American Cyanamid. Therefore, the application of the "prima facie test" in the 
fraud rule cases may be exceptional. Actually, this application is reasoning 
from the high standard of proof for applying the fraud rule in normal 
documentary credits cases. The standard proof to apply the fraud rule has 
been lowered from "a clearly proved fraud "to "a seriously arguable case of 
fraud" in injunction cases. 
After all the standard of proof to obtain an interlocutory injunction in the fraud 
rule case is much higher than which in ordinary injunction cases. This is 
proved more clearly by the following study. 
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3. An Intensive Study to the Application oftfte Fraud Rule at 
the Pre-trial Stage in Documentary Credits 
The previous research in this chapter suggests that a lower standard of proof 
regarding the demonstration of fraud may be applied in injunction or 
summary judgment cases in considering the application of the fraud rule. The 
case law specified several situations of the application as follows: 
First of all, in applying for an interlocutory injunction at the pre-trial 
stage to restrain the beneficiary from demanding payment, the 
applicant is required to prove a seriously arguable case of fraud rather 
a clearly proved fraud on the part of the beneficiary to apply the fraud 
rule in documentary credits. This application was established in 
Themehelp, and based on reasoning from the non-involvement of the bank or 
guarantor at the early stage. 
Secondly, a bank may not be forced to pay the beneficiary by a 
summary Judgment as long as it has a claim with a real prospect that 
there was a misrepresentation by the beneficiary when directing or 
persuading the bank to enter to the letter of credit This exception was 
established in Safa, and then confirmed in Solo. The court believes that a 
bank is allowed to avoid a bond by relying on the invalidity of the bond. 
Thirdly, a bank may not be forced to pay by a summary judgment if it 
can establish a claim with a real prospect of success that the demand 
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was fraudulent even if it had no clear evidence of fraud at tlie time of 
demand. This application is established in Safa case and based on 
reasoning from the bank's own "ex turpi causa" defence against the 
fraudulent beneficiary. This exception includes the situation of the bank was 
involving in the underlying contract. However, the thesis argues that a bank's 
underlying transaction claims should not be accounted in considering the 
application of the fraud rule.''^ 
3 .1 . T h e trial test" and "the pre-trial test" 
It is interesting that all the three exceptions in applying the lower standard of 
proof were at the pre-trial stage for either an injunction or a summary 
judgment. In this sense, Rix J's following words in the case of Rionda^^ may 
be very important: 
"This case [United Trading] is also the locus 
classicus for the elucidation of the standard of 
proof required to make good a case of fraud, both 
at trial and at the stage of requesting a pre-trial 
injunction (at p. 561) .''^ 
At trial the test is this: 
If the Court considers that on the material before 
it the only realistic inference to draw is that of 
fraud, then the seller would have made out a 
sufficient case of fraud. 
At the pre-trial stage the test therefore becomes: 
Have the plaintiffs established that it is seriously 
arguable that, on the material available, the only 
'^ For detailed discussion, see section 1.4 of this ciiapter. 
" Czarnikow-Rionda [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 187, supra note 20. 
8^ United Trading Corporation, [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 554, 561, supra note 9. 
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realistic inference is that [the beneficiary] could 
not honestly have believed in the validity of its 
demands on the performance bonds?"" 
Rix J classified the standard of proof in applying the fraud rule into two 
catalogues by the timing. Of course the "prima facie case test" may not be 
restricted to the validity of its demands on the performance bonds. When the 
issue of standard of proof comes to the court at the trial, the court would 
consider the test as whether there was a clear case of fraud. However, when 
the same issue comes to the court at the pre-trial stage, the test might be 
amended as whether there was a seriously arguable case of fraud. The 
former is the traditional test for the standard of proof while applying the fraud 
rule in English law; the latter is an exceptional test for the same issue at the 
pre-trial stage. 
According to this classification, the new approaches in applying the fraud rule 
in documentary credits may be summarised into one sentence: At the pre-trial 
stage, it has to be proved that there was a seriously arguable case of fraud 
on the part of the beneficiary in applying the fraud rule in documentary credits. 
Of course the general rule for granting an interlocutory injunction or a 
summary judgment should be considered separately in each case. 
3.2. Banks' knowledge of the fraud 
" Czarnikow-Rlonda, at 200, supra note 20. 
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The issue of the banks' knowledge was always a controversial issue in 
applying the fraud rule. English court is always considering banks' knowledge 
as a crucial requirement in applying the fraud rule in documentary credits. In 
R. D. Harbottl^^, Kerr J said, the courts will leave the merchants to settle 
their disputes under the contracts by litigation or arbitration unless the 
banks have noticed clear cases of fraud;»^ In Edward Owerfi^, the Court of 
Appeal also recognized the fraud exception as that "the bank ought not to 
pay under the credit if it knows that the documents are forged or that the 
request for payment is made fraudulently in circumstances where there is no 
right to payment"^^ In Gian Singlf^, the bank was held not liable to pay 
against a forgery documents even the forgery was proved during the trial, 
because the bank had no knowledge of fraud at the time of payment. 
Therefore, it seems that the new approach of not considering the knowledge 
of the bank at the time of demanding as an essential issue is totally contrary 
to the ordinary approach of applying the fraud rule. Banks' knowledge of 
fraud was not discussed specifically either in Themehelp or in Solo. But 
things are not that simple. 
In the case of Czamikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc. v. Standard Bank 
London Ltd.^^, which was decided a year earlier than Safa, an injunction 
80 R. D. Harbottle, [1978] Q.B. 146, supra note 59. 
81 Ibid, 155 to 156. 
8^  Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v. Barclays Banl< International Ltd., [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 
166. 
83 Ibid, 171. 
8" Gian Singh & Co. Ltd. v. Banque de I'Indochine [1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1. 
85 Czarnikow-Rionda [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 187, supra note 20. 
176 
Lu Lu: The Exceptions in Documentary Credits in English Law. 
against a bank to pay was discharged, and one of the reasons was the lack of 
notice of the bank on the time of demand. In a more recent case, Banque 
Saudi Fransi V. Lear Siegier Sen/ices inc^^, the courts also held that a bank's 
notice of the fraud Is a consistent requirement imposed by the courts to apply 
the fraud rule. Both of the two cases did not follow the view of the new 
approach that the knowledge of the bank on the time of demand was not 
necessary. To understand this confused situation, it is important to research 
more deeply Czamikow-Rionda Sugar Trading inc. K Standard Bank London 
Ltd.^-' 
In Riondsp^, the plaintiffs (Rionda) sought to maintain a pre-trial injunction 
against the first defendant (Standard) to prevent it from paying out to two 
Swiss banks, United European Bank (UEB) which confirmed two of the letters 
of credit, and Banque Cantonale de Geneva (BCGe) which confirmed the 
third, at maturity the proceeds of the three letters of credit which Standard 
had opened at the request of its customer Rionda. The application of the 
injunction was based on the fraud exception. Rionda claimed that the 
beneficiary of the credit (Dine Group) was fraudulent. 
Rionda is an important case on the new approaches in applying the fraud rule. 
The judgment was against the plaintiffs, and the injunction restraining 
Standard from giving instructions payment out under the three letters of credit 
8^  Banque Saudi Fransi V Lear Siegier Services 12Q^^'\ 1 Lloyd's Rep 273. (QB); [2007] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 47 (CA). 
87 [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 187. 
88 Ibid. 
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was discharged. But Rix J considered the "prima facie test", the "balance and 
convenience" and the cause of action during the judgment, which made 
/?/onc/a be'mg a clear example of the application of the general injunction rule 
in the fraud rule cases. More importantly, Rix J analysed "the knowledge of 
the bank"^^ particularly during the discussion of the cause of action, and 
said: 
"...at any rate the possibility of an injunction, 
however exceptional, is contemplated where it is 
proved that the bank knows that a demand for payment 
is fraudulent"^" 
"The interest in the integrity of banking contracts 
under which banks made themselves liable on their 
letters of credit or their guarantees is so great 
that not even fraud can be allowed to intervene unless 
the fraud comes to the notice of the bank."^^ 
"The formulation of the fraud exception, to the 
extent that it requires the timely knowledge of the 
bank and not merely that of the beneficiary (who, 
ex hypothesis knows of his own fraud), emphasizes 
the distinctiveness of this rule."^^ 
He believed the fraud rule exception is limited under one condition, which is 
the bank's knowledge or notice of the fraudulent demand. He even made a 
fresh explanation to the doctrine of "fraud unravels all" by the following 
words: 
"It would be less pithy but more accurate to fill 
out the dictum by saying that fraud unravels the 
bank's obligation to act on the appearance of 
documents to be in accordance with a credit's 
requirements provided that the bank knows in time 
89 Ibid, 199. 
9° Ibid. 
91 Ibid, 202. 
« Ibid. 
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of the beneficiary's fraud. "^ ^ 
Rix J expressed the essential requirement of the banks' knowledge in 
applying the fraud rule. However, the conclusion was made on the basis of 
the fact of the current case. In R/'onda, the applicant was seeking to maintain 
a pre-trial injunction against a bank to prevent it from payment. According to 
"the Siskina principle", the applicant has to prove a cause of action against 
the bank, which means it has to prove that the bank would be in breach of 
mandate to make the payment. In a case relevant to the application of the 
fraud exception, the applicant then has to prove that the bank is in breach of 
mandate to pay a fraudulent beneficiary. In accordance with the fraud rule, 
the bank is not in breach of mandate by paying a fraudulent beneficiary 
unless the fraud comes to the notice of the bank. Consequently, the applicant 
may not have a cause of action against the bank to prevent the bank to pay 
unless the bank's knowledge of fraud is proved. 
Rix J did not try to extend the requirement of the bank's knowledge to all the 
fraud exception cases. In the judgment, he accepted Themehelp v. l/l^est as 
"either a genuine distinction, based on the fact that the claim against the 
beneficiary alone was brought at an early stage, well before the question of 
enforcement of the guarantee arose; or the decision must be regarded as 
undermined by the concession there that a claim against a beneficiary, as 
distinct from a claim against a bank, was not covered by prior authority"^"*. 
" Ibid, 199. 
«" Ibid, 202. 
179 
Lu Lu: The Exceptions in Documentary Credits in English Law. 
Consequently, it was reasonable in Themehelf^^ not to consider the banks' 
knowledge of fraud as a condition in granting the injunction against the 
beneficiary between the applicant and the beneficiary. Rix J also suggested 
in the judgment: 
"If the source of the power to injunct were purely 
the law's interest in preventing the beneficiary 
from benefiting from his own fraud, I do not see why 
there should be the added requirement that the fraud 
be patent to the bank."^^ 
Rix J's suggestion seems particularly apposite to the case where a 
beneficiary is asking for a summary judgment to force the bank to pay. In this 
circumstance, in applying the fraud rule, the bank is only required to establish 
a claim with a real prospect of success that, by rejecting the payment, it is 
"preventing the beneficiary from benefiting from his own fraud". Therefore, 
there should be no "added requirement that the fraud be patent to the bank". 
After an analysis off Rionda, it may be concluded that the banks' knowledge 
of fraud is very important in applying the fraud rule in documentary credits. 
According to the fraud rule, fraud unravels the bank's payment obligation to 
pay against the complying documents; but fraud only unravels the applicant's 
obligation to reimburse the bank who paid against facially complying 
documents provided that the bank knows the beneficiary's fraud before or at 
the time of payment. The courts may not grant an injunction at a pre-trial 
" The banks' knowledge was not mentioned during the judgment in Themehelp, the 
injunction was granted restrain the demanding without proof of fraud as between the 
defendant and the banks. See section 1.2 of this chapter. 
96 Ibid. 
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stage to prevent the bank from payment as long as the bank does not notice 
the fraud; but the courts may not grant a summary judgment, either, to force a 
bank to pay against a fraudulent beneficiary on a pre-trial stage simply 
because the bank has no knowledge of the fraud. 
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Summary: 
The new approaches of applying the fraud rule appeared in the 1990s may 
also be seen as exceptions within the context of the fraud exception. Despite 
the difference of the causes of action and involved parties among those 
exceptions, all of them were applied under a certain stage by English courts, 
the pre-trial stage. And the exceptional issues of those exceptions were also 
similar: An application of a lower standard of proof while applying the fraud 
rule. It has to be mentioned here, the lower standard of proof, which is a 
seriously arguable case of fraud on the part of beneficiary, is only the 
standard of proof in applying the fraud rule at the pre-trial stage. The general 
rule for granting an interlocutory injunction or a summary judgment has to be 
considered separately in each case as well. The analysis to the application of 
the general injunctions rules in fraud documentary credits cases shows that 
the standard of proof to obtain an interlocutory injunction in the fraud rule 
cases is much higher than which in ordinary injunction cases. The importance 
of banks' knowledge of fraud for applying the fraud rule, in different cases, 
may vary in accordance with the different contractual relationships among 
parties under the credit. 
In Safaar\6 So/o, the courts believe that a bank is allowed to avoid a bond by 
relying on the invalidity of the bond. In both cases, the possible invalidity was 
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caused by a beneficiary's misrepresentation in directing or persuading the 
bank to enter into the letter of credit, which was a fraud issue. However, 
invalidity is not necessarily caused by a fraud, it may cause by some other 
issues, such like illegality. The illegality exception in documentary credits is 
the key content of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four: The Illegality Exception in 
Documentary Credits 
Preface: 
The autonomy principle, which is a cornerstone of documentary credits, 
counteracted the development of the fraud rule both in American and English 
law since the birth of the fraud rule. Traditionally, in English law, the standard 
of proof in applying the fraud rule is extremely strict. First, the fraud has to be 
clearly established, a mere allegation of fraud arguing nothing for an 
application of the fraud rule; secondly, the fraud has to be on the part of the 
beneficiary, the beneficiary has to be involved in the fraud and a third party 
fraud was rejected as one of the fraud in applying the fraud rule in the famous 
case of United City i\/ferchants^; Lastly, it is likely that the fraudulent facts 
have to be known to banks at the time of payment.^ These three high 
standards made the application of the fraud rule very difficult, even more 
difficult than the material standard in the United States, although the material 
1 United C/ty Merchants V. Royal Bank of Canada (The American Accord) \\^^V[h.Z. 168 
(HL); [1982] Q.B. 208(CA). 
^ This principle was established in the case of Gian Singh & Co. Ltd. v. Banque de 
L'Indochine[197A'] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1, 11 per Lord Diplock, where the action was between the 
applicant and the bank, and the judgment was for the paying bank because the bank was 
unaware of the forgery although the forgery was proved by the plaintiff. See Chapter 2, 
section 5.2.2. However, this principle may vary while the cause of action changed. This point 
will be discussed later in this chapter, section 5.3.1. 
184 
Lu Lu: The Exceptions in Documentary Credits in English Law. 
standard is not so effective itself in the United States^. 
Because of the importance of the existence of the fraud rule, English courts 
have been aware of the inefficacy of it and made some efforts recently to 
Improve the efficacy of the fraud rule. From the 1990s, many new approaches 
toward applying the fraud rule appeared in English law. Generally, those 
approaches applied a lower stand of proof, a strong arguable case of fraud 
instead of clearly established fraud, under certain conditions. The lower 
evidential standard can be strongly justified in terms of its reasonableness'*. 
Other issues such as the necessity of the knowledge of the bank were not in 
a firm position either. Chapter four will continue researching in the 
reasonableness of those new approaches, and the study will start with the 
illegality exception in documentary credits. 
^ See Chapter 2, section 3 and 4. 
^ Generally see Chapter 3 of the thesis. 
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/. The Background of Other Exceptions 
Although the fraud rule has been established for over half a century since the 
case Sztejn v. J. i-ienry Sciiroder Banldng Corporatiorf, the standard of proof 
is still unclear in English law. The conflicts between new approaches and the 
one which was determined in the case of United City i\4ercf)ants (investments) 
Ltd. V. Royai Banl< of Canada cause lots of arguments, which had already 
been discussed in the earlier part of the thesis^. However, problems are not 
easy to be solved, and the contradiction is mainly between the exception 
itself and the famous autonomy principle in documentary credits. Therefore, 
other possible exceptions, the illegality exception and the nullity exception^, 
arose from recent cases and may be worth analysing for a better 
understanding of the fraud rule. 
Both of the two possible exceptions are contradictory to the autonomy 
principle, just as is the fraud rule; however, attitudes of whether they should 
be accepted as an independent exception are not the same in English law. 
While the nullity exception was largely rejected in the case of Montmd Ltd. 
Grundi(6tter Fieiscfivertriebs Gmbhh, the illegality exception was admitted in 
i\/Iai7onia Ltd v. JPI\4organ Ctiase Banic° by Colman J The application of the 
5 Sztejn I/. J Henry Schroder Banking Corp (1941) 31 NYS 2d 631. 
* United City Merchants, supra note 1. 
^ See Chapter 2, section 5.2.3 of the thesis. 
^ The nullity exception will be discussed in the next chapter, Chapter 5. 
9 l^ontrodLtd V. Grundkotter Fieisch\/ertriebs GmbH \20Q1] EWCA Civ 1954, [2002] 1 
W.L.R. 1975. 
1" l^ahonia Ltd v. JPMorgan Chase Bank (No. l ) [2003] EWHC 1927 (Comm); [2003] 2 
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illegality exception in English law may be a good starting point. 
2. The Nature of/llegality 
2 . 1 . Definition 
To discuss the illegality exception, the first point which should be analysed is 
the illegality itself. Illegal conduct means conduct which does not conform to 
the law, or is even prohibited by the law. Professor Nelson Enonchong wrote 
in his book "Illegal Transactions" that "A transaction is illegal or at least 
affected by illegality If the transaction or some aspect of it is prohibited by 
law."i' An illegal transaction may either involve the commission of a legal 
wrong (criminal or civil) or conduct which is illegal as contrary to public policy 
although it may not be prohibited by the law. Consequently, illegal 
transactions, which may cause illegality, should be classified into two 
categories. The first type of illegality may be caused by illegal transactions 
which are prohibited by legislation; the other illegality may not be literally 
prohibited by law but contrary to public policy. However, in practice the 
establishment of an illegality transaction is not as easy as the literal definition. 
For illegality which is caused by a statutory prohibition, the court will have to 
Lloyd's Rep 911 and (No.2) [2004] EWHC 1938 (Comm). 
" Professor Nelson Enonchong, "Illegality Transactions" (Lloyd's of London Press, 1998), p. 
2. 
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consider the intention of the Act to decide the effect of illegality. Statutory 
illegality was explained in the American case of Yango Pastoral Co. Pty. Ltd v. 
First Chicago Australia Ltd^ as follows: 
"Generally a transaction will be illegal as being 
in contravention of a statute if (a) the transaction 
is to do something which the statute forbids, or (b) 
the transaction itself is one which the statute 
forbids, or (c) the transaction, although lawful it 
itself, is made for a purpose which in the statute 
is unlawful, or (d) the transaction, although lawful 
in itself, is intended to be performed in a manner 
which the statute prohibits." 
The statutory illegal transactions may thus be classified into two types: one is 
the transaction of which the mal<ing is prohibited by the statute law; the other 
is the transaction of which the purpose is prohibited by the statute law. It 
needs to be mentioned here that the statutory illegal transaction may not be 
restricted to what was expressly prohibited by the statute; a transaction 
involving conduct in breach of the terms of a statute may be illegal even 
though it is not expressly prohibited by the statute, as long as it is impliedly 
prohibited by the statute.'^ This means the intention of the statute is still the 
fundamental criterion to decide whether there is a statutory illegality. Although, 
similar to the intention of fraud in the fraud rule, the intention of the legislation 
is to prohibit a conduct when there is no express provision. 
The other category of illegality consists of transactions contrary to public 
" Yango Pastoral Co. Pty. Ltd v. First Chicago Australia Ltd {1^1^') 139 C.LR. 410, 413, per 
Gibbs A.C.J. 
3^ In the case of Cf. Johnson v. Moreton [1980] A.C. 36, 37, Lord Simon of Glaisdale 
concluded that for a transaction which is implied prohibited by statute is just as illegal as 
one which is expressly prohibited. 
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policy. In the case of the public policy illegality, the definition and cognizance 
of public policy would be the essential issue. In the case of Gray v. Barr\ it 
was stated that public policy "is a method which the courts use where there is 
conduct which the public disavow"''. Public policy has many characteristics, 
such as its flexibility and regionality. Those characteristics make the 
reorganization of public policy very difficult. To make a decision on whether 
conduct is contrary to public policy, the judge has to weigh competing 
interests or policies; he is not interpreting the law but also making the law in 
some sense. Therefore, the subjective view could affect the decision as 
well.'s To minimize the weight of any subjective views of the judge, English 
courts put a quite heavy border on the cognizance of which conduct is 
contrary to public policy. The House of Lords has insisted that a court will hold 
that a transaction is illegal as contrary to public policy only where "the harm to 
the public is substantially incontestable".'^ It is even said that the courts 
should not declare a contract contrary to public policy unless "the contract is 
incontestable and on any view inimical to the public interest".'« In any event, 
the harm must be substantial enough to outweigh the public interest objective 
expressed in the specific rule of law which othenwise would have governed 
" Gray v. Barr [1971] 2 Q.B. 554. 
15 Ibid, 561. 
16 Of course, all the cases in common law follows a similar Idea that the subjective view of 
different judges affect the judgment in different cases, not only in the public policy cases. 
" Fender v. St. John M/'/dma/[192Q] A.C. 1, 12, per Lord Atkin. As Donaldson U put it in 
Cheall V. A.P.E.X\X9d,'i'\ 1 Q.B. 126, 147,, before a court declares a contract or a provision 
in it to be contrary to public policy the court must be "satisfied that any reasonable person 
would agree" that the enforcement of the contract or provision would be harmful thing. 
18 Monk/and I/. Jack Barc/ay [1951] 2 K.B. 252, 265, per Asquith U For public policy to be 
invoked there must be "a discernible public interest" to protect: J w. S-T(Formerly J) 
(Transsexual) [1997] 1 F.L.R. 402, 437, per Ward U. 
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the matter. 
Interestingly, the harshness of the assessment of acts contrary to the public 
policy is so similar to the application of the fraud rule in documentary credits. 
This may be explained in that the fraud rule was rooted from public policy to 
some extent. There is no necessity to analyse too much the issue of the 
cognizance of the illegality, or what especially in contrary to public policy. 
However, it may be worth discussing the effects of an illegal transaction in 
English law, since it may be a fundamental principle to apply an illegality 
exception. More importantly, the effects of an illegal transaction to different 
parties, especially for the innocent party, may bring some inspiration for 
applying the illegality exception; and furthermore, for the application of the 
fraud rule. The discussion is based on Law Commission paper LC 320, CP 
189 and CP 154^ 9. Although CP 189 and CP 154 are only consultation papers, 
and hence do not state the law, they show an aspiration of the approaches of 
the law in area of the illegality. This thesis considers the central idea that the 
^' LC 320 Is the final report published by the Law Commission to conclude a long-running 
review of the illegality defence, which has considered how the defence applies to the law of 
contract, unjust enrichment, tort and trusts. The final report followed most of the 
recommendations in the 2009 consultative report CP 189. CP 189 is the most recent 
consultation paper published by the Law Commission to discuss "the illegality defence". The 
effect of Illegality was discussed as one of the main issues in illegality in CP 189. However, 
the analysis of this issue in CP 189 was highly depending on the old paper of CP 154, which 
was published In 1999 and entitled "Illegal transactions: the effect of Illegality on contracts 
and trusts". The central proposal put forward in CP 154 was that, in general, a court dealing 
with a transaction tainted by illegality should have discretion whether to enforce it. The 
discretion would be "structured" by setting out the factors that the court should take into 
account (such as the seriousness of the illegal purpose, whether refusing to enforce the 
transaction would tend to deter illegality of that kind, and so on). This thesis organized the 
research of the effect of illegality on the basis of CP 154 ,2.3 to 2.31 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cpl54.pdf; the relevant sections in CP 189 are 3.3 to 3.49 
http://www.lawcom.aov.uk/docs/cp 189.pdf; the relevant sections in LC320 are 3.1 to 3.47 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc320.pdf. 
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discretion of judges in different illegality cases is quite reasonable.^" 
2.2. Effects of an illegal transaction in English law 
One of the essential issues relating to the effect of illegality is whether 
illegality renders a contract void or merely unenforceable. There is in the 
authorities "some inconsistency in determining whether [illegal contracts] are 
void, voidable or unenforceable".^' The uncertain situation led some judges 
to attempt to say that illegality renders an agreement both "void and 
unenforceable".22 However, there is a very important difference between a 
contract which is void and one which is only unenforceable. A contract which 
is void is one which gives rise to no rights and duties, which means the 
contract is null. But a contract which is merely unenforceable may still have a 
legal formation. Some rights, like property rights, may be legally enforceable. 
In English law, unlike some other systems of law, an illegal contract can be 
effective to transfer property rights. Most of the cases proceed on the footing 
that an illegal agreement is only "unenforceable"." Thus, it may be safe to 
say that under English law an illegal contract is in general unenforceable, not 
20 Most of the responses to CP 154 supported the proposal that the court should be given 
discretion whether to enforce a contract tainted by illegality. However, a minority of 
respondents raised concerns to some ideas in CP 154. 
" Aratra Potato Co. v. Taylor Johnson GarrettiV^^S\ 4 All E.R. 695, 708. See N Enonchong, 
"Effects of Illegality: A Comparative Study in French and. English Law" (1995) 44ICLQ 196, 
198-199. 
" Haseldine v. Hosken [1933] 1 K.B. 822, 836. 
" Cleaver V. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association [1892] 1 Q.B. 147,152; Bennett v. 
Bennett\\^sr\ 1 K.B. 260; Aratra Potato v. Taylor J. Garrett\X<^^S\ 4 All E.R. 695. 
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void. When a contract is unenforceable, the contract does come into 
existence, but the courts will refuse to assist in its enforcement.^" 
2.2.1. The reliance principle 
Actually, contracts involved fraud or illegality are both unenforceable 
according to the principle of "ex turpi causa". The policy of "ex turpi causa" 
vtfas first explained by Lord Mansfield in 1775 in IHolman v. JolinsorP as "No 
court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an 
immoral or an illegal act." And this principle was further explained by the 
House of Lord in the case of Tinsley v. I\^illigar9-'^ by the following words: 
"In my judgment the time has come to decide clearly 
that the rule is the same whether a plaintiff founds 
himself on a legal or equitable title: he is entitled 
to recover if he is not forced to plead or rely on 
the illegality, even if it emerges that the title 
on which he relied was acquired in the course of 
carrying through an illegal transaction."^'' 
The above words have since been applied as the "reliance principle". 
Under this principle, the claimant is able to enforce his or her equitable 
interest notwithstanding any illegality in the arrangement, provided that the 
claimant does not need to plead or lead evidence of the illegality to prove the 
interest.28 Although the Law Commission explained that "outside the context 
of proprietary claims, the reliance principle is by no means the universal rule 
2" In re Mahmoud and Ispahan! [1921] 2 K.B. 716; Maries v. Philip Trant & Sons [1954] 1 
Q.B. 29, 38. 
" Holman v. Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341. 
26 Tinsley v. Mllllgan [1994] 1 AC 340. 
" Ibid., 376. 
2^  See LC 320, section 2.2, supra note 19. 
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that is used to determine whether illegality should have any effect on the civil 
claim",2^ it seems that the "reliance principle" has been broadened by the 
case law all the time.2° 
In the recent case of Stone & Rolls Ltd v. Moore Stephens^', Lord Phillips 
rejected "the idea that 'the reliance principle' should operate in a mechanical 
fashion"22 said: 
"I do not believe that it is right to proceed on the 
basis that the reliance test can automatically be 
applied as a rule of thumb. It is necessary to give 
consideration to the policy underlying the ex turpi 
causa in order to decide whether this defence is bound 
to defeat [Stone & Rolls'] claim."^^ 
He further subdivided "ex turpi causa" into two principles in relation to 
contractual obligations as follows: 
"(i)The court will not enforce a contract which is 
expressly or impliedly forbidden by statute or that 
is entered into with the intention of committing an 
illegal act. (ii) The court will not assist a claimant 
to recover a benefit from his own wrongdoing."^^ 
Those two principles also represent the two types of act which may not be 
enforced by the courts: illegality and fraud. The court will not assist a claimant 
to recover benefit from his own fraud, which means the claimant will not be 
able to enforce a contract by relying on his own fraud. This is a simple 
^^  See LC 320, section 3.2, supra note 19. 
^° For example, Cross v. /O'r/irdy [2000] All ER (D) 212, Hewison v. Meridian Shipping 
Services PTELtd \200y\ ICR 766. 
^^  Stone & Rolls Ltd v. Moore Stephens [2009] 1 A.C. 1391. 
32 See LC 320, section 3.28, supra note 19. 
" Stone & Rolls 1200^] 1 A.C. 1391, 1453, supra note 3 1 . 
3" Ibid, 1452. 
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application of "the reliance principle" in fraud. However, Lord Phillips it seems, 
did not restrict the explanation of the principle as to illegality to the reliance 
test. On one hand the courts will never entertain a claim if the claimant has to 
rely on his own illegality to establish the claim;^^ on the other hand, the court 
will also refuse to lend its aid to enforce an illegal contract even where the 
claimant is not pleading on the illegality^^. The later explanation may also be 
a better rationale for the application the illegality exception in documentary 
credits.^^ It may not be conclusive to say that English courts have applied a 
flexible approach to the illegality defence; however. Lord Philips' opinion to 
the application of the reliance principle is not isolated in English law. 
Lord Hoffmann also represented a similar view in another recent case of Gray 
V. Thames Trains Ltcfi^: 
"The maxim ex turpi causa expresses not so much a 
principle as a policy. Furthermore, that policy is 
not based upon a single justification but on a group 
of reasons, which vary in different situations." 
Those recent cases at least showed an approach that English courts started 
to relax the strict application of the reliance test to the defence of illegality. As 
what was stated in LC 320: 
"It is difficult to anticipate what precedent, if 
any. Stone & Rolls will set regarding the illegality 
defence. Though there was a majority verdict, there 
was no majority reasoning, with all their Lordships 
3= Ibid, 1453. 
*^ See United City Merchants, supra note 1. 
" Further discussion, see section 3.2 of this chapter. 
38 Gray v. names Trains Ltd [IQQ^] 1 AC 1339, 1370. 
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reaching different conclusions on how the defence 
should be applied. However there was no general 
endorsement of the view that the illegality defence 
should always be applied so as to defeat a claim 
founded on an illegal act .... we are encouraged by 
the references made by their Lordships to the 
importance of considering the policies that underlie 
the application of the illegality defence."^^ 
2.2.2. The position of the innocent party and the seriousness 
ofillesaiity 
The possible flexible approach in applying the "reliance principle" to illegality 
also causes arguments in the position of the innocent parties in illegal 
contracts. It is clear that the defence of fraud is based on the fraudulent 
intention of the party. In other words, the innocent party who has no intention 
to commit a fraud may still be able to obtain assistance from the court to 
enforce a contract involving fraud."^ ^ But it is unclear whether an innocent 
party who has no knowledge of the illegality should be able to enforce an 
illegal contract. The analysis of this question was divided into two categories 
by CP 189"': cases where the illegality was caused by the statutory law and 
cases where the illegality was caused by common law. 
" See LC 320, section 3.32, supra note 19. 
•*" Before Un/tedC/ty Merchants, it was not clear whether the fraud of anyone apart from the 
beneficiary would be sufficient for applying the fraud rule. Lord Diplock restricted the 
application of the fraud rule to the beneficiary's fraud during the House of Lord in UCM. See 
Chapter 2, section 5.2.3.2. 
"^  In Law Commission 189, 3.2, page 18, it was stated that: "We consider, first, cases in 
which illegality may act as a defence to a claim for contractual enforcement because of the 
provisions of a statute or other legislation. These are frequently referred to as cases of 
'statutory illegality'. Next we consider cases where the claim may be unenforceable because 
of the doctrine of illegality at common law. Also in CP 154 page 12:"It is difficult to extract 
the various principles applied by the courts and some of the decisions are hard to reconcile. 
The case law draws a distinction between contracts which are rendered unenforceable by 
statute (that is where the statute expressly or impliedly provides that a contract which 
involves the breach of one of its provisions should be unenforceable by either or both parties) 
and those which are rendered unenforceable by common law." 
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On one hand, for cases in which the illegality was caused by the statutes, 
either by expressed provisions or implied provisions, CP 189 suggested that 
"A statute (or other legislation) may expressly provide what should be the 
consequences for a contract that involves the contravention of one of its 
provisions. However, in many other cases the legislation is silent on the point. 
Then it will be necessary for the court to interpret the relevant provisions in 
the ordinary way to determine whether the legislation impliedly renders the 
contract unenforceable by either or both parties."^ Therefore, it is always an 
unclear issue "whether a contract that is impliedly prohibited by statute is 
always unenforceable by both parties, or whether there are circumstances in 
which only one party will be affected.""^ In many cases, the affected contract 
was assumed to be unenforceable by both parties, even by the innocent 
party."" However, there were other cases which suggested that in certain 
circumstances only the guilty party's contractual claim will be affected by the 
illegality and the innocent party may be left to his or her usual contractual 
remedies."^ CP 189 did not made a clear approach on this issue; it only 
suggested that "It might, therefore, be better if, instead of deciding whether 
the contract is 'illegal', the court were to ask whether the statute renders the 
claim being made by the particular claimant unenforceable""^ 
"^  The Law Commission CP 189, 3.3, p. 18, supra note 19. 
« Ibid, 3.8, p. 20. 
"'• Ibid. Also see Phoenix General Insurance Co of Greece SA v. Halvanon Insurance Co Ltd 
[1988] QB 216, 268. by Kerr LJ: "It is settled law that any contract which is prohibited by 
statute, either expressly or by implication, is illegal and void". 
"= Ibid, 3.9, page 20. S&& Anderson Ltd v. Danlel\\^2A\ 1 KB 138,147, and Maries v. Phillip 
Tranta Sons Ltd[1'553^ I All ER 645. (reversed but not on this point: See [1954] 1 QB 29). 
« Ibid. 
196 
Lu Lu: The Exceptions in Documentary Credits in English Law. 
On the other hand, for cases in which the illegality was caused by being 
contrary to common law, the Law Commission seems to be even less rigid 
when determining issues. There are also three different situations where the 
illegality happened. First, where the terms of the contract require the 
commission of a legal wrong, it is often stated that the contract is illegal and 
unenforceable by either party. And in theory, the seriousness of the unlawful 
conduct should not be considered at all. However, CP 189 pointed out the 
difference between the theory and the practice and suggested that the 
contract is only unenforceable by either party when a serious crime involved 
in. In another word, in contracts where there are only trivial illegal issues 
involved, the knowledge of the parties may be considered during the 
judgment.''^ Secondly, where the purpose of the contract is to facilitate the 
commission of a legal wrong, a party with an unlawful purpose will not be 
able to enforce the contract. It is not clear whether the knowledge of claimant 
of the unlawful purpose is important during the judgment.^ Although CP 189 
argues that the innocent party will not be prevented from enforcing the 
contract, the acknowledgement of the innocence is a confusing issue."^ 
Thirdly, where the contract is performed in an unlawful manner, it was 
suggested in CP 189 that the mere commission of an unlawful act in the 
'''' The Law Commission CP189, section 3.14 to 3.17, page: 22, supra note 19. 
••s CP 189 used two examples to explain the unclear issue. In Waugh v. Morris {1Q72-73) LR 
8 QB 202, Blackburn J decided that in order to avoid a contract which can be legally 
performed it is necessary to show that there was a "wicked intention" to break the law. In 
contrast, in J M Allan (Merchandising) Limited v. Cloke [1963] 2 QB 340, despite the 
innocence of the claimant, his attempt to recover the rent under the contract failed because 
of the illegal purpose of the contract. The Law Commission CP 189, section 3.20 and 3.21, 
p. 23-24, supra note 19. 
"9 CP 189. 3.22. P. 24, supra note 19. 
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course of carrying out a contract would not at common law affect 
enforcement. The example which was taken is the case Wetherell v. Jones^, 
in which the plaintiff succeeded in an action for the price of goods delivered, 
despite his unlawful performance in providing an irregular statutory invoice. 
However, a party who intends to perform the contract in an unlawful manner 
from the outset will not be able to enforce the contract. In other words, the 
intention of the parties again becomes the essential point to decide whether 
the contract is enforceable.^^ 
It seems that for the effect of an illegal transaction, the Law Commission 
suggests that, under English law, the enforceability of an illegal contract to 
different parties is not very clear, especially when the party is an innocent 
party, in both the statutorily illegal and the common law illegal situations. In 
statutory illegality cases, it will be necessary for the court to interpret the 
relevant provisions in the ordinary way to determine whether the legislation 
impliedly renders the contract unenforceable by either or both parties;" and 
in common law illegality cases, the innocent party's position is even less 
rigid.=2 Although, in common law practice, as Lord Goff said in Tinsley v. 
Milligan, the common law rules on illegality do not distinguish "between 
degrees of iniquity"^^ and the seriousness of the illegal issue should not be 
taken into account in judging the effect of illegality among cases, in the case 
5" Wetherell v. Jones (1832) 3 B & Ad 2 2 1 ; 110 ER 82. 
" CP 189. 3.29 to 3.32, p. 26-27, supra note 19. 
" See above, the second paragraph of 2.1 (B). 
" See the above paragraph. 
" Tinsley v. Mllllgan [1994] 1 AC 340, 362, supra note 26. 
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of a contract to comnnit a serious crime, such as murder, the contract is 
clearly unenforceable by either party even one of the parties has no intention 
to do anything unlawful.^^ CP 189 also suggests that it seems questionable 
that any contract which necessarily requires the commission of such a minor 
offence is unenforceable by either party. LC 320 also suggests there are 
exceptions to the general rules for the enforceability of illegal contracts 
"where the illegality involved is of a minor or trivial nature or one of the 
contracting parties was unaware of the other's illegal intent"^^. Thus it may 
be right to say that the seriousness of the iliegality may at least affect 
the decision of the court in considering the effect of the illegality in 
common law practice though there is no rule on this issue. In other words, 
unlike in fraud, the innocent party who has no intention of the illegality can 
still be affected by the illegality in common law. But the innocent party may be 
entitled to enforce an illegal contract if the illegal issue is trivial. However, the 
definition of a "trivial illegality" becomes another difficult issue in common 
law.5^ 
Of course, CP 189 is only a consultation paper; even the final report of LC 
320 is not the law for the effect of illegality. But as a review of Law 
" JMAllan [1963] 2 QB 340, supra note 48. Where neither party realised that the conduct 
was unlawful it may be that, following the House of Lords' decision in Kleinwort Benson v. 
Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349, the contract will be void for mistake. Contrast this 
with the position in relation to contracts that are unlawfully performed. Here, it seems, a 
party will only be denied contractual remedies if he or she knew that the relevant 
performance was unlawful (and possibly participated in it). See CP189, 3.27 to 3.46, supra 
note 19. 
^^  See LC 320, section 3.3, supra note 19. 
" In the case of Mahonla Ltd, see supra note 10, Colman J suggests that the impregnability 
of letters of credit may not be affected by a "relatively trivial illegality" of the underlying 
contract. For further discussion, see later this chapter, section 4.3. 
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Commission in the area, it provides guidance for the approaches of the 
development of the law. As Lord Walker of Gestinghorpe said in the case of 
Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens: 
"The Law Commission is well advanced, . . . These 
proposals, if enacted by Parliament, would introduce 
more flexibility into this area of the law (although 
without reintroducing a general 'public conscience' 
discretion) . "^ ^ 
The approach suggested by the Law Commission may also bring some 
inspirations in the research of the innocent party's position in applying the 
illegality exception, even the fraud rule. 
J. Arguments about the Existence of the Illegality Exception 
in Documentary Credits 
Since the effect of unenforceability of a contract, which may be caused by an 
illegality in an illegal transaction, the argument of whether there should be a 
similar effect of unenforceability when the illegality occurs in a letter of credit 
transaction was brought into consideration under the background of the 
recognition of the fraud rule as an exception in documentary credits. To 
understand the illegality issue in documentary credits, a classification should 
be made first to the possible illegality in a letter of credit transaction. 
58 Stone & Rolls {TX^m^ 1 A.C. 1391, 1481, supra note 31. 
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3.1. Letter of credit Itself tllegal 
When there is an illegal issue in a letter of credit transaction, the simple 
circumstance could be that the letter of credit itself is illegal. In other words, it 
could be either that the issue of the letter of credit itself is prohibited by the 
law or that the enforcement of the letter of credit is prohibited by the law. 
According to the discussion in the Law Commission reports and the case law, 
an illegal transaction should be unenforceable in English Law. Therefore, a 
letter of credit may be unenforceable if the issue or performance of the letter 
of credit is prohibited by law. 
3.2. Illegality In underlying transactions 
The controversial issue of the illegality of a letter of credit was not the 
situation of the self-illegal letter of credit but the circumstance when the 
illegality happens in the underlying contract which relates to the issue of the 
letter of credit. To put it another way, the most debatable issue in applying an 
illegality exception is whether the letter of credit will be unenforceable 
because of the illegality of underlying transactions. 
The first reason why there are views that there should not be an illegality 
exception in documentary credits is a simple one: the illegality exception will 
be contrary to the autonomy principle of letter of credits. If the enforcement of 
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the letter of credit is to be affected by the illegality of the underlying contract, 
the principle of autonomy would be destroyed. There is exactly the same 
argument as when the fraud rule is applied as an exception in documentary 
credits. And the autonomy principle was not successful in counteracting the 
application of the fraud rule. One of the most important reasons was that the 
fraud rule has a clear basis in the ''ex turpi causa non oritur actid' principle. 
This maxim may be translated in English as "no action can arise from a base 
cause" or "no action arises from an unworthy cause". Actually, "fraud" is one 
of the "unworthy causes", the other one is "illegality". Therefore, it is 
reasonable to argue that if the maxim ''ex turpi causa non oritur actio" could 
be helpful for the fraud rule to withstand the rigorous of the autonomy 
principle, why the application of the illegality exception should be barred by 
the autonomy. What is more, as Professor Nelson Enonchong suggested in 
his article, "The Autonomy Principle of Letter of Credif'59, the wrong doing of 
fraud is against a private interest^", but the wrong doing of illegality is against 
a public interest. He further stated that "If fraud against the private interest of 
a bank is weighty enough to displace the principle of autonomy, then illegality 
against the wider public interest should have the same potent effecf.^i 
Secondly, it was clearly suggested in the Law Commission CP 189 that a 
^' Professor Nelson Enonchong, "The Autonomy Principle of Letters of Credit: An Illegality 
Exception?" [2006] Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 404. 
*° Most time is the bank, but also the applicant when the applicant is not involved in the 
fraud. 
^1 Professor Nelson Enonchong, [2006] Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 
404, 412, supra note 59. 
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party who enters into a contract with the intention of using it for the 
commission of a legal wrong or carrying out conduct which is otherwise 
contrary to common law, will not be able to enforce it. Such guilty intent might 
involve the use of the subject matter of the contract for the commission of a 
legal wrong, or even the use of the contractual documentation for such a 
purpose.62 An illegal purpose of a contract would always be rendered 
unenforceable by the responsible party. In the case of a letter of credit, when 
the issue of the letter of credit was for execution of an illegal underlying 
contract, in other words, the purpose of the establishment of the letter of 
credit was illegal; there is no reason why the issue should be legal just 
because it was a letter of credit. Although a letter of credit contract has its 
own special principles as a security contract, the essence of its being a 
contract will not be changed because of its autonomy. Therefore, when the 
purpose of the letter of credit contract is illegal, the letter of credit should be 
unenforceable, just as would be any other contract. Furthermore, it will be a 
breach of public policy for a court to assist a claimant to enforce a letter of 
credit if the letter of credit is essential for the enforcement of the underlying 
illegal contract.^^ 
Besides the anxiety about the contradiction between the illegality exception 
and the autonomy principle, another argument against applying the illegality 
exception is that the exception may counteract the normal running of the 
" The Law Commission CP 189, Page 27, supra note 19. 
" The court will refuse to lend its aid to enforce an illegal contract. See supra note 34-37. 
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documentary credits system. However, this issue may totally depend on how 
the illegality exception is applied in documentary credits system. The 
application of the fraud rule could be good pattern to apply the illegality 
exception. How could the duties and security of banks not be disturbed by 
application of necessary exceptions? That was always a question for English 
courts. And new approaches^" toward the application of the fraud rule were a 
very good attempt. The current attitude of English courts to the application of 
the illegality exception is also worth analysing. 
4. The Approach of the Application of the lllesality 
Exception in English Law 
Because of the solidity of the autonomy principle in documentary credits 
system, similar to the fraud rule, there is no statutory regulation for the 
application of the illegality exception in English law. The development of the 
approach for applying the illegality exception in documentary credits may 
only be traced in case law. However, unlike the fraud rule, the argument for 
whether applying the illegality principle as an exception separate from and in 
addition to the fraud rule was not so ardent. There were not many cases 
which mainly discussed the application of the illegality exception in English 
Law. Nevertheless, the illegality exception was not really a new consideration 
" The new approaches were mainly discussed in Chapter 3 of the thesis. 
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in English Law, since the approach of accepting the illegality exception 
occurred so long ago as United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd. v. Royal 
BankofCanadgp^, which restricted the application of the fraud rule in England 
and Wales.^ s 
4.1. The case of United City Merchants 
Although, in United City Merchants the application of the fraud rule was 
rejected by Lord Diplock because of the lack of fraudulent intention on the 
part of the beneficiary, the judgment in the case was also affected by the 
illegality issue. In this case, the illegality issue was called "the Bretton Woods 
Point" during the judgment. The Bretton Woods point arose from the 
agreement between the buyers and the seller collateral to the contract of sale 
of the goods between the same parties that out of the payments in U.S 
dollars received by the seller under the documentary credit in respect of each 
installment of the invoice price of the goods, they would transmit to the 
account of the buyers in America one half of the U.S. dollars received. 
However, the Bretton Woods Agreements Order in Council 1946, made under 
the Bretton Woods Agreements Act 1945, gives the force of law in England to 
article VIII section 2(b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement, which is in the 
" United City Merchant^lB^Zl 1 A.C. 168, supra note 1. 
*^  The decision of the House of Lord in United City i^erciiants e\c\\s6Q6 the third party's 
fraud from the application of the fraud rule, which made the application of the fraud rule 
even more difficult. Details discussed in Chapter 2, section 5.2.3. 
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following terms: 
"Exchange contracts which involve the currency of 
any member and which are contrary to the exchange 
control regulations of that member maintained or 
imposed consistently with this agreement shall be 
unenforceable in territories of any member..." 
During the hearing, after the analysis of the probably illegal issue under the 
Bretton Woods Agreements, Lord Diplock agreed to Lord Denning M.R. in his 
judgment in the Terruzzf'^ case at p. 714 that the court in considering the 
application of the provision should look at the substance of the contracts and 
not at the form. And he continuing stated: 
"The question whether and to what extent a contract 
is unenforceable under the Bretton Woods Agreements 
Order in Council 1946 because it is a monetary 
transaction in disguise is not a question of 
construction of the contract, but a question of the 
substance of the transaction to which enforcement 
of the contract will give effect. "'^^ 
For the instance case, he believed that "it was not a contract to exchange one 
currency for another currency but a contract to pay currency for documents 
which included documents of title to goods''^ ,^ and that "there is no difficulty in 
identifying the monetary transaction that was sought to be concealed by the 
actual words used in the documentary credit and in the underlying contract of 
sale."'° Therefore, although the contract between the sellers and the 
confirming bank constituted by the documentary credit fell altogether outside 
" Wilson Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terrazz/[1976] Q.B. 683. 
»^ Un/tedC/ty Merc/7antsil983] 1 A.C. 168, 189, supra note 1. 
69 Ibid. 189-190 . 
''° Ibid, 190. 
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the Bretton Woods Agreement, "Payment under the documentary credit by 
the confirming bank to the sellers of that half of the invoice price ... was an 
essential part of that monetary transaction and therefore unenforceable ..."^ ^ 
Thus, in the end of United City l\/lerctiants, although the fact was not felt into 
the fraud exception, the seller lost half the installments because of the 
illegality issue. It was true that the illegality issue has not been recognized as 
an independent exception under documentary credits, but it was not difficult 
to see the illegal conduct cannot be protected because it's under the umbrella 
of documentary credits system. And this case may be seen as the first case 
accepting the illegality exception as a distinct exception, separate from and in 
addition to the fraud rule. 
4.2. The case of Group Josi Re 
Following the judgment in United City l\^erciiants. Group Josi Re v. Waibrool< 
insurance Co. LtdJ'^ may be the first case in which illegality has been 
considered as affecting payment under a letter of credit. In that case, a 
reinsurance company. Group Josi, which was not authorised to carry on 
business in the United Kingdom under the Insurance Companies 1974, or 
subsequently under the Insurance Companies Act 1982," entered into a 
" Ibid, 190. 
2^ Group Josi Re v. Wa/bmok Insurance Co. Ltd. [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152. 
" Insurance Companies Act 1982, s.2: " ( l ) - no person shall carry on any insurance 
business in the United Kingdom unless authorised to do so under ...". 
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number of reinsurance contracts with the defendant insurance companies 
through the agency of Weavers. And the reinsurers procured an opening of 
letters of credit in favour of the reassured companies. The reinsurers 
subsequently brought proceedings against Weavers and the reassured 
companies to restrain them from drawing down under the letter of credit, and 
claimed that the contracts of reinsurance were void on the ground their own 
illegality in carrying on insurance business in the United Kingdom without 
statutory authorization.^^ In the trial, Clarke J set aside those ex parte 
injunctions" on the ground that although the reinsurance contracts were 
illegal and void, the letters of credit were not be tainted by the illegality of the 
underlying contracts. Group Josi then appealed. During the appeal, 
Staughton LJ, after a review of the previous judgment, divided the case into 
eight issues: 
"(1) Do the reinsurers have a cause of action 
sufficient to justify an injunction? (2) Can the 
reinsurers bring this action when it involves 
asserting their own illegality? (3) What is the level 
of proof required for the grant of an interim 
injunction in a letter of credit case? (4) Has there 
been non-disclosure sufficient to justify avoidance 
of the reinsurance contracts, or misrepresentation? 
(5) If so, would a claim on the letters of credit 
be clearly fraudulent? (6) Can a letter of credit 
be affected by illegality of the underlying 
transaction? (7) Is there illegality of the 
'^' After the claim was dismissed, Tiie reinsurers amended their pleadings to allege that the 
reinsurance contracts had been avoided pursuant to section 18 of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906 for non-disclosure of a material circumstance, namely that overriding commission 
payable under the reinsurance contracts which should have been paid to the assured 
companies had been misappropriated by three directors of the underwriters to whom the 
placing, administration and handling of the reinsurance had been delegated. 
" The plaintiff obtained ex parte injunctions in July 1993 restraining the defendants from 
drafting on the letter of credits. Id 18, 1156 
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reinsurance contracts in this case? (8) Is there a 
constructive trust, and do the reinsurers have a 
proprietary right? I shall consider those issues in 
turn, although in the event it is not necessary to 
reach a conclusion on all of them."'* 
There were three issues above which were directly or indirectly related to the 
illegality issue. The first one is issue (2) in his judgment. "Can the reinsurers 
bring this action when it involves asserting their own illegality?"" Staughton 
LJ admitted the well-established principle which cited from the speech of Lord 
Jauncey of Tulllichettle in Tinsleyv. Milligarp^ that"... a party is not entitled to 
rely on his own fraud or illegality in order to assist a claim or rebut a 
presumption"'^ but believed that the reinsurers did not seek to rely on their 
own illegal conduct of unauthorised insurance business for either of those 
purpose. 
"They do not ask the court to order the defendants, 
or for that matter the bank, to do anything illegal. 
On the contrary they seek to prevent something 
happening which they say would be illegal, that is 
to say the payment of moneys due under illegal 
reinsurance contracts."^" 
Therefore he decided that the reinsurers were entitled to bring the action 
although there were their own illegalities in the assertion. The view of 
Staughton LJ in this issue was not directly related to the illegality exception. 
However, it did imply that the illegal conduct was, and always was, prohibited 
by English courts because of public policy, especially when the guilty party 
'6 Group Josi, [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1159, supra note 72. 
" Ibid. 
8^ Tinsley v. Milligan [1994] 1 A.C. 340, supra note 26. 
5^ Ibid. 
^° Group Josi, 1160, supra note 72. 
209 
Lu Lu. The Exceptions in Documentary Credits in English Law. 
tries to assist his own claim of illegality.^ ^ Of course, the autonomy of 
documentary credits was not mentioned here. 
The other two issues, which were are clearly related to the illegality exception, 
were pointed to by Staughton LJ as the issue (6) and issue (7). For the 
question of whether a letter of credit can be affected by the illegality of the 
underlying transaction, although Staughton LJ considered that "the Bretton 
Woods" point was not an indication that illegality generally is a defence under 
a letter of credit, he believed it did show that established fraud is not 
necessarily the only exception. He insisted there must be cases when 
illegality can affect a letter of credit^ ^ He even took an example of a contract 
for the sale of arms to Iraq under a letter of credit. And he made an 
assumption to the current case: 
"If the reinsurance contracts are illegal, and if 
the letters of credit are being used as a means of 
paying sums due under those contracts, and if all 
that is clearly established, would the court 
restrain the bank from making payment or the 
beneficiary from demanding it? In my judgment the 
court would do so. That would not be because the 
letter of credit contracts were themselves illegal, 
but because they were being used to carry out an 
illegal transaction."" 
Staughton U's opinion on this issue is very essential for the discussion of the 
illegality exception. Although in the end of the case, the illegality was not 
^' Group Josi, 1159, see supra note 72, Staughton LJ cited the speech of Lord Jauncey of 
Tulllichettle in Tinsley v. Mllllgan, see supra note 26, to support this view. 
8^  Group JosI, 1164, supra note 72. 
" Ibid. 
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proved in the reinsurance contract by his decision, at least, the possibility of 
the application of the illegality exception was accepted. Unlike the conclusion 
of Clark J that the letter of credit may not be tainted by the illegality underlying 
contract, Staughton LJ admitted the effect of the illegality on a letter of credit, 
which means that the autonomy principle of documentary credits may be 
affected by the illegality underlying contract. Also the Bretton Woods Point 
from United City Merchants "^BS) affirmed again. 
The standard of proof for applying the illegality exception was not discussed 
in depth in this case, Staughton LJ only implying his opinion that the illegality 
should be clearly established and known to the bank. He said in his judgment 
that: 
"Would illegality, like fraud, have to be clearly 
established and known to the bank before it could 
operate as a defence or a ground for restraining 
payment by the bank? That is not an altogether easy 
question, but I am inclined to think that it would. 
If the legality of the payment is merely doubtful, 
it may be that the bank would not be restrained. But 
whether in a United City Merchants type of case, if 
illegality were clearly proved at trial, it would 
be a defence that it was not clear at the time when 
the documents were presented for payment is even more 
of a problem. "«< 
Group Josi is the first case in English Law which considered illegality as 
affecting the payment under a letter of credit. Although the decision was not 
held under an illegality exception base because the illegality of the underlying 
8* Ibid. 
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contract was not established in the end, the illegality, besides the fraud rule 
was first nnentioned as a separately factor which may affect the enforcement 
of the letter of credit under the principle of autonomy. This case also pointed 
out the different approaches of English law in applying an illegality exception 
contrasted to the United States and Canada.^ And the points made by 
Staughton LJ relating to the illegality exception may be summarised as 
follows: 
First of all, prior to a discussion in the scope of documentary credits system, 
illegal conduct was and always was prohibited by English law because of 
public policy, especially when the guilty party tries to assist his own claim of 
illegality. Staughton LJ decided in Group JosithaX the reinsurers were entitled 
to bring the action although there were their own illegalities in the assertion. 
Because they were seeking "to prevent something happening which they say 
would be illegal" rather than "ask the court to order the defendants, or for that 
matter the bank, to do anything illegal". 
Secondly, considering with the Bretton Woods point in United City A/ferc/jants, 
Staughton LJ believed that "there must be cases when illegality can affect a 
letter of credit". He took a view that although there might not be an indication 
in United City H/fe/v/iants that illegality generally was a defence under a letter 
^^  According to Article 5 under UCC, the fraud rule is the only exception to the autonomy in 
the letter of credit in the United States; and in Canada. It was held in Morguard Bank of 
Canada v. Reigate Resource Ltd and Canada TreustCo. (1985) 40 Alta 1. R (2d) 77. that the 
letter of credit was a separate and distinct agreement and was not tainted by the illegality 
of the underlying contract. For the details of the position in the United States and Canada in 
applying the illegality exception , see Professor Nelson Enonchong, "The Autonomy Principle 
of Letters of Credit: An Illegality Exception?" [2006] LMCQ 404, 408-409, supra note 59. 
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of credit, it, at least, showed that fraud was not necessarily the only 
exception. 
Thirdly, unlike the conclusion of Clark J that the letter of credit may not be 
tainted by illegality in the underlying contract, Staughton LJ admitted the 
effect of the illegality on a letter of credit. He believed that the autonomy 
principle of documentary credits may be affected by the illegality of the 
underlying contract. 
Lastly, regarding to the detailed standard of applying the illegality exception, 
Staughton LJ made a comparison between the fraud rule and illegality 
exception and took a view that the illegality had to be cleared established and 
known to the bank. 
4.3. The case of Mahonia v. JPMorgan 
While Group Jos/"\s the first case in English law in which illegality has been 
considered as affecting payment under a letter of credit, the case which most 
clearly shows the judicial opinion of English law recognizing illegality as an 
exception to the autonomy principle in documentary credits is Mahonia Ltd v. 
JPMorgan Chase Banh^. This case arose out of the collapse of the erstwhile 
mighty Enron Corporation. West LB AG, a German bank with offices in 
London, New York and elsewhere, issued a letter of credit for the benefit of 
*^ Mahonia Ltd v. JP Morgan, supra note 10. 
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Mahonia on the request of Enron. The letter of credit was issued to support a 
swap transaction between Enron North American Corporation (ENAC") and 
Mahonia. Enron's financial difficulties began to come to light shortly after the 
letter of credit was issued, Enron then went into Bankruptcy. Under the letter 
of credit Enron's bankruptcy was an event of default which entitled Mahonia 
to make a demand. That demand was made for the amount due under the 
credit (about US $165 million). However, West Bank refused to pay by the 
reason of the letter of credit was unenforceable for illegality. West Bank 
alleged that although the document presented for payment was in conformity 
with the letter of credit, the purpose of the underlying swap transaction was to 
provide Enron with a disguised loan to enable Enron improperly to 
manipulate its account, which was in breach of US Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) and the Securities Exchange Act 1934.^ 8 
Therefore, the claimant (Mahonia Ltd) applied to strike out the illegality 
defence and for summary judgment to enforce the defendant bank to pay. 
During the hearing, Colman J, after introduced the fact of the case, first 
pointed out the main issue of illegality in the current case by saying: 
^^  ENAC was a subsidiary of Enron. 
^^  Tiie allegation was that this illegal purpose emerged when the swap transaction was seen 
together with two other related swap transactions: on between Mahonia and Chase and the 
other between ENAC and Chase. The swaps provided for fixed and floating payments in 
opposite directions. Chase paid a sum of $350 million(less than arrangement fee of $1 
million) to Mahonia under Chase/Mahonia swap and Mahonia paid it to ENAC under the 
ENAC/Mahonia swap. Also, under the ENAC/Chase swap the fixed payment which ENAC 
agreed to pay Chase was $356 million. The effect of the three swap transactions was that 
$350 million was paid by Chase to Mahonia and by Mahonia to Enton and Enron was obliged 
approximately six months later to pay approximately $356 million to Chase. As the floating 
payments were exactly the same in each of the three swap transactions, the ultimate effect 
of the transaction was to provide Enron with $350 million(less.the arrangement fee) for a 
period of six months, for which it was obliged to pay a figure which equated to repayment 
of a loan of $350 million with an effective annual interest rate of 3.44%. 
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"For the purposes of the present applications only, 
the parties are agreed that the facts which I have 
set out as constituting the relevant illegality or 
unenforceability should be assumed to be true."^^ 
4.3.1. Foreign and domestic illesality 
He then expressed the unenforceable effect of illegality and said: 
"If the relevant contract were entered into by the 
claimant for an unlawful purpose and the 
unlawfulness contemplated was English, rather than 
foreign, there is strong authority that the claimant 
could not enforce the contract."^° 
The words of "the unlawfulness contemplated was English" pointed out one 
of the important issue during the judgment which is the effect of an illegal 
contract when breaches a foreign law. To analyse this point, Colman J took 
the case Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia Ltd (1944) Ltd.^^ as an example. In that 
case, the claim was proposed by the buyer for wrongful repudiation of the 
seller in a contract of sale of jute bags CIF Genoa. This contract was, in the 
end for the purpose of re-selling the goods for shipment to South Africa. And 
both parties were aware that such a large of quantity of jute bags could not be 
obtained from anywhere except India; however, Indian law prohibited the 
export of goods to South Africa. It was held that although on the face of it the 
contract provided neither for the shipment of goods from India nor their 
delivery into or sale to South Africa, the action must fail because the 
89 MahoniaLtdv. JPMorgan, [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep 911, 914, supra note 10. 
9° Ibid. 
91 Regazzoni V. K.C. Sethia Ltd(1944) Ltd. [1958] A.C. 301. 
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enforcement of the contract would be contrary to public policy. 
According to the decision of Regazzoni, Colman J believed the contract was 
unenforceable if both the claimant and the defendant knew the immoral or 
illegal purpose under internal or foreign law. However the present case was 
different from Ragazzoni v. Sethia, since the purpose of Enron in procuring 
the letter of credit which was to affect a breach of United States law was 
entirely unknown to the defendant bank. 
To justify this situation, Colman J cited Scott LJ's judgment in Alexander v. 
Rayson: 
"It is settled law that an agreement to do an act 
that is illegal or immoral or contrary to public 
policy, or to do any act for a consideration that 
is illegal, immoral or contrary to public policy, 
is unlawful and therefore void. But it often happens 
that an agreement which in itself is not unlawful 
is made with the intention of one or both parties 
to make use of the subject matter for an unlawful 
purpose, that is to say a purpose that is illegal, 
immoral or contrary to public policy. The most common 
instance of this is an agreement for the sale or 
letting of an object, where the agreement is 
unobjectionable on the face of it, but where the 
intention of both or one of the parties is that the 
object shall be used by the purchaser or hirer for 
an unlawful purpose. In such a case any party to the 
agreement who had an unlawful intention is precluded 
from suing upon it. Ex turpi causa non oritur actio. 
The action does not lie because the Court will not 
lend its help to such a plaintiff."" 
By relying on the above words of Scott LJ's judgment, Colman J took the view 
" Alexander V. Rayson [1936] 1 K.B. 169,182. 
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that there is strong authority that the claimant could not enforce the contract if 
the relevant contact were entered into by the claimant for an unlawful 
purpose and the unlawfulness contemplated was English, rather than foreign. 
Therefore, after cited another decision of Court of Appeal in Scott i/. Brown, 
Doering, McNab & Co.,^^ Colman J concluded that: 
"If a claimant enters into a contract lawful on its 
face for the purpose of using the subject-matter to 
be derived from the contract or the very existence 
of the contract or the consequence of its being 
performed for an unlawful purpose he will not be 
permitted to enforce it. To permit him to do so would 
be contrary to public policy as offending against 
the ex turpi causa principle. That the defendant was 
ignorant of the purpose when the contract was entered 
into is irrelevant."'" 
Colman J stated that where both the claimant and the defendant knew the 
illegal purpose of the underlying contract, and the defendant was ignorant of 
the underlying illegality, the court would not enforce the contract which is 
legal on its face but in fact immoral or illegal under the law. He then asked: 
"Does it make any difference that the purpose was unlawful, not under 
English law, but under the law of a foreign friendly state?"s5 He continued: 
"In my judgment, it does not. It must logically be 
just as contrary to public policy to enable the 
claimant to enforce a contract which has been entered 
" Scott V. Brown, Doering, McNab & Co. [1892] 2 Q.B. 724, In this case, a plaintiff claimed 
to recover money paid to the defendant stockbrol<ers through whom he had purchased 
shares in a company on the grounds that the contract should be rescinded on the grounds 
that the brokers had used their own shares to satisfy his instructions and had not purchased 
shares on the open market. However, the court rejected the claim on the grounds that the 
contract was entered into and the money under it paid to the defendant for the unlawful 
purpose of rigging the market in those shares. 
«" Mahonia, [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep 911, 918, supra note 10. 
« Ibid., 919. 
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into for an illegal purpose know only to himself as 
to enable him to enforce such a contract the purpose 
of which is known to both parties to it"-^  
The above analysis clearly expressed Colman J's opinion for the effect of an 
illegal contract which breaches foreign law. He believed an illegal contract is 
unenforceable no matter the breached law is internal or international. The 
reason is simply the enforcement of an illegal contract is contrary to public 
policy. 
4.3.2. lUegaUty and letters of credit 
Since the one even more controversial issue in the case of Mahonia Ltd v. JP 
Morgan, other than the enforceability of the illegal foreign contract, is the 
conflict between the illegality and the autonomy of principle in documentary 
credits, Colman J then focused his discussion on enforceability of the letter of 
credit when an illegal underlying contract is involved. 
After the analysis of the development of the fraud exception in English law 
and the case of Group Jos/, he went back to the present case of Mahonia and 
justify the transaction in this case similar to "one in which the underlying 
contract is illegal to the knowledge of both parties and therefore 
unenforceable by either and where one of the parties to procures an innocent 
third party to provide to the other a bond which pays against a certificate that 
Ibid. 
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the underlying contact has not been performed"". And he decided the 
innocent third party could rely by the way of defence on the underlying 
illegality. However, the problem in his discussion was whether it makes any 
difference that "the security was provided by means of a documentary letter 
of credit confirmed by a bank innocent of the illegality of the underlying 
transaction, but which has clear evidence of that illegality at the time when it 
ought otherwise to pay"^ ^? In other words, does the policy of no permitting the 
autonomy of a letter of credit to be used to obtain fraudulent benefits extend 
to a case where there was an illegal purpose during the letter of credit was 
procured? 
Although he did not support Staughton LJ's view on the case of United City 
l\4erci}ants,^^ he agreed with Staughton LJ that it is incredible for a party to an 
unlawful arms transaction to be permitted to enforce a letter of credit which 
was an integral part of that transaction even if the relevant legislation did not 
on its proper construction render ancillary contracts illegal. In the end he 
concluded: 
"If a beneficiary should as a matter of public policy 
(ex turpi causa) be precluded from utilizing a letter 
of credit to benefit from his own fraud, it is hard 
to see why he should be permitted to use the courts 
to enforce part of an underlying transaction which 
would have been unenforceable on grounds of its 
" Ibid, 926. 
98 Ibid. 
99 During ti ie appeal of the case of Group Jos/, see supra note 72, Lord Justice Staughton 
justified the bretton woods point In the case of United City Merchantv^as a kind of approving 
the illegality exception, however, Colman J alleged that was only an example of a letter of 
credit which because of its cosmetic purpose was directly rendered unenforceable by 
legislation. 
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illegality if no letter of credit had been involved, 
however serious the material illegality involved. 
To prevent him doing so in an appropriately serious 
case such as one involving international crime could 
hardly be seen as a threat to the lifeblood of 
international commerce.""" 
Colman J's conclusion on the issue of illegality and the letter of credit 
provided a clear support to the existence of the illegality exception in 
documentary credits. He further discussed the position that "the claimant 
seeks the court's assistance in enforcing the letter of credit which has been 
opened pursuant to a contract which would be unenforceable on the grounds 
of public policy due to its unlawful purpose, that purpose being known to the 
claimant, but not to the bank until long after the demand for payment had 
been presented to the bank."''°^ In other words, neither at the time when the 
document was presented to the bank under the letter of credit nor at the 
deadline for making payment under it was the bank aware of the illegal 
purpose of the underlying contract. Colman J explained that because the 
bank is protected by the doctrine of"ex turpicausa'*'^'^, he is also protected at 
trial if it is proved the claimant is attempting to use the court's process to 
benefit from the illegality. Thus "the bank did not have clear evidence of such 
illegality at the date when payment had to be made would not prevent it 
having a good defence on that basis if such clear evidence were to hand 
when the Court was called upon to decide the issue." 
10° Mahonia, [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep 911,927, supra note 10. 
i°i Ibid, 919. 
^°^ The "reliance test" to the principle of "ex turpi causa" was established in the case of 
Holman v Johnson, see supra note 25, by Lord Mansfield a , "No court will lend its aid to a 
man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act." For details, see 
earlier this chapter, section 2.2.1. 
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Although in the end of the Mahonia case, after a full trial, Colman J found that 
there was no illegality in the underlying transaction since Enron's accounting 
was not in breach of US Security law and the beneficiary, Mahonia, was not 
privy to any unlawful purpose, having no knowledge of any element of 
wrongful accounting^" Consequently, it was not necessary for the court to 
decide what would have been the effect of illegality in the swap transaction 
on the enforceability of the letter of credit. But Colman J arrived at the same 
conclusion as Stoughton LJ on the illegality issue that "the autonomy of a 
letter of credit does not prevent it from being tainted by the illegality of the 
underlying transaction." In other words, illegality in the underlying transaction 
could constitute a defence to the enforcement of a letter of credit.^ "" The 
public policy arguments that are operable at the underlying contract level 
apply equally where the documentary credit is "being used to carry out an 
illegal transaction"'''^ JQ the extent that illegality prevents enforcement of the 
underlying contract, it should also prevent documentary credits "being used 
to carry out an illegal transaction". 
The case of Mahonia was almost the most important case on the issue of 
applying an illegality exception in English law. That was the first time the 
illegality exception was accepted as a distinct exception to the autonomy 
principle under documentary credits. However, there are still many problems 
'"^ Mahonia (No.2), supra note 10. 
1°'' Professor Nelson Enonchong, [2006] Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 
404, 410, supra note 59. 
It's See £7roz//7705/[1996] 1 W.LR. 1152, 1164, supra note 72. 
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about the application of the illegality exception, which were not clearly solved 
in this case. For example, the issue of "the seriousness of the Illegality"^°^. 
Colman J mentioned "there is much to be said for the view that the public 
policy in superseding the impregnability of letters of credit where there is an 
unlawful underlying transaction defence may not be engaged where the 
nature of the underlying illegal purpose is relatively trivial, at least where the 
purpose is to be accomplished in a foreign jurisdiction.".''°^ However, he did 
not try to explain the criterion of assessing the "relatively trivial illegality". Also, 
emphasizing the issue of the foreign jurisdiction issue seems to be contrary 
to his earlier point that an illegal contract is unenforceable no matter the 
breached law is internal or international. 
Nevertheless, this case may be a good beginning for the illegality exception 
to grow up in the earth of English law. The discussion which was made by 
Colman J in this case may also be seen as an extension of the discussion 
regarding to the illegality exception in Group Jos/. Colman J's detailed 
discussion regarding to the application of the illegality exception also made 
some implications for the conditions of this new exception in documentary 
credits. 
^°^ This issue was discussed In section 2.2.2 of this chapter. It was concluded that the 
seriousness of the illegality may affect the decision for an illegality defence. 
1 " Mahonia, [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep 911,927, supra note 10. 
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5. Conditions for Applyins the /i/egality Exception in 
Documentary Credits under Current English Law 
After over 50 years' development, the conditions of the application of the 
fraud rule are still not settled. Problems such like the standard of proof remain 
In. Therefore, it may be too early to set certain conditions for the appliance of 
new exceptions, such as Illegality. However, the scant few cases which 
related to the illegality exception in documentary credits did bring some 
implication, or at least discussion, to conditions of the application. 
5.1. The approved conditions 
First, for the question of the establishment of an Illegality exception, a clearly 
established illegal fact would be an indubitable condition. This Is a same 
condition for the application of the fraud rule. When, in the fraud rule 
exception, the fraudulent conduct has to be clearly established, a mere 
allegation of fraud is not enough. In the illegality exception, the illegal fact 
also has to be clearly established. It was expressed by Staughton LJ In the 
case of Group Jos/Re K Wa/brook insurance Co. Ltcf°^ 
"It seems to me that there must be cases when 
illegality can affect a letter of credit... 
Would illegality, like fraud have to be clearly 
i^ s See Group Jos/[1996] 1 W.LR. 1152, 1164, supra note 72. 
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established and known to the bank before it could 
operate as a defence or a ground for restraining 
payment by the bank? This is not an altogether easy 
question, but I am inclined to think that it would. 
If the illegality of the payment is merely doubtful, 
it may be that the bank would not be restrained." 
Not only in Group Josi, but also in Mahonia, "an established illegality" was the 
basis for the discussion of the application of this doctrine.^ °s Therefore, it is a 
condition that the illegality has to be clearly established. A mere suspicion of 
illegality is not enough. The court may not grant an injunction restraining 
payment if the underlying contract is only arguably illegal. And like the 
well-known fact that because of the difficulty of satisfying the high standard of 
proof, most of the fraud rule pleading were failed, the high standard also 
made the proof of the illegality exception very difficult. But the high standard 
of proof will also be useful to avoid the abuse of the illegality exception by 
applicants in letter of credits transactions. Also "the high standard of proving 
illegality will ensure that the exception does not become an easy excuse for 
banks to refuse to honour their obligation under a letter of credit."^^° 
Secondly, according to the Mahonia and Group Josi, the participation of the 
beneficiary is also a condition for the application of the illegality exception in 
documentary credits. This issue was discussed in case l\^ationia during the 
discussion of the cognizance of an illegal contract. Colman J referred to Lord 
1°^  In Mahonia, during the discussion [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep 911, 926., Colman J alleged that: 
"The transaction is therefore similar in many ways to one in which the underlying contract 
is illegal to the knowledge of both parties and therefore unenforceable by either and where 
one of the parties to it procures an innocent third party to provide to the other a bond which 
pays against a certificate that the underlying contract has not been performed." 
""Professor Nelson Enonchong, [2006] Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 404, 
414, supra note 59. 
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Justice Sankey's opinion in Foster v. Driscolh^ that: "If the question is one of 
illegality under our law, the contract is unenforceable if the defendant knew 
that the goods or money or other consideration were to be used for a purpose 
immoral or illegal under our law.""^ 
And for an opposite situation, in Group Jos/, since the illegal issue of the 
unauthorised contract of insurance was not known to the assured companies, 
it was held that reinsurance contracts were rendered unenforceable by the 
reinsurers but not by the assured companies. In a letter of credit case, the 
participation of parties may be represented by an intention or knowledge of 
one party or both parties that the letter of credit was issued for performance 
of an illegal contract. In other words, if the purpose of the letter of credit is 
itself illegal or the purpose is for an illegal underlying contract, and the 
purpose was known to the party, the illegality exception applies, and the party 
will not be permit to enforce the letter of credit. But the illegality exception will 
not be applied to defeat a party's title to enforce a letter of credit if the illegal 
purpose of the letter of credit is not known to the party. This is also the reason 
why in Mahonia (No. 2)''^ the defence of the illegality exception was not 
approved."" However, does this condition apply in all the cases in applying 
the illegality exception? The earlier research of Law Commission reports^^^ 
111 Foster V. Z?r/5ro//[1920] 2 K.B. 287. 
"2 Mahonia, [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep 911,917, supra note 10. 
1 " Mahonia (No.2), at 430, supra note 10. 
"'• In the end, the illegality defence was not succeeding because the beneficiary of the 
letter of credit was not aware of the illegal purpose of the letter of credit. 
"5 CP 154; CP 189 and LC 320. For details, see earlier this chapter, section 2.2, supra note 
19. 
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brings some new thoughts to the thesis. If the innocent party is not always 
able to enforce an illegal involved contract, then accordingly, the participation 
of the party may not be a condition for the unenforcement of the illegal 
contract to take effect. In other words, under some circumstance, the 
innocent party may not be able to enforce a contract whose purpose was 
illegal. In a letter of credit case, under certain circumstances, the beneficiary 
may not be entitled to payment where the underlying transaction is illegal 
even he has no knowledge of the illegality.^ ^^ 
5.2. Some other possibilities 
There are also some possible conditions, such as the seriousness of the 
illegality, and the connection between the illegality and the letter of credit, 
were suggested by academic authorities.^ ^^ 
Of course, the seriousness of illegal conducts may affect the judges' 
discretion in accepting the illegality exception. The illegal issue in Mahonia 
\N2& not that serious in English Law. The situation may change if the illegal 
purpose of the underlying contract was too serious. For example, if the 
purpose of the underlying contract is to violate the criminal law, such like 
^^ ^ The seriousness of t i ie illegality may affect tine enforcement of an illegal contract by an 
innocent party. See section 2.2.2. of this chapter. For example, J M Allan, supra note 48. 
^^ ^ Professor Nelson Enonchong approved the seriousness of the illegality and the degree of 
connection as two conditions for the application of the illegality exception in his article, 
[2006] LI^CLQ 404, supra note 59. 
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murder, or for some more serious commercial purpose, such like trading with 
the enemy during the wartime. In those circumstance, English courts may not 
enforce the credit even none of the parties has knowledge of the illegality.^ ^s 
As Scrutton LJ said in Re Mahmoud v. Spahanh^: 
"In my view the Court i s bound, once i t knows that 
the contract i s i l l e g a l , to take objection and to 
refuse to enforce the contract , whether i t s 
knowledge comes from the statement of the party who 
was gui l ty of the i l l e g a l i t y , or whether i t s 
knowledge comes from outside sources. The Court does 
not s i t to enforce i l l e g a l con t rac t s . " 
However, the seriousness of the illegality is rather a simple factor to be 
considered for a cognisance of an illegal contract than a separate condition 
for the appliance of the illegality exception in documentary credits.^ 2° 
And for the idea of seeing the connection between the illegality and the letter 
of credit as a condition, there is no clear rule of what is a sufficiently close 
connection between the letter of credit and the illegality of the underlying 
transaction. The only reasonable suggestion was that in Mahonia. Colman J 
said that if it had been established that the underlying transaction had the 
unlawful purpose alleged and if the beneficiary had been a party to that 
unlawful purpose, he would have accepted the connection that the letter of 
"^ In Law Commission CP 189, 3.15 to 3.16, see supra note 19, it was suggested at page 
22 that: In theory the common law rules do not explicitly take into account the seriousness 
of the unlawful conduct at all However it must be doubtful whether the law is really this 
rigid. There is a vast amount of statutory regulation creating numerous statutory offences 
which maybe committed without any guilty intent and involve misconduct of a fairly trivial 
nature. To suggest that any contract which necessarily requires the commission of such a 
minor offence is unenforceable by either party seems questionable". 
"9 Re Mahmoud v. Spahan/[1921] 2 KB 716, 729. 
120 See supra note 93. 
227 
Lu Lu: The Exceptions in Documentary Credits in English Law, 
credit was sufficiently connected to the illegal purpose of the underlying 
transaction as to be tainted by it. However, if the sole factor, which is the 
knowledge of the beneficiary, should be used to determine whether the 
illegality is sufficiently connected to the letter of credit, it may not be 
necessary to have a separate requirement that there has to be a connection 
between the letter of credit and the illegal underlying contract. The knowledge 
of the beneficiary, like the involvement of the beneficiary in the illegality, has 
already been a requirement for the application the illegality exception. 
Therefore, basically, the illegality exception in documentary credits has been 
applied in English law but under two conditions according to the current case 
law, which are a clearly proved illegal fact and the involvement of the 
beneficiary. 
5.3. Several unclear issues 
However, since the limited development of the illegality exception in English 
case law, there are still some issues which have not been discussed clearly. 
One of the main issues is the knowledge of the bank when applying the 
illegality exception. 
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5.3.1. Banks' knowledge of the illegality 
In the case of G/an S/ngh'^', the application of the fraud rule was rejected by 
the court because of the bank's unawareness of the forgery. Although the 
banks' knowledge has not been discussed in the current application of the 
illegality exception, it should not be ignored. If, in applying the fraud rule, the 
bank is entitled to the reimbursement even there's a clearly proved fraud as 
long as the bank has no knowledge of the fraud at the time of the payment, it 
is hard to see why the same principle will not be applied while applying the 
illegality exception. However, is the bank's knowledge always a condition in 
applying the fraud rule? According to the early research on the issue of 
banks' knowledge in applying the fraud rule, the court may not grant an 
injunction at a pre-trial stage to prevent the bank from payment as long as the 
bank does not notice the fraud, but the court may not grant a summary 
judgment to force a bank to pay against a fraudulent beneficiary on a pre-trial 
stage simply because the bank is not able to prove he has the clear evidence 
of the fraud. •'22 Since both the application of the fraud rule and the illegality 
exception share the same basis of "ex turp/causa", it may be concluded that 
the bank's knowledge principle applies similarly in the illegality exception. In 
other words, it is true that the applicant has to pay the reimbursement to the 
bank as long as the bank has no knowledge of the involved fraud or illegality, 
but it is difficult to see why the bank's knowledge should be so important 
*^ ^ G/an Singh & Co. Ltd. v. Banque de L Idochine Judicial Committee oftiie Privy Council 
[1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1, see Chapter 2, section 5.2.2. 
122 See section 3.2 of Chapter 3. 
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where the beneficiary is asking for a summary judgment to enforce the bank 
to pay under the credit, or applicant is applying for an injunction to restrain 
the beneficiary from demanding. Under those circumstances, banks' 
knowledge of the illegality may not be seen as a condition in applying the 
illegality exception. 
5.3.2. The crucial time for the evidence of iUesality 
Actually, the issue of the knowledge of banks may be relative to another issue 
which was discussed both in Group Jos/and Mahonia, "the crucial time of the 
establishment of the evidence". 
In Group Josi, during the hearing, Staughton LJ pointed out this difficult 
question and said: 
"If illegality were clearly proved at trial, it would 
be a defence that it was not clear at the time when 
the documents were presented for payment is even more 
of a problem. "^ " 
He analysed this problem and stated his own view in the following words: 
"....would the court restrain the bank from making 
payment or the beneficiary from demanding it? In my 
judgment the court would do so. That would not be 
because the letter of credit contracts were 
themselves illegal, but because they were being used 
to carry out an illegal transaction. "^^^  
A similar decision was made by Colman J in Mahonia that the bank was 
1" Group Jos/[1996'] 1 W.LR. 1152, 1164, supra note 72. 
12" Ibid. 
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entitled to rely on the evidence of illegality at the date of the trial even though 
it did not have that evidence at the date v^ /hen the payment was made.^ s^ 
However, those two similar decisions did not come from a similar analysis. 
During the judgment, the similar time issue in the fraud rule was discussed. 
And in both cases the application of the fraud rule from Sztejn by United City 
i\/fe/viiants (investment) Ltd. v. Royal Banl< of Canada^^^ was cited as a 
beginning of the discussion. However, a different understanding was 
achieved. While, in Group Josi, Staughton LJ believed the decision of United 
City i\/ferciiants s\\o\N^ that "it is nothing to the point that at the time of trial the 
beneficiary knows, and the bank knows, that the documents presented under 
the letter of credit were not truthful in a material respect. It is the time of 
presentation that is critical .... When that reasoning is applied to an 
interlocutory application to restrain a bank from making the payment, the 
same result follows. The bank is entitled and bound to pay on presentation of 
apparently conforming documents, unless the demand of the beneficiary is 
clearly fraudulent. ... The effect on the lifeblood of commerce will be precisely 
the same whether the bank is restrained from paying or the beneficiary is 
restrained from asking for payment."'^'' In i\4aiJonia, Colman J believed the 
implication in United City i\/ferciiants to be that "the fraudulent claimant will 
not be entitled to remedy if the bank, having clear evidence of fraud,.declines 
^" Mahonia, at 923, supra note 10, "As long as there is before the court evidence which 
establishes fraud by the beneficiary there is evidence sufficient to establish a straight 
defence based on ex turpi causa. For this purpose, I agree with Lord Justice Waller that the 
strength of the fraud case has to be tested on the evidence available at the hearing of the 
summary judgment application, as distinct from the time of demand." 
126 United City Merchants \\<i^Z\ 1 A.C. 168, supra note 1. 
1 " G'/-(?i//7705/[1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1161-1162, supra note 72. 
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to pay at the time when the documents are presented."^ ^a^ and was not saying 
that "the claimant who, at trial, is proved to be fraudulent will nevertheless be 
entitled to recover from the bank if it did not have clear proof of fraud at the 
time of the presentation of documents"^ 29 Colman J believed that "If the 
bank is protected by the doctrine of ex turpi causa when It has clear 
evidence of fraud at the time of presentation it must, inescapably, also 
be protected if, at trial, It is demonstrated that the beneficiary is 
attempting to use the court's process to benefit from his own fraud."''° 
It may not be reasonable just to admit one of the two different understandings. 
However, if Staughton LJ was right, that while applying the fraud rule, it is 
"the time of presentation is crucial", and the bank's knowledge "at the time of 
trial" is "nothing", then why would a totally different principle apply to the 
illegality exception, which is also based on the doctrine of "ex turpi causal 
Furthermore, if the principle of "the time of presentation is critical" is followed 
in applying the fraud rule, then the beneficiary might be able to achieve a 
summary judgment to force the bank to pay as long as the bank had no clear 
evidence of fraud at the time of presentation. "But what happens if, in the 
meantime and, before the application for summary judgment is heard, the 
bank acquires clear evidence of fraud? Is the beneficiary still entitled to 
judgment? Has the bank lost the "ex tu/picausa"dieience which would have 
been available to it if it had acquired that clear evidence at the time when it 
^^ ^ Mahonia, at 922, supra note 10. 
1 " Ibid. 
" ° Ibid. 
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was called upon to pay?"^^^ An even less reasonable result may be that the 
beneficiary will be able to claim damages from the bank even the fraud is 
clearly proved at the time of trial as long as the bank did not have the clearly 
evidence of the fraud at the time of presentation. It would be ridiculous for the 
court to assist a fraudulent beneficiary to claim for benefits by relying on his 
own fraud. This will be clearly in breach of the "reliance principle" to "ex turpi 
causd\ which was established in the case of Holman ]/ Johnsori^^'^, by Lord 
Mansfield CJ "no court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of 
action upon an immoral or an illegal act."^^^ 
In this sense, the conclusion in Mahonia may be more proper. Colman J 
decided that "the surety should have a direct defence on the basis of ex turpi 
causa at whatever stage in the proceedings prior to the hearing of the 
summary judgment application he can adduce the evidence necessary to 
establish fraud". In other words, the time of presentation may be the crucial 
time for the evidence of fraud or illegality if the applicant is applying for an 
interlocutory injunction to restrain a bank from payment or the bank is 
claiming for reimbursement from the applicant; but in situations where the 
beneficiary is asking for a summary judgment to force the bank to pay, the 
strength of the fraud or illegality case has to be tested on the evidence 
available at the hearing of the summary judgment application, as distinct from 
the time of the presentation. 
131 Ibid, 921. 
132 (1775) 1 Cowp 341 ,343, see supra note 25 
1 " For further discussion of "tlie reliance principle", see earlier this chapter, section 2.2.1. 
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The above discussion may also benefit the understanding of one of the new 
approaches in applying the fraud rule, that a bank should not be forced to pay 
by a summary judgment if it can establish a claim with a real prospect of 
success that the demand was fraudulent, even if it had no clear evidence of 
fraud at the time of presentation.^^ In this circumstance, it is the time of trial 
that is crucial. By considering the strength of the evidence of fraud, the court 
should give the bank a chance to prove the fraud if the bank, at the time of 
hearing the summary judgment, have a real prospect of success in proving 
the fraud at the later trial. The beneficiary cannot achieve a summary 
judgment to force the bank to pay by relying on the bank having no clear 
evidence of fraud at the time of presentation. 
^^^ This approach was established in the case of Safa Ltd. v. Banque Du Caire [2000] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 600 . For detailed discussion of this new approach, see Chapters, section 1.4. 
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Summary 
The illegality exception is an essential part of the development of 
documentary credits system. The illegality exception, like the fraud rule, 
provides a safe and stable environment for the documentary credits practice. 
The same basis of the principle of "ex turpi causa" between the fraud rule and 
illegality exception clearly shows the reasonableness and necessity of 
applying the illegality exception. The research of the detailed application of 
the illegality exception is not only useful in explaining the illegality exception 
as a new exception in documentary credits system; it also benefits the 
understanding of the fraud exception, especially the new approaches which 
emerged during the 1990s. However, exceptions in documentary credits 
developed much more quickly than could be expected. Another possible 
exception, the nullity exception, appeared first in Singapore, starting to affect 
the English Law only recently. The last chapter of the thesis will be mainly 
discussing the application of the nullity exception in English law. 
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Chapter Five: The Nullity Exception in 
Documentary Credits 
Preface 
Unlike the other exceptions, the fraud rule and illegality exception, the nullity 
exception has not been accepted by English law as an independent 
exception which may impact the ordinary operation of documentary credit 
system. The case of Montrod Ltd. v. Grundkdtter Fleischvertriebs GmbH" is 
mainly seen as the clear authority that rejects the nullity exception. However, 
the Singapore Court of Appeal in Beam Technologies v. Standard Chartered 
Banl^ departed from the English position and applied that there is a nullity 
exception separated from the established fraud exception. This is probably 
the first time that the nullity exception was applied in common law jurisdiction. 
This chapter, which is also the last chapter of the thesis, will focus on a 
discussion of the possibility and restriction in applying a nullity exception in 
English law. The research may also benefit the early study of the fraud rule 
and illegality exception. 
1 Montrod Ltd V. Grundkdtter Fleischvertriebs GmbH \2Qi<:i\'\ EWCA Civ 1954, [2002] 1 
W.LR 1975. 
2 Beam Technologies v. Standard Chartered Bank ll^^Tj, 2 SLR 155, [12 ] ; aff "d [2003] 1 
SLR 597. 
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/. The Nature of the Nullity Exception Contrasted to the 
Fraud Rule 
It is well know that the fraud rule and illegality exception are both established 
on the application of the principle of "ex turpi cause/'. As the first and most 
important exception in documentary credits, the fraud rule was developed in 
United City i\/te/viiants? Lord Diplock restricted the application of the fraud 
rule to the situation where "the seller, for the purpose of drawing on the credit, 
fraudulently presents to the...bank documents that contain, expressly or by 
implication, material representations of fact that to his knowledge are untrue." 
The rationale for this application is that the principle of "ex turpi causa" will 
not allow the court to help a dishonest person to carry out a fraud. According 
to the decision of United City i\/fercijants, the beneficiary's knowledge of fraud 
becomes an essential condition in applying the fraud rule. Thus, a beneficiary 
may still receive payment by presenting forged documents, as long as he has 
no knowledge of the fraud. In other words, banks are obliged to pay against 
documents which they know involved fraud because the beneficiary is " 
innocent".'* 
The decision of Lord Diplock may be seen reasonable on the judicial basis of 
^ Before Un/tedC/ty Merchants, it was not clear whether the fraud of anyone apart from the 
beneficiary would be sufficient for applying the fraud rule. Even during the Court of Appeal 
of Un/tedC/t/ Merchants, Mocatta J called the fraud exception as " established or obvious 
fraud to the knowledge of the bank" [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep 267, 276 (col 2). 
" See K Donnelly, "Nothing for Nothing: a Nullity Exception In Letters of Credit?" [2008] 
J.B.L316, 322. 
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"ex turpicausd' since the fraud rule operates as to prevent proven fraudsters 
from claiming payment. However, it may also cause the circulation of forged 
documents in international trade. And forged documents is always being 
seen as " a cancer in international trade"^. In this circumstance, an 
application of a nullity exception may be attractive because it does not 
require the knowledge of the beneficiary as a condition. The nullity exception, 
unlike the fraud rule, is based on the attributes of the documents tendered. 
Therefore, the operation of a nullity exception may not be disturbed by the 
conduct of the beneficiary.^ The nullity exception, if established, will prevent 
the beneficiary to achieve payments by presenting forged documents which 
are null no matter whether the beneficiary is innocent to the fraud. Further 
speaking, according to the nullity exception, the bank will be entitled to refuse 
payment solely on the null of documents even if there is no fraud involved at 
all. In the sense, the nullity exception can be useful in solving the problems 
caused by the limit of the fraud rule. This is also one of main reasons why the 
application of the nullity exception in documentary credits is so attractive. 
2. The Nullity Exception in Singapore 
Possibly the first and only official admission of the nullity exception so far is 
5 See Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan National Shipping Corpn. (No. 2) [1998] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 684, 686 (QB). See Chapter 2, note 19. 
^ See Professor Paul Todd, "Non-genuine Shipping Documents and Nullities" [2008] 
L.M.C.LQ 547-573, 552. 
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Beam Technologies v. Standard Chartered Banff in Singapore. This case 
may be a good start point to discuss the prospective application in English 
law. The fact of Beam Technologies was as follows: 
Beam Technology Pte Ltd made a contract of selling electronic components 
with an Indonesian buyer, PT Mulia Persada Permai. The buyer obtained a 
letter of credit from the issuing bank, PT Bank Universal HO Jakarta in favour 
of the seller as the beneficiary.^ The credit was then confirmed by Standard 
Chartered Bank. According to the credit, a full set of clean air way bills was 
required to be issued by the seller's freight fonwarders, "Link Express(S) Pte 
Ltd". During the time of presentation, the conforming bank. Standard 
Chartered Bank, rejected the document and refused to pay the seller on the 
basis of the finding that the seller's freight fonA/arders, "Link Express(S) Pte 
Ltd" did not exist at all. The confirming bank believed that there was a forgery 
in the air way bills. 
On this basis, the Court of Appeal of Singapore held that the bank was 
entitled to reject the forgery. It accepted a nullity exception and took the view 
that: 
"[The] confirming bank is not obliged to pay if it 
has established within the seven-day period that a, 
material document required under the credit is 
forged and null and void and notice of it is given 
within that period."^ 
' Beam Technologies, 2003] 1 S.LR 597, supra note 2. 
^ The letter of credit was subjected to the terms of UCP 500. 
^ Beam Technologies, 610, supra note 2. 
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The decision of this judgment was quite on the basis of the facts of the case. 
In this case, the nullity was clearly established and it was decided that the 
bank was not obliged to pay against the null documents as long as the nullity 
can be proved in time. However, a general application of the nullity exception 
may face more hazards in different cases. 
2 .1 . The Identification of nullity in nullity exception 
In Beam Technologies, the non-existence of the seller's freight forwarders 
was a straightfon/vard situation of nullity. The air way bill was not only forged 
but clearly null. However, in applying a nullity exception, it is always a difficult 
question to determine whether a document is null. There could be lots of 
confusion between the cases. For example, a misdated bill of lading was 
decided by Devlin J as "valueless but not a complete nullity"i° in case Kwei 
Te/( Ciiao v. Britisfi Traders and Shippers;''' in contrast, in the case of 
Egyptian International Foreign Trade Co v. Soplex Wholesale Supplies'^, 
Leggatt J described a misdated bill of lading which includes a misstatement 
of the vessel's as a "sham piece of paper"^^ Although it was suggested in 
"Benjamin's Sale of Goods" that a document in which the forgery destroys the 
^° Kwei TekChao v. British Traders andSiiippers [1954] 1 QB 459, 476. 
^1 Ibid. 
" Egyptian InternationaiForeign Trade Co v. Sopiex Wiiolesaie Suppiies [1984] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 102. 
" Ibid, 116. 
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"whole or essence of the instrument"'" would be considered as a null 
document, the concept of "a null document" was not clear. 
In United City Merchants, Lord Dip lock said: 
" [T]he bill of lading with the wrong date of loading 
placed on it by the carrier' s agent was far from being 
a nullity. It was a valid transferable receipt for 
the goods giving the holder a right to claim them 
at their destination ... and was evidence of the terms 
of the contract under which they were being 
carried. "^ ^ 
It seems Lord Diplock explained nullity from the legal right provided by 
documents against the carrier. In other words, a document is null if it can not 
provide any legal rights to the holder against other people. For a bill of 
landing, the nullity will made the documents given no legal right to the holder 
to claim against the carrier. Kieran Donnelly understands this explanation as 
similar to the approach of "destruction of the whole or essence of the 
instrument"^^ Accordingly, a bill of lading that has been fraudulently 
backdated is not a nullity, it does not render the bill of lading as being without 
legal effect. And, In Hesiceii i/. Continental Express LtcP, the bill of lading 
issued was decided as a nullity by Devlin J because the cargo had been left 
behind. 
"^* Professor Michael Bridge, edits, "Benjamin's Sale of Goods", (10* edn. Sweet & Maxwell. 
2010), para 19-034. 
IS United Ot/Merchants [_19Q3] 1 A.C. 168, 188. 
^^  For further reading, see Kieran Donnelly, "Nothing for Nothing: a Nullity Exception in 
Letters of Credit?" [2008] J.B.L.316, 317-321; Professor Michael Bridge, edits, "Benjamin's 
Sale of Goods", (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell. 2010)^^; Heskell v. Continental Express Ltd 
(1950) 83 LI L Rep 438, 455 (col 2). 
1^  Heskell V. Continental Express Ltd W^SQi\ 1 All England 1033. 
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However, it is not easy to define nullity during practice , for example, Devlin J 
while citing Kreditbank Cassel GmbH v. Schenkers Ld,^^ as the authority of 
forged signature will usually render a document a nullity, also decided a 
forged signature need not render the document a nullity if is not central to the 
imposition of liability. Therefore, "whereas a test based on deprivation of all 
legal effect is reasonably certain, the essence of a document to one party 
might differ from its essence to another."^^ 
The issue may be more complex when it comes to the nullity exception in 
documentary credits. In Montrod, the forged signature was in an inspection 
certificates, and an unauthorized signature would have deprived it of all legal 
effect. But the Court of Appeal implied that a document signed by the 
beneficiary in honest error as to its authority would not be a nullity. The 
unclear identification of the concept of "nullity" will no doubt cause difficulty in 
applying a nullity exception in documentary credits.^o 
2.2. The materiality of the document 
While the application is between the bank and the beneficiary, the 
identification of nullity is probably depending on the security interests 
provided by the document to the bank. However, the weight of security 
18 Kreditbank Cassel GmbH v. Schenkers Ld {1921} 1 KB 826, 835, per Bankes U. 
1' Professor Paul Todd, "Non-genuine Shipping Documents and Nullities", supra note 6. 
20 L Ciiin and Y. Wong, " Autonomy A Nullity Exception at Last?" [2004] L.I^.C.L.Q. 14, 17. 
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interests in documents may also vary by the type of the document. This is 
probably also the reason why the Court of Appeal of Singapore mentioned 
the materiality of documents as a main issue in applying the nullity exception. 
For instances, a null certificate, which was proved in Gian S/nghan6 Montrod, 
may not affect the bank's security interest very much. However, if the null 
document was an insurance document, the bank's security interests may be 
reduced or even destroyed by the null document. The most serious 
demolition to banks' security interests on documents may caused by a null bill 
of lading. While it is possible that other documents can also be documents of 
title, the only document about which this can always be said with certainty is 
the shipped bill of lading.^ ^ A delivery of the bill of lading can be seen as a 
transfer of the goods. Banks usually take the bill of lading as their main 
security in documents. A null bill of lading means a total destruction of the 
banks' security interests. If the required shipping document is a bill of lading, 
and the bill of lading is so defective that it cannot be regarded as being a bill 
of lading at all; the extreme case could be that a document appearing to be a 
bill of lading is produced, conforming on its face with the terms of the credit, 
but both ship and cargo are invented. In that case, whatever this piece of 
paper looks like, on no reasonable definition can it be described as a bill of 
lading"=2_ it will offer no security to the bank if it is not a bill of lading. It is 
unreasonable to force a bank to pay against a document, especially a bill of 
^^  Professor Paul Todd, "Bills of Lading and Bankers' Documentary Credits", (4* edn, 
Informa Law, 2007), p. 106. 
" Professor Paul Todd, [2008] LM.C.L.Q 547-573, 554, supra note 6. 
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lading, which is known to the bank as a piece of paper provided no security. 
The different security interests provided by different kinds of documents may 
cause more difficulties In defining the concept of nullity. 
What is more? Themateriality itself is a complex issue for the application of 
the nullity exception. A similar issue was pointed out by Lord Diplock in United 
City Merchants. Regarding to the submission that the bank is entitled to reject 
payment if there was a material misstatement in the document, Lord Diplock 
asked the question: "material to what?". He then rejected the suggested 
answer of "a misstatement of a fact which if the true fact had been disclosed 
would have entitled the buyer to reject the goods" and explained the reason 
as "this is to destroy the autonomy of the documentary credit".^^ Of course, a 
material misstatement may not affect the buyer's obligation under a letter of 
credit according to the autonomy principle. However, the bank may not be 
force to pay if it knows there is a material inaccuracy in documents which 
may affect its ability to pay. Actually, this view, which was first mentioned by 
Stephenson LJ during the Court of Appeal of United City l\/lerciiants}^ was 
not rejected by Lord Diplock either. Lord Diplock said in the House of Lords: 
"if this were so, the answer to the question: "to 
what must the misstatement in the documents be 
material?" should be: "material to the price which 
the goods to which the documents relate would fetch 
on sale if, failing reimbursement by the buyer, the 
bank should be driven to realise its security." But 
this would not justify the confirming bank' s refusal 
" See United City Merchants, at 185, supra note 15. 
-^t See United City l^ercfiants [192,2] Q.B. 208, 239. 
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to honour the credit- in the instant case; the 
realizable value on arrival at Callao of a glass fibre 
manufacturing plant made to the specification of the 
buyers could not be in any way affected by its having 
been loaded on board a ship at Felixstowe on December 
16, instead of December 15, 1976."" 
Lord Diplock, though believed the forged date in the document was not 
material enough to affect the bank's security interests, did not clearly suggest 
the bank's position v\^en the forgery in the document was material enough to 
affect the bank's security interests. In this sense, banks' discretion to reject a 
forgery document which is material enough to affect its ability of payment 
should not be seen as todestroy the autonomy in documentary credits. The 
distinctive relationship between the bank and the beneficiary was also an 
essential for the application of the nullity exception in the Singapore case. 
2.3. The distinctive cause of action 
In Beam Technologies, the action was between a confirming bank and the 
seller who was the beneficiary of the letter of credit. In that case, the bank 
chose to go behind the face of the document and found the nullity. However, 
banks were not under an obligation of examining any issues besides whether 
documents are facially conforming under UCP 500.^ ^ The relevant provisions 
^^  See United City Merchants, at 186, supra note 15. 
^^  See UCP500, Article 13a: "Banks must examine all documents stipulated in the Credit 
with reasonable care, to ascertain whether or not they appear, on their face, to be in 
compliance with the terms and conditions of the Credit. Compliance of the stipulated 
documents on their face with the terms and conditions of the Credit shall be determined by 
international standard banking practice as reflected in these Articles. Documents which 
appear on their face to be inconsistent with one another will be considered as not appearing 
245 
Lu Lu: The Exceptions in Documentar)' Credits in English Law. 
in UCP 600 are Articles 7(a) and 8(a)2^ In this case, the authority of 
Singapore in applying a nullity exception nnay only be seen as restricted 
between the bank and the beneficiary. And the bank choose to reject the null 
documents by relying on its security interests under the letter of credit and 
took the risk of being sued by the beneficiary. Thus, one question may be 
proposed here: What is the situation if the bank chose to accept the 
document by its facially conforming, would the buyer in this case be able the 
make a defence on the nullity exception? This was just what happened in the 
English case MontrodLtd v. Grundkotter Fleischvertiiebs GmbtP. 
3. The Facts andJudsment in the Case of Montrod 
Although the nullity exception was approved by the Singapore authority, it 
was generally rejected by English courts in Montrod Ltd v. Grundkotter 
Fleischvertriebs GmbU^. Montrod was also the first case which clearly 
considered and discussed the possible application of the nullity exception as 
a separate exception in documentary credits in English law. 
on their face to be In compliance with the terms and conditions of the Credit. Documents not 
stipulated in the Credit will not be examined by banl<s. If they receive such documents, they 
shall return them to the presenter or pass them on without responsibility." 
" UCP 500, Article 7(a) "[Issuing Bank Undertaking] [p]rovided that the stipulated 
documents are presented to the issuing bank and they constitute a complying presentation, 
the issuing bank must honour if the credit is available by..."; Article 8(a) "[Confirming Bank 
Undertaking] [p]rovided that the stipulated documents are presented to the confirming 
bank or to any other nominated bank and that they constitute a complying presentation, the 
confirming bank must..." 
^^  Montrod, supra note 1. 
" Ibid. 
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In Montrod, there was a GIF contract between a German company and 
Russian entity, for the sale of a large consignment of frozen pork. The 
transaction was financed by a documentary credit issued by the third 
defendant bank (SCB), at the request of the second defendant (Fibi), on the 
application of the claimant (Montrod). One of the documents required under 
the credit was a "certificate of inspection issued and signed by Montrod at his 
discretion on the goods quality and quantity in good order before shipment" 
which should be presented by the beneficiary of the credit, GK. Montrod had 
the intention that this stipulation of certificate would allow them to delay 
payment until they themselves were put in funds. GK was unaware of this 
intention though. GK presented the certificate, which was actually signed by 
GK himself (GK believed he had Montrod's authority to do so), to SCB for 
payment. And SCB claimed reimbursement against Fibi. In turn Fibi claimed 
a similar reimbursement from Montrod. Montrod refused reimbursement and 
claimed that SCB should have refused payment on the ground that the 
certificate was a nullity. Montrod's claim was dismissed by the judge. Then 
Montrod appealed and GK started a cross-appeal.^o 
During the hearing of the appeal, Potter LJ, after explaining the fact of the 
case, first pointed to the possible nullity exception and said: 
"The formulation of the so-called "nullity 
exception" as advanced before the judge was as 
follows: 
°^ There were actually two claims arose by Montrod: one was on the ground of the nullity of 
the certificate, and the other one was that GK had acted negligently and in breach of 
fiduciary duty in presenting the certificate. The second claim was also rejected by the court. 
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'If, by the time of full payment (or the time when 
a bank irrevocably commits itself to a third party 
who has taken in good faith, if earlier), the only 
reasonable inference is that one (or more) of the 
documents . . . presented under the credit is not what 
it appears on its face to be, but is a nullity, then 
the bank is not obliged to make payment under the 
credit. ' "^i 
Then Potter LJ brought the decision of early judgment into discussion by an 
analysis of UCP500 Articles which is to the autonomy principle and banks' 
duties under documentary credits.^ ^ He emphasized on the issue of the 
liability of the bank under the credit stated: 
"Leaving aside for a moment the exception of fraud 
on the part of the beneficiary (which the judge held 
not to exist) the liability of SCB to make payment 
under the UCP 500 terms is clear. 
...Neither as a matter of general principle, nor under 
UCP 500, is an issuing bank obliged to question or 
investigate the genuineness of documents which 
appear on their face to be documents the nature and 
content of which comply with the requirements of the 
credit."" 
He took the words of Lord Diplock in case Gian Singti & Co Ltd v Banque de 
I'IndochineP''' as an example: 
"The fact that a document presented by the 
beneficiary under a documentary credit, which 
otherwise conforms to the requirements of the credit, 
is in fact a forgery does not, of itself, prevent 
the issuing bank from recovering from its customer 
money paid under the credit. The duty of the issuing 
bank, which it may perform either by itself, or by 
^^  Montrod, at 1983, supra note 1. 
^^  UCP 500 Article 3, 4, 9, 13, 14, and 15, were cited during discussion. 
" Montrod, [2001] EWCA Civ 1954, 1985 to l986 , supra note 1. 
"^^  Gian Singh & Co. Ltd. v. Banque de L 'Idochiine Judicial Committee ofthie Privy Council 
[1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1 
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its agent, the notifying bank, is to examine 
documents with reasonable care to ascertain that 
they appear on their face to be in accordance with 
the terms and conditions of the credit." 
To discuss the banks' liability when the application of exceptions involvedin, 
Potter LJ cited Rix J's decision In Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v 
Standard Bank London Ltd.'^^ 
"The fact that the rationale of the fraud exception 
is the law's prohibition on the use of its process 
to carry out fraud (per Lord Diplock in United City 
Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada) 
may appropriately be viewed as an authoritative 
expression of the source of law of the implied 
limitation on a bank's mandate... If the source of 
the power to injunct were purely the law's interest 
in preventing the beneficiary from benefiting from 
his own fraud, I do not see why there should be the 
added requirement that the fraud be patent to the 
bank" 
Potter LJ also made a support to Lord Diplock's view on "halfway house" that 
the intention of beneficiary was crucial for applying the fraud rule in United 
City l\/ferciiant^: 
"I consider that the judge was correct in the decision 
to which he came. The Fraud Exception to the autonomy 
principle recognised in English law has hitherto 
been restricted to, and it is in my view desirable 
that it should remain based upon, the fraud or 
knowledge of fraud on the part of the beneficiary 
or other party seeking payment under and in 
accordance with the terms of the letter of credit. 
It should not be avoided or extended by the argument 
that a document presented, which conforms on its face 
with the terms of the letter of the credit, is none 
" Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard Bank London Zfty[1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
7, 203. 18  
36 
/ , 2UJ. 
United City Merchants, supra note 15. 
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the less of a character which disentitles the person 
making the demand to payment because it is fraudulent 
in itself, independently of the knowledge and bona 
fides of the demanding party."" 
And for the words of Lord Diplock that "I would prefer to leave open the 
question of the rights of an innocent seller/beneficiary against the confirming 
bank when a document presented by him is a nullity because unknown to him 
it was forged by some third party; for that question does not arise in the 
instant case/'^ s, Potter LJ explained: 
"While he left open the position in relation to a 
forged document where the effect of the forgery was 
to render the document a 'nullity", there is nothing 
to suggest that he would have recognised any nullity 
exception as extending to a document which was not 
forged (i.e. fraudulently produced) but was signed 
by the creator in honest error as to his authority; 
nor do I consider that such an exception should be 
recognised. "^ ' 
After all the discussion, Potter LJ made a decision in the current case and 
stated: 
"I do not consider that the fact that in this case 
it was the seller/beneficiary himself who created 
the document said to be a nullity should of itself 
disentitle him to payment, assuming (as the judge 
found) that such, creation was devoid of any 
fraudulent intent..."" 
He also made a clear expression about the appliance of the nullity exception 
and gave the reason as follows: 
" Montrod, [2001] EWCA Civ 1954, 1991, supra note 1. 
8^ United City Merchants, at 188, supra note 15. 
39 l^ontrod, at 1991-1992, supra note 1. 
''o Ibid, 1992. 
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"In my view there are sound policy reasons for not 
extending the law by creation of a general nu l l i t y 
exception ... The creation of a general nu l l i t y 
exception, the formulation of which does not seem 
to me susceptible of precis ion, involves making 
undesirable inroads into the pr inciples of autonomy 
and negot iab i l i ty universal ly recognised in 
re la t ion to l e t t e r of credi t t ransac t ions . ""^  
However, after the conclusion of "there should be no general nullity exception 
based upon the concept of a docunnent being fraudulent in itself or devoid of 
commercial value"« Potter LJ added an idea that there might be possibility 
that "the conduct of a beneficiary in connection with the creation and /or 
presentation of a document forged by a third party might, though itself 
nor amounting to fraud, be of such character as not to deserve the 
protection available to a holder in due course".''^  
To make the above idea clear, he cited the decision of the High Court of 
Singapore in Lamb/as (Importers and Exporters) Co Pte Ltd v. Hong Kong 
and Shanghai Banking Corpn^. In this case, he defendant bank rejected 
documents tendered under a letter of credit which included a quality and 
weight inspection certificate required to be countersigned by a named 
individual. The court held that the certificate contained discrepancies which 
entitled the bank to refuse the documents tendered and went on to find that 
the inspection certificate was in any event a nullity by the following words: 
"1 Ibid. 
« Ibid. 
« Ibid, 1992-1993. 
•''• Lamb/as (Importers and Exporters) Co Pte Ltd K Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank/ng Corp 
[1993] 2 SLR 751. 
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"The law cannot condone actions which, although not 
amounting to fraud per se, are of such recklessness 
and haste that the documents produced as a result 
are clearly not in conformity with the requirements 
of the credit. The plaintiffs in the present case 
are not guilty of fraud, but they were unknowingly 
responsible for having aided in the perpetration of 
the fraud. In such a case where the fraud was 
discovered even before all other documents were 
tendered, I think it is right and proper that the 
plaintiffs should not be permitted to claim under 
the letter of credit."" 
While the Singapore High Court's decision argued against a rejection of the 
nullity exception, Potter LJ's took a narrow view of it: 
"While such a finding was not necessary to the outcome 
of the case, it fell within the reservation of Lord 
Diplock in the United City Merchants case and has 
certain attractions. However, it is not necessary 
for us to decide in this case whether it is correct. 
This is a case where the judge found neither 
recklessness, haste, nor blame in the conduct of GK. 
Furthermore, in the Lambias case the bank rejected 
the documents as non-compliant, whereas in this case 
SCB accepted the documents as compliant, having 
raised Montrod's observations and reservations with 
Fibi before it did so. Fibi in turn accepted the 
documents when sent to them, making clear to Montrod 
that payment would be made unless a court order to 
prevent it were obtained." 
4. Arguments for Applying the Nullity Exception 
Although Montrod rejected an application of the nullity exception. The 
"5 Ibid. 765-766. 
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decision was not approved by some commentators''^ The mandate of banks 
under a letter of credit became a complex issue and was discussed in many 
articles. 
4.1. The mandate of the bank to the applicant 
A strong dissent arose from the bank' position as agent of the applicant. It 
was argued that besides the title of receiving reimbursement from the 
applicant, the bank must also act within the mandate to the applicant. And no 
applicant would authorize a bank to accept and pay out on tendered 
documents that, to the bank's knowledge, involve nullity, because the 
applicant will ultimately be obliged to reimburse the bank and therefore bear 
the loss resulting from acceptance of such documents. Therefore, where the 
bank knows that the documents tendered are fraudulent or a nullity it is 
arguably entitled to, and required to, withhold payment on the basis that to 
accept and pay on such documents would fall outside its mandate from the 
applicant.''^  
However, the thesis argues the above proposition is strongly 
unpersuasive. 
First, according the UCP, banks' obligations under documentary credits may 
"« E.g. L. Chin and Y. Wong, "Autonomy: a Nullity Exception at Last" [2004] M.C.L.Q. 14; 
Neo "A Nullity Exception " [2004] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 46; and Kieran 
Donnelly," Nothing for Nothing: a Nullity Exception in Letters of Credit?" [2008] J.B.L.316; 
etc. 
"^ Kieran Donnelly, [2008] J.B.L.316, 322, supra note 5. 
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be split into two sides. On one hand, the bank owes a duty to the applicant to 
examine the stipulated documents in the credit before payment; on the other 
hand, the bank owes a duty to the beneficiary to pay as long as the 
documents are conforming. In another words, a bank is not only working as 
an agent of the applicant, the bank itself has a connection with the beneficiary. 
Accordingly, a bank's mandate may not be limited to the obligation of an 
agent of the applicant. It is also obliged to perform the obligation of payment 
against conforming documents to the beneficiary, which is one of the core 
mandates of bank under documentary credit system. 
Secondly, it is the bank's mandate to follow the instructions from the 
applicant to examine documents under the credit, however, this mandate only 
requires the bank to examine the face conformity of documents with 
reasonable care. As long as the bank examined the face conformity of the 
documents, the bank had completed its obligation to the applicant. It is 
unreasonable to ask the bank to bear any loss caused by the fraud or nullity 
even it did exist but the bank did not realize the issue. The bank's 
responsibility is only to examine the facially conformity of documents. In fact, 
to the bank, even the application of the fraud rule to refuse the payment is 
"extra-contractual'"*^, lit is . What is more, the underlying contract provides 
alternative actions to the parties to it, in respect of the matters already 
considered. For example, if the beneficiary of a credit is in breach of the sale 
contract, the applicant can sue for damages, it is not necessary to ask to 
"8 See Bolivinter OilS.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 251, 257; 
also see Czarnikow-Rionda, [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 187, 199, supra note 35. 
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bank to refuse the payment to the beneficiary of a credit because the 
beneficiary is in breach of the underlying contract. Actually, it would be 
against the autonomy principle of documentary credits to ask the bank to 
consider the performance of the underlying contract. Accordingly, the bank is 
entitled to pay against facially conforming documents and get reimbursement. 
Banks are not in breach of their mandate to pay against apparently 
conforming documents even the documents is forged or null as long as they 
examined documents strictly complying with the credit. Banks are not liable 
for the damages caused by the forgery or nullity of the documents, and are 
entitled to get the reimbursement from the applicant."*^ 
4.2. Banks' security interests based on documents 
The documents, which are essential for both the documentary credits 
contract and the underlying contract, may also have a close connection with 
the bank. The system of international trade which is financed by documentary 
credits requires banks to look to the applicant for reimbursement after paying 
on the credit. Banks will, therefore, generally seek to strengthen their position 
by taking security from the applicant for protection in case of the applicant is 
unable to pay.5° And documents which are in the control of the bank before 
reimbursement may contain a very important security interest for the bank. A 
''^  The decision of Gian Singh, supra note 34, was based on a similar principle. 
5° Neo "A Nullity Exception" [2004] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 46, 58. 
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forged especially null document may cause a disaster for banks' security 
interests. Choo Han Teck JC held in the case of Beam Technologies v. 
Standard Chartered''^ that a forged document is not a "document" at all and 
is indistinguishable from a "blank piece of paper", which implys that such a 
document is commercially worthless, offering no security.^^ Accordingly, it is 
unreasonable to force a bank to pay against a document, especially a bill of 
lading, which is known to the bank as a piece of paper provided no security 
interests at all. 
Professor Paul Todd, while discussing the decision in Gian Singh, pointed the 
distinction of the nullity issue arose between bank and beneficiary and said: 
"Even though a bank which pays against a document 
which is a nullity should be entitled to 
reimbursement, a bank which is aware, at time of 
presentation, that a document tendered is a nullity, 
thereby according it no security, should be entitled 
to refuse it."^ ^ 
The importance of the banks' security interest was also discussed by Ackner 
LJ in the Court of Appeal in United City Merchants.^ Unlike Lord Diplock in 
the House of Lords, Ackner LJ took the view that the bank was entitled to 
reject the facially conforming documents. He expressed his view of the 
important of the bank's security interests and said: 
51 Beam Technologies, supra note 2; L Y Chin and Y K Wong, [2004] LM.C.L.Q 14, supra 
note 46. 
" Seer R Hooley, "Fraud and Letters of Credit: Is Tinere a Nullity Exception?" [2002] C.L.J 
379, 380; Professor'Pau! Todd, "Non-genuine Shipping Documents and Nullities", supra 
note 6. 
" Professor Paul Todd, "Non-genuine Shipping Documents and Nullities" at 554, supra note 
6. 
5" United City Merchants [l^Sl] Q.B. 208, supra note 24. 
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"Moreover, the bank is prepared to provide finance 
to the exporter because it holds shipping documents 
as collateral security for the advance and, if 
necessary, can take recourse to the buyer as 
instructing customer and the exporter as drawer of 
the bill. The bank invariably asks for the delivery 
of a full set of original bills of lading; otherwise 
a fraudulent shipper would be able to obtain payment 
under the documentary credit on one of them and 
advances from other banks on the security of the other 
originals constituting the set: see Schmitthoff's. 
The Export Trade", 6th ed. (1975), p. 216. It is 
therefore of vital importance to the bank not to take 
up worthless documents."" 
Although the decision of the Court of Appeal was rejected by Lord Diplock in 
the House of Lords, the thesis believes the security interests should not be 
ignored when nullity issue arises in a documentary credit case. In fact, nullity 
was not established in United City Merchants. Ackner LJ himself said during 
the appeal that "a bill of lading on which the date of shipment has been 
forged is not a nullity, since such a forgery would not go to the essence of the 
document, the primary purpose of which is to evidence a contract of 
affreightment and to enable the buyer to remove the goods from the ship."" 
Thus, the decision of Lord Diplock, which rejected the application of the fraud 
rule in this case, could not be seen as an authority rejected the nullity 
exception in documentary credits. Actually, Lord Diplock, when deciding that 
fraud by a third party could not be acknowledged as an established fraud for 
the application of the fraud rule, pointed out a possible different application 
^^  The current edition is Carole Murray, Leo D'Arcy, Barbara Cleave, Giles Dixon and Daren 
Timson-Hunt, "Schmitthoff's Export Trade, The Law and Practice of International Trade", 
(!!'•' edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), p. 221. 
5« United City Merchants [1982] Q.B. 208, 247, supra note 24. 
" Ibid. 
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which is a nullity issue arose between an innocent beneficiary and the bank 
by the following words: 
"I would not wish to be taken as accepting that the 
premise as to forged documents is correct, even where 
the fact that the document is forged deprives it of 
all legal effect and makes it a nullity, and so 
worthless to the confirming bank as security for its 
advances to the buyer. . . . I would prefer to leave 
open the question of the rights of an innocent 
seller/beneficiary against the confinning bank when 
a document presented by him is a nullity because 
unknown to him it was forged by some third party ; 
for that question does not arise in the instant 
case. "^ ^ 
Lord Diplock did not only admit the possibility of applying a nullity exception 
between the bank and innocent beneficiary but also emphasized the 
documents as "the security for its advances to the buyer". It seems that Lord 
Diplock himself saw banks' security interests as the rationale of the 
application of a nullity exception between the bank and beneficiary. In fact, 
banks' security which was emphasised by both Ackner LJ and Griffiths LJ 
during the Court of Appeal, was not rejected by Lord Diplock as an essential 
in documentary credits cases. But Lord Diplock alleged this would not justify 
the confirming bank's refusal to honour the credit in United City Merchants, 
because the realisable value of the goods could not be affected by its having 
been loaded on board one day late.^^ Banks' security interests, inanyway, 
should not be ignored in documentary credits system. It may be considered 
58 United City Merctiants [1983] 1 A.C 168, 188, supra note 15. 
" Ibid, 186. Of course. Lord Diplock also discussed the beneficiary's position as a holder in 
due course. This issue is discussed later in section 4.2.2, this chapter. 
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as a essential defence for banks to reject payment against the beneficiary 
when the document presented is null. Of course, issues regarding to the 
justification of a null document or the materiality of a documents can be 
another difficult problem. 
4.3. The beneficiary's liability by presenting null documents 
This is no doubt that under a letter of credit the bank is only obliged to 
examine the face of the document but actual performance of the underlying 
contracts. Therefore, the bank takes no responsibility by paying against a 
forged or null document as long as the document is in facial conformity. 
However, there must be a difference between the bank's responsibility of 
examining documents and the beneficiary's obligation of presenting 
conforming documents. Under Arts 7(a) and 8(a) of the UCP 600, the bank's 
obligation of payment is against "a complying representation", and Arts 2 
defined the "complying representation" as complying presentation as one that 
is in accordance with the terms and conditions of the credit. Accordingly, UCP 
600 does not say that the beneficiary's obligation of presenting complying 
documents can be satisfied by presenting documents only in facial conformity. 
In fact, the beneficiary, who was also a party of the underlying contract, was 
supposed to have the knowledge of the underlying contract. At least, the 
beneficiary should have a common sense that the document relevant to the 
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underlying contract must not be forged. It is reasonable to rely on the 
beneficiary to check the authenticity of documents before he hands in them to 
the bank. What is more, in single transactions it is arguable that the 
beneficiary is the only party in a position to police the validity of the 
documents produced by third parties and, accordingly, that he should bear 
the burden of any loss associated with presented documents that are a 
nullity.^ " The position of an innocent beneficiary in the illegality exception 
cases was even less clear. CP 189 itself admits that it is not clear from the 
case law whether an illegal contract is always unenforceable by both parties, 
or whether there are circumstances in which only one party will be affected in 
both the statutory illegal and common law illegal cases. '^ In some cases, the 
innocent party had already been prohibited to enforce the contract which was 
tainted by an illegal purpose.^ ^ when comes to the fraud rule, the seller 
beneficiary may not be seem as liable to present a forged document because 
it was not the beneficiary who forged it. However, it will be hard to see why 
the beneficiary should not be liable for the loss of the commercial value of a 
null document. 
In the Court of Appeal in United City Merchants, Stephenson LJ said: 
"Banks trust beneficiaries to present honest 
documents; if beneficiaries go to others (as they 
have to) for the documents they present, it is 
important to all concerned that those documents 
" Kieran Donnelly, [2008] J.B.L316, 338, supra note 5. 
" See CP 189, 3.8 to 3.32. Also see section 2.1.2 in Cliapter 4 of the thesis. 
" For example, see JM Allan (Merchandising) Limited v. Cloke [1963] 2 QB 340, the 
claimant's attempt to recover rent under the agreement failed in despite of his innocence. 
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should accord, not merely with the requirements of 
the credit but with the facts; and if they do not 
because of the intention of anyone concerned with 
them to deceive, I see good reason for the choice 
between two innocent parties putting the loss upon 
the beneficiary, not the bank or its customer."^^ 
Stephenson LJ's above word showed a clear support to the view that the 
beneficiary should be liable to present null documents and further bare the 
damages caused by the null documents. The innocent of the beneficiary may 
not be seen as the reason of transferring the damages to eitherthe bank.^ '* 
Kieran Donnelly also believed "the beneficiary should bear the risk that a 
document presented might be a nullity on the basis that it is the beneficiary 
who has the obligation to present conforming documents which are genuine 
and valid"^^. 
If the above analysis is correct, then it may be concluded that when the nullity 
issue arose between the applicant and beneficiary without the involvement of 
the bank, the applicant may be entitled to prevent the beneficiary from 
demanding by relying on the nullity of the document. However, the situation 
can be different when the nullity issue arose between the applicant and bank. 
The contractual relationship between the applicant and beneficiary, is 
different to which between the applicant and bank similarly in the application 
of the fraud rule.^^ 
" United City Merchants [1982] Q.B. 208, 234, supra note 24. 
" However, Lord Diplock may disagree to Stephenson U because he believed that the 
innocent beneficiary should be in the same position as a holder in due course. [1983] 1 AC 
168, 187 to 188. See section 4.2 of this chapter for further discussion. 
"Kieran Donnelly, [2008] J.B.L.316, 338, supra note 5. 
^^  See different decision between Ttiemefielp Ltd. v. WestW^^^I QB 84 and Consolidated 
OiiLtd V. American Express Banl< Ltd [2002] CLC 488. 
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After the discussion of the arguments above, the thesis argues an application 
of the nullity exception is quite reasonable according to banks' security 
interests and the beneficiary's obligation regarding to documents. However, 
English Courts seems not being attracted by the new exception according to 
the decision in Montrod. Therefore, it may be necessary to analyse English 
authorities relevant to the application of the nullity exception. 
5. An Analysis to English Authorities related to the Nullity 
Exception 
Although Montmd^as the first case which clearly considered and discussed 
the possible application of the nullity exception as a separate exception in 
documentary credits in England and Wales, nullity is not a totally fresh issue 
in English law; it was mentioned and discussed in many cases during the 
application of the fraud rule.^ ? 
5.1 . The decision in Gian Singh 
Similarly to the fraud rule and illegality exception, the most serious obstacle 
" E.g. see Gian Singii& Co. Ltd. v. BanquedeL'Indociiine[191A'\ 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1; United 
City l^ercfiants Ltd. and Giass Fibres and Equipments Ltd. v. Royai Bank of Canada [19^2] 
1 A.C. 168(HL). 
262 
Lu Lu: The Exceptions in Documentary Credits in English Law, 
for the application of a nullity exception is the autonomy principle in 
documentary credits. The autonomy principle leads a separation between the 
bank's letter of credit contract with applicant or beneficiary and the underlying 
contract. Accordingly , a bank is entitled to pay a beneficiary and to get the 
reimbursement from the applicant as long as a facially complying document 
is presented.«8 The autonomy principle requires the parties to a documentary 
credit to assume that the bank will neither wish nor be able to concern itself 
with disputes under the underlying transaction, and that the seller's assured 
right to payment should be independent of such disputes.^^ An earlier 
approach in nullity issues in documentary credits was showed by the case of 
Gian Singh & Co. Ltd. v. Banque de /'/ndoch/ne.''° 
In that case, it was proved that the signature in a document was a forgery, 
and accordingly the document, which was a certificate, was also a forgery. In 
other words, the certificate was null. However, the decision of both the Court 
of Appeal and the House of Lords were both in favour of the bank because 
the forged signature was made in personal capacity and the certificate 
therefore complied with the term of the credit. Although the nullity exception 
was not discussed in this case, G/an Singh is an early case which implied 
English court's approach inthe apply ofa nullity exception in documentary 
8^ UCP 600 - Article 7 a. "Issuing Bank [ujndertaking a. Provided that the stipulated 
documents are presented to the nominated bank or to the issuing bank and that they 
constitute a complying presentation, the issuing bank must honour.."; c. "An issuing bank 
undertakes to reimburse a nominated bank that has honoured or negotiated a complying 
presentation and forwarded the documents to the issuing bank..." 
^' Professor Paul Todd, "Non-genuine Shipping Documents and Nullities" at 554, supra note 
6. 
0^ [1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1. 
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credits. A certificate which contained a forged signature was a clearly null 
document. Nevertheless, the nullity did not prevent the bank from getting a 
reimbursement from his client. 
However, It can only be concluded from Gian Singh that there is no nullity 
exception exits as between the issuing bank and the applicant for the credit, 
and presumably the same principle would operate as between the banks.^ ^ 
The essential view in the judgment was that the duty of the bank "is to 
examine documents with reasonable care to ascertain that they appear on 
their face to be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the credit", 
and "the bank is under no duty to take any further steps to investigate the 
genuineness of a signature which, on the face of it, purports to be the 
signature of the person named or described in the letter of credit."^^ 
Therefore, the bank is entitled to get reimbursement from the applicant as 
long as the documents was conforming on the face even if it was clearly a 
null document. But there is no discussion in whether a null document will 
entitle the bank to refuse to pay against the beneficiary. Therefore, Gian 
Singii should not be seen an an authority which was contrasted to the 
application of Singapore court. 
^^  Professor Paul Todd, "Non-genuine Shipping Documents and Nullities" at 555, supra note 
6. 
" Gian Singh [1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1, 11 , supra note 34. 
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5.2. The Judgement In United City Merchant 
5.2. t. "Matching duties" 
In the case of United City IWerciianP, Lord Diplock though rejected the 
application of the fraud rule kept neutral in discussing the possible nullity 
issue arose between an innocent beneficiary and the bank by saying: 
"...I would prefer to leave open the question of the 
rights of an innocent seller/beneficiary against the 
confirming bank when a document presented by him is 
a nullity because unknown to him it was forged by 
some third party; for that question does not arise 
in the instant case..."''* 
Lord Diplock did not reject the possibility of having a nullity exception 
between the bank and the beneficiary. But his later analysis in bank's 
discretion of accepting forged thedocument seems implied that he is not in 
favor of considering the difference between the duty of the bank to the 
applicant and what to the beneficiary. He said: 
"It would be strange from the commercial point of 
view, although not theoretically impossible in law, 
if the contractual duty owed by confirming and 
issuing banks to the buyer to honour the credit on 
presentation of apparently conforming documents 
despite the fact that they contain inaccuracies or 
even are forged, were not matched by a corresponding 
contractual liability of the confirming bank to the 
seller/beneficiary (in the absence, of course, of 
any fraud on his part) to pay the sum stipulated in 
the credit upon presentation of apparently 
" United City Merchants [1983] 1 A.C 168, supra note 15. 
^^  Ibid, 188. 
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confirming documents ."" 
If Lord Diplock was right in the above words that the contractual relationship 
between the bank and the applicant is equ to the what between the bank and 
the beneficiary, then it would be no reason why the nullity exception which 
does not exit between the bank and applicant should exit between the bank 
and the beneficiary. However, it seems quite clear that the two relationships 
can not be the same. On one hand, banks' payment obligation of paying 
against conforming documents to the beneficiary does not equal to bank's 
responsibility of not paying against document which are facially 
nonconforming. On the other hand, bank's payment obligation against 
conforming documents is even more different to bank's title of get the 
reimbursement from the applicant as long as he is payment against 
apparently conforming documents.''^ 
It is true that the bank is entitled to pay against facially conforming documents, 
and receive reimbursement when the document appears on its face to 
conform, but it goes too far to say that the bank is obliged to make payment 
against non-conforming documents." In fact, the distinction between "the 
contractual duty assumed by the bank under the letter of credit and the 
availability to a beneficiary of a remedy for breach of that duty" has already 
" Ibid.184-185. 
'6 For detailed discussion of the relationships among the bank, applicant and beneficiary, 
see Chapter 1, section 2.1 to 2.3. 
" Hooley [2002] CLJ 379, 280, supra note 52; see also Roy Goode and Ewan McKendrick, 
"Commercial Law", (4* edn. Penguin, 2009), p. 1008-1009, for detailed discussion see 
section 2.2 of this chapter. 
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been discussed in the case of Mahonia'^. Also banks' discretion to refuse to 
pay, and to take the risk of being sued by the beneficiary had already been 
analysed during the discussion of the new approaches in applying the 
fraud/^ Therefore, there is no reason why there could not be a different 
application of the nullity exception between the bank and the beneficiaryother 
than between the applicant and the bank. As between the bank and the 
beneficiary, the bank is free to choose to reject the null document by relying 
on its security interests. Of course, similar to the application of the fraud rule 
or illegality exception, the bank should be ready to take the risk for being 
sued by the beneficiary for a wrongful dishonour. 
5.2.2. "Holder in due course" 
One of the main arguments for an application of the nullity exception during 
the early discussion was that the beneficiary should bear the risk by 
presenting a nullity because it is the beneficiary's obligation to present 
conforming documents which are genuine and valid.^° However, Lord 
Diplock's view that an innocent beneficiary may be seen in the same position 
as the holder in due course may be a big challenge for the above argument. 
"This is certainly not so under the Uniform 
Commercial Code as against a person who has taken 
•a draft drawn under the credit in circumstances that 
8^ MahoniaLtdv. JPMorgan Chase Bank {Ho.1) [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep 911 , 922. See Chapter 
4, section 4.3. 
^' See Balfour Beatty Civil Engineering v. Technical & General Guarantee Co Ltd{\'^'^^) 68 
Con LR 180, cited with approval in Safa Ltd v. Banque du Caire [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 600. 
For a detailed discussion in the necessity of banl<s' l<nowledge see Chapter 3, section 3.2 
and Chapter 4, section 5.3.1. 
^° See section 2.3 of this chapter. 
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would make him a holder in due course, and I see no 
reason why, and there is nothing in the Uniform 
Commercial Code to suggest that, a 
seller/beneficiary who is ignorant of the forgery 
should be in any worse position because he has not 
negotiated the draft before presentation. "^^ 
Lord Diplock alleged that an innocent seller/beneficiary who was ignorant of 
the forgery was in the same position of a holder in due course. But the thesis 
does not think this view is so convictive. How could bea seller of a contract, 
who actually had duties of doing a genuine performance to the buyer and 
providing security to the bank, under the same protection as a holder in due 
course who has nothing to do with the performance of the contract? The idea 
of the seller should not be seen as the holder in due course was also 
supported by Professor Roy Goode, who expressed in his Article "Reflections 
on Letters of Credit -1''^^ as follows: 
"Is a plaintiff who seeks to enforce a letter of 
credit affected by forgery of the documents or other 
fraud in the transaction if he himself acted in good 
faith? There is a remarkable dearth of authority on 
this question. Let us start with the beneficiary. 
He himself has a duty to tender documents which are 
in order, and the fact that he acted in good faith 
in tendering forged documents is thus irrelevant. 
This fundamental point appears to have been 
overlooked by Mocatta J in the [United City Merchants 
case"] when he held that the beneficiary was entitled 
to collect payment despite the insertion of a 
fraudulent shipping date on the bill of lading, since 
the fraud had been committed by the loading broker 
who was the agent of the carrier, not of the 
" United City Merchants [l^S^] 1 A.C 158,187 to 188, supra note 15. 
" Professor Roy Goode, "Reflections on Letters of Credit - I", [1980] JBL 291, 294. This was 
also mentioned by Stephenson LJ during the Court of Appeal in United Cit/ Merchants 
[1982] Q.B. 208, 238. 
" [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep 267. 
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seller/beneficiary. But this, with respect, is not 
to the point. The beneficiary under a credit is not 
like a holder in due course of a bill of exchange; 
he is only entitled to be paid if the documents are 
in order. A fraudulently completed bill of lading 
does not become a conforming document merely because 
the fraud is that of a third party." 
Professor Roy Goode's words clearly expressed the view that the 
seller/beneficiary's position in documentary credits might not be seen as that 
of a holder in due course. The duty of tendering documents "in order" keeps 
the seller out of the position of holder in due course and makes the view that 
the beneficiary should bear the risk of a nullity document fair enough. 
Therefore, in the thesis. United City /\4e/vi>ant may not be seen as a clear 
authority which successfully in rejecting the nullity exception. 
5.3. Discussion of the decision of Montrod 
As the most important case for the nullity exception in English law. The 
l\4ontfvd case gave rise to many arguments. The decision rejecting a nullity 
exception in documentary credits was not approved by some 
commentators.^" Nevertheless, i\4ontrod may not be seen as authority of a 
total rejection of a nullity exception. 
According to the decision of l\/fontrod, although the bank's obligation should 
8" L Y Chin and Y K Wong, [2004] L.M.C.L.Q 14, supra note 46; Neo "A Nullity exception", 
supra note 50, and Kieran Donnelly, [2008] J.B.L316, 338, supra note 5; etc. See section 
2 of this chapter for the discussion of arguments for applying the nullity exception. 
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not be affected by a pure nullity exception, there may be other situations 
where applying a nullity exception may be reasonable. This view was implied 
in the case of Montmdby a comparison between Montrodax\6 the Singapore 
case Lambias'^. 
"Furthermore, in the Lambias case the bank rejected 
the documents as non-compliant, whereas in this case 
SCB accepted the documents as compliant, having 
raised Montrod's observations and reservations with 
Fibi before it did so. Fibi in turn accepted the 
documents when sent to them, making clear to Montrod 
that payment would be made unless a court order to 
prevent it were obtained."" 
Here, although Potter LJ did not clearly say that there would be a possible 
nullity exception if the bank decided to reject the document, it was admitted 
that bank's choice might affect decisions in cases. It is well known that the 
bank is an intermediate party in the documentary credits system. On one 
hand, the bank works for his client, who is normally the applicant of a credit. 
The bank has to take reasonable care to examine documents stipulated in 
the credit, and does not make a payment until the facially conforming 
documents are handed in. On the other hand, the bank also works for the 
beneficiary of the credit. The bank has an obligation to pay the beneficiary as 
long as the beneficiary presents conforming documents. Therefore, the bank 
almost stays in the middle of the line between the applicant and the 
beneficiary. This position may also create a dilemma for the bank. There may 
be, on one side, the applicant is claiming that the document was not actually 
^^  Lambias v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp [1993] 2 SLR 751, see supra note 44. 
86 Montrod, [2001] EWCA Civ 1954, 1993, supra note 1. 
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conforming; but one the other side, the beneficiary is insisting on the payment. 
The dilemma of the bank is not only a hazard for the bank, but may also stop 
the smooth process of documentary credits system. Thus, both the UCP and 
English courts provided a comparative protection to the bank. The UCP only 
requires the bank to pay upon taking reasonable care during the examination 
of documents. And the criterion for a conforming document becomes 
comparatively easier to achieve for the bank, given that only facial conformity 
is required. English courts' approach of protecting the bank was clearly 
shown in Gian Singh & Co. Ltd. v. Banque de I'lndochine.^'' This is also the 
main view that the decision of Montrod^as based on. 
A limitation of banks' obligation under documentary credits does not only help 
the bank to avoid a dilemma, but also upholds the ordinary operation of the 
documentary credits system. It may also be seen as an embodiment of the 
autonomy principle of documentary credits. The bank keeps a connection 
with both the beneficiary and the applicant according to the credit, but is not 
involving in the underlying contract between the beneficiary and the applicant. 
In United City il/ferciiants, it was clear that documentary credits are 
contractually based^e. Therefore, all the parties' obligations should be subject 
to the contracts which were involved. If the action is between a bank and an 
applicant of the credit, the bank's obligation is to exam the face conforming of 
^^  See G/an Singh, supra note 34, also see early discussion in section 3.2. 
88 United City Merchants [19Q3] 1 A.C 168,182-183, supra note 15. The contract between 
confirming bank and beneficiary must be unilateral, since (typically at least) no undertaking 
is entered into by the beneficiary. 
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the documents, the applicant is obliged to pay the reimbursement to the bank 
as long as the bank fulfilled its obligation;^^ conversely, if the action is 
between a bank and a beneficiary, although the bank should pay against 
conforming documents under the contract between the bank and the 
beneficiary, ignoring the underlying contract between the applicant and 
beneficiary, the bank may be entitled to reject the documents because of its 
security interests.^" Nevertheless, the nullity exception applying between the 
bank and beneficiary will not prevent the bank from getting a reimbursement 
from the applicant. In other words. The nullity exception applying restrictively 
between the bank and beneficiary will not alter the bank's obligation in 
documentary credits. This view was also expressed by Professor Paul Todd 
in his articles :^ 
"As between bank and beneficiary, it can be argued 
that, even though a bank which pays against a document 
which is a nullity should be entitled to 
reimbursement, a bank which is aware, at time of 
presentation, that a document tendered is a nullity, 
thereby according it no security, should be entitled 
to refuse it." 
After the above analysis, it may be concluded that Potter LJ's decision of 
rejecting the nullity exception is only applied between the applicant and the 
bank. The reason why Potter LJ rejected the nullity exception was mostly 
based on the limited liability of the bank. He expressed that "neither as a 
^^  The situation will be similar on the contract between the banks if there is more than one 
bank (as of course there will always be with a confirmed credit), See Professor Paul Todd, 
"Non-genuine Shipping Documents and Nullities" at 554, supra note 6. 
'° For the issue of bank's security interest, see section 2.2. 
^^  See Professor Paul Todd, "Non-genuine Shipping Documents and Nullities" at 556, supra 
note 6. 
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matter of general principle, nor under UCP 500, is an issuing bank obliged to 
question or investigate the genuineness of documents which appear on their 
face to be documents the nature and content of which comply with the 
requirements of the credit"^^ and "the bank assumes no liability or 
responsibility for the genuineness or legal effect of any such document."^^ 
Accordingly, it would be wrong to place the loss caused by the nullity on the 
bank. However, he did not reject the possibility of a nullity exception if the 
bank decided to reject the documents as a nullity because of its security 
interests. In other words, the security interests may give the bank a 
powerful defence against the beneficiary who presents a null document. To 
express it more clearly, A banic is entitled to reject to pay the beneficiary 
against a null document as long as the bank has realized the nullity 
before the payment. However, a buyer is not entitled to reject the 
reimbursement to the bank on the basis of a nullity as long as the document 
was conforming on its face to the credit. Generally, the establishment of a 
nullity exception in the above situation is on the basis of the beneficiary's 
obligation to provide the security interests to the bank by presenting 
stipulated documents in the credit. 
Following to Potter LJ's view of the bank should not be liable for the damages 
caused by a null document, there would be either the beneficiary or the buyer 
to suffer the loss. Actually, the below analysis of Potter U's in Montrod\Nas 
52 Montrod, [2001] EWCA Civ 1954, 1993, supra note 1. 
" Ibid. 
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even more attractive. 
Potter LJ implied in his judgment though he literally rejected a nullity 
exception that "in an individual case, the conduct of a beneficiary in 
connection with the creation and/or presentation of a document forged by a 
third party might, though itself not amounting to fraud, be of such character as 
not to deserve the protection available to a holder in due course."^" And to 
explain the connection, he cited the decision of the High Court of Singapore 
in Lambia^^, in which the bank was entitled to reject a certificate which 
contained discrepancies because the inspection certificate was in any event 
a nullity and the nullity was a kind of cause by the fraudulent countersignatory 
who was introduced to the bank by the beneficiary. This explanation of the 
"connection" led to many possibilities. One of them, for example, is a 
circumstance where under a GIF contract, in which the responsibility of 
arranging the transport is on the side of the seller, the carrier who was 
choose by the seller fraudulently made the bill of lading and the seller had no 
knowledge of the fraud. Does the seller have an enough close connection 
with the fraud in such a case? The author would think so according to the 
decision of Lambias. If the fact the seller introduced the fraudulent party to 
the bank was qualified for the "connection", an arrangement of the transport 
by hiring a fraudulent carrier should be in no doubt qualified for the 
"connection". In other words, the connection is easy to be established as long 
s-* Ibid, 1992 to 1993. 
« Z.5/77Z7/a5 [1993] 2 SLR 751, supra note 44. 
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as the seller has a relationship with the fraudulent party. 
If the above analysis of the "connection" was right, another possibility of 
applying a nullity exception may be seen as implied by Potter LJ Because a 
beneficiary is not in the position of holder in due course, the buyer/applicant 
of the credit may also have a defence against the beneficiary to demand 
thepayment as long as the applicant is able to prove the allocation of the risk 
should be on the beneficiary when there is an established nullity in the 
documents. Of course, the issue has to be raised before the enforcement of 
the letter of credit arose as between the beneficiary and the bank. In the case 
Qi^Themehelp Ltd. v. WesP^,' which was a fraud case, it was held by the Court 
of Appeal that although a performance guarantee was an autonomous 
contract not to be interfered with on grounds extraneous to the guarantee 
itself, where fraud was raised between the parties to the main transaction 
before any question of enforcement of the guarantee arose as between 
beneficiary and guarantor, to grant an injunction restraining the beneficiary's 
rights of enforcement did not amount to a threat to the integrity of the 
performance guarantee; and that,accordingly, the judge had jurisdiction to 
entertain the application for an injunction. And the standard of proof of the 
fraud in that circumstance was also reduced from a clearly established fraud 
to a seriously arguable case of fraud. The test applied by the court for 
granting an interlocutory injunction in Themehelp is believed as an 
5^  Themehelp Ltd V. W^e5-/^ [1996] Q.B. 84. 
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application of the general rule for injunctions.^^ 
The decision of Themehelp Ltd., in accession to the allocation of risk defence 
of the buyer to the beneficiary nnay be strong enough to lead to another 
possible application of the nullity exception, which Is when there Is a nullity 
in the documents and the nullity was raised before the enforcement of 
the letter of credit arose as between the beneficiary and the bank, the 
buyer Is entitled to prevent the beneficiary from demanding the 
payment as long as he can prove the beneficiary have a closer 
connection to the nullity than the buyer. However, it does not follow that 
the applicant can ask an interlocutory injunction to prevent the bank from 
payment by claiming on the nullity exception. Where an injunction is sought 
by the applicant to prevent payment, he will succeed if he can show, not only 
that the bank would be acting in breach of its mandate by making payment, 
but also that an interlocutory injunction is an appropriate remedy.^ ^ 
6, The Exceptions and Documentary Credits 
According to the discussion and authorities, the thesis may get a conclusion 
that although the nullity exception was not established clearly by any of 
English cases, the nullity exception was not totally rejected in English law. It 
" See Section 2.2.2, Chapter 3 of the thesis. The application of the injunction rule in 
Themehelp was before the stage in which the autonomy of the performance guarantee 
involved in. 
'8 See Professor Paul Todd, "Non-genuine Shipping Documents and Nullities" at 556, supra 
note 6. 
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is still reasonable to have a nullity exception in documentary credits in certain 
circumstances. The decision of the case of Montrod is very conductive to the 
development the nullity exception in English law. The present main hazard to 
apply a nullity exception was similar to the application of the fraud rule and 
the illegality exception that exceptions may destroy the autonomy of 
documentary credits; especially baffle the bank's performance of payment 
under the credit. 
However, all the exceptions were established based on the assumption of the 
reasonable defence. While the fraud rule and the illegality exception shared 
the same the doctrine of ex turpi causa, the nullity exception, when applying 
between the bank and beneficiary , was based on the bank's defence of its 
security interests. A nullity exception may also be applied between the 
applicant and beneficiary before the enforcement of the letter of credit arose 
as between the beneficiary and the bank, in this circumstance, the buyer's 
cause of action is that the beneficiary is in breach of his mandate as 
presenting null documents and according should bear the loss caused by the 
nullity. 
Clearly, all three exceptions are applied without in contradiction to banks' 
autonomous obligation in letters of credit or performance guarantee. Both the 
fraud rule and the illegality exception may not be applied if the fraud or 
illegality was not to banks' knowledge at the time of payment. Banks are 
entitled to get reimbursements from the applicant by paying against facially 
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conforming documents or requests. The nullity exception is applied even 
more narrowly. It can only be applied between the bank and beneficiary when 
the bank chose to reject documents by relying on its security interests or 
between the applicant and beneficiary before the enforcement of the letter of 
credit or performance guarantee arose as between the beneficiary and the 
bank. Banks have not obligation to the applicant to check the value of 
documents, accordingly, the applicant has no cause of action to prevent the 
bank to pay against nullity documents even the nullity has been noticed by 
the bank. 
A narrow but efficient application of the exceptions subject to banks' 
autonomous responsibility in documentary credits system is very essential for 
documentary credits as a main means of payment in international trade. A 
clear application of certain exceptions can provide both the applicant and 
bank effective and conventional remedies to solve the problems caused the 
separation of the credit and underlying contracts in documentary credits 
without contradicting to the autonomy principle. The effective application of 
certain exceptions in documentary credits may also be effective in avoiding 
the abuse of strict compliance principles during banking practice. The high 
rate of rejection of documents by relying on the strict compliance principle in 
practice had already serious impacted the market share of documentary 
credits as a recognized means of payment in international trade.^^ By relying 
^' See Chapter 1, section 4. 
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on those exceptions, banks are not necessary to rely on the strict compliance 
principle to avoid payments when certain issues, such like fraud, were 
noticed before the payment. As the necessary exceptions are applied 
efficiently, the disputes existing in documentary credits system currently may 
be settled without the appliance of any explanatory rules. Consequently, the 
documentary credits system will be able to develop while maintaining its 
featured advantage of autonomy as a main payment means in international 
trade transactions. 
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Summary: 
Although the nullity exception has not been applied clearly by English law as 
an independent exception, alike the fraud rule and illegality exception, in 
documentary credits, the research in this chapter provides a strong support to 
the application of the nullity exception. Unlike most commentators who 
propose a general application of the nullity exception, the thesis argues the 
application of the nullity exception will be restricted between either the bank 
and beneficiary or the applicant and beneficiary. The nullity exception should 
not be applied between the bank and applicant to tolerate the ordinary 
operation of documentary credits. More importantly, the analysis of the case 
of M?/7/'/Ddy provides an essential support for a prospective application of the 
nullity exception. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis mainly aims to explore an appropriate and efficient way to apply 
certain necessary exceptions in documentary credits system: 
• The autonomy principle is the essence of documentary credits system. 
The separation between the documents and underlying contract requires 
banks to make the decision of whether paying solely based on the facially 
complying of the documents. Accordingly, the strict compliance doctrine 
becomes the best way for the bank to avoid payment especially when a 
bank suspect a fraud but cannot prove it. The difficulty in the application 
of the fraud exception may be one of the reasons of the high rate of 
rejection of documents by the strict compliance. The high rate of rejection 
of documents by relying on the strict compliance principle in practice has 
serious implications for maintaining or increasing its market share as a 
recognized means of settlement in international trade. The new 
phenomenon of the applying of additional warranty to restrict the 
beneficiary's title in achieving payment shows the problems caused by 
the inefficiency of the application of the fraud exception. The serious 
drawbacks within documentary credits system revealed by the research 
further pointed out the necessity of a research in the exceptions in 
documentary credits. (Chapter 1) 
• The research of the early application of the fraud rule in both English law 
and American law reflects the difficulty in applying the exception in 
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practice. A comparison of the standard of proof in applying the fraud rule 
between English law and American law shows, both English courts and 
American courts are reluctant to disturb the autonomous operation of 
documentary credits because of the strong position of the autonomy 
principle in documentary credits. In this circumstance, banks prefer to 
choose a comparatively easy way by relying on the principle of strict 
compliance to reject payment to avoid the high standard of proof for the 
application of the fraud rule. The importance of improving the efficiency of 
the fraud rule in documentary credits has been reflected during the 
analysis.(Chapter 2) 
• The different application of the fraud rule appeared in the 1990s may also 
be seen as exceptions within the context of the fraud exception. Despite 
the difference of the causes of action and involved parties among those 
exceptions, all of them were applied under a certain stage by English 
courts, the pre-trial stage. Generally, the different approach is an 
application of a lower standard of proof in applying the fraud rule at the 
pre-trial stage. The reasonability and application pattern of the different 
approaches have both been concluded through the analysis of the case 
law. More importantly, the special rule for granting an interlocutory 
injunctions in fraud documentary credits case has been worked out 
during the research.(Chapter 3) 
• The application of the illegality exception is an essential achievement in 
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the development of documentary credits system. The illegality exception, 
similar to the fraud rule, provides a safer and stable environment for the 
documentary credits practice. The same basis of the principle oVex turpi 
causa" between the fraud rule and illegality exception clearly shows the 
reasonability and necessity of applying the illegality exception. The 
research of the detailed application of the illegality exception does not 
only useful in explaining the illegality exception as a new exception in 
documentary credits system, it also benefits the understanding of the 
fraud exception, and especially the new approaches emerged during 
1990s. (Chapter 4) 
• Although the nullity exception has not been applied clearly by English law 
as an independent exception, unlike the fraud rule and illegality exception, 
in documentary credits, the research in this chapter provides a strong 
support to the application of the nullity exception. Unlike most 
commentators who propose a general application of the nullity exception, 
the thesis argues the nullity exception should be applied narrowly in 
certain circumstances and between certain parties. Although most 
commentators criticized the decision in the case of Montrod Ltd v. 
Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs GmbH^ which rejected the nullity exception 
in English law, the thesis argues that the analysis of the case of l\^ontrod 
during the judgment provides an essential support for a prospective 
1 Montrod, [2001] EWCA Civ 1954, supra note 1. 
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application of the nullity exception. In the end the thesis, some common 
features among the application of the three exceptions are summarized. 
A prospective development of the documentary credits system has also 
been suggested in the last chapter.(Chapter 5) 
• In summary, all three exceptions were established based on the 
assumption of the reasonable defence. While the fraud rule and the 
illegality exception shared the same the doctrine of ex turpi causa, the 
nullity exception, when applying between the bank and beneficiary , was 
based on the bank's defence of its security interests. All the exceptions 
are applied without in contradiction to banks' autonomous obligation in 
letters of credit or performance guarantee. Both the fraud rule and the 
illegality exception may not be applied if the fraud or illegality was not to 
banks' knowledge at the time of payment. The nullity exception is applied 
even more narrowly. It can only be applied between the bank and 
beneficiary when the bank chose to reject documents by relying on its 
security interests or between the applicant and beneficiary before the 
enforcement of the letter of credit or performance guarantee arose as 
between the beneficiary and the bank. The thesis considers that a narrow 
but efficient application of the exceptions subject to banks' autonomous 
responsibility in documentary credits system will relieve the current 
disputes existing in documentary credits system. 
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